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Abstract 
This thesis reports a number of empirical studies exploring the development of 
expertise in computer programming. Experiments 1 and 2 are concerned with 
the way in which the possession of design experience can influence the 
perception and use of cues to various program structures. Experiment 3 
examines how violations to standard conventions for constructing programs can 
affect the comprehension of expert, intermediate and novice subjects. 
Experiment 4 looks at the differences in strategy that are exhibited by subjects of 
varying skill level when constructing programs in different languages. 
Experiment 5 takes these ideas further to examine the temporal distribution of 
different forms of strategy during a program generation task. Experiment 6 
provides evidence for salient cognitive structures derived from reaction time and 
error data in the context of a recognition task. Experiments 7 and 8 are 
concerned with the role of working memory in program generation and suggest 
that one aspect of expertise in the programming domain involves the acquisition 
of strategies for utilising display-based information. The final chapter attempts 
to bring these experimental findings together in terms of a model of knowledge 
organisation that stresses the importance of knowledge restructuring processes 
in the development of expertise. This is contrasted with existing models which 
have tended to place emphasis upon schemata acquisition and generalisation as 
the fundamental modes of learning associated with skill development. The work 
reported here suggests that a fine-grained restructuring of individual schemata 
takes places during the later stages of skill development. It is argued that those 
mechanisms currently thought to be associated with the development of 
expertise may not fully account for the strategic changes and the types of error 
typically found in the transition between novice, intermediate and expert 
problem solvers. This work has a number of implications for existing theories 
of skill acquisition. In particular, it questions the ability of such theories to 
account for subtle changes in the various manifestations of skilled performance 
that are associated with increasing expertise. Secondly, the work reported in this 
thesis attempts to show how specific forms of training might give rise to the 
knowledge restructuring process that is proposed. Finally, the thesis stresses the 
important role of display-based problem solving in complex tasks such as 
programming and highlights the role of programming language notation as a 
mediating factor in the development and acquisition of problem solving 
strategies. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction and overview 
The work reported in this thesis represents an attempt to understand the 
problem-solving processes involved in programming. My original motivation for 
studying programming arose from rather practical considerations i.e., how we 
might best design tools to support the problem-solving activities that are typically 
involved in programming tasks. However, in order to do this one needs to 
understand the nature of these problem-solving activities. Moreover, it rapidly 
became clear that existing theories of problem-solving do not provide an adequate 
account of the kinds of problem-solving behaviour that have been observed in 
programming. Hence, the original emphasis of this research moved away from the 
design of tools towards a more empirically motivated mode of research from 
which I attempted to gain some theoretical insight into the complexities of 
problem-solving in this domain. 
Alan Newell (1973) once claimed that cognitive psychology tends to be 
phenomenon-driven, in that the discovery of a new phenomenon (for instance, the 
visual icon) leads to an exhaustive exploration of all its possible ramifications by 
cognitive psychologists. To some extent we could also claim that cognitive 
psychology and cognitive science are not only phenomena driven but also artifact 
driven. The widespread and continuing use of high-level programming languages 
has spawned a significant amount of research into the problem-solving processes 
involved in the creation and the comprehension of complex software artifacts. 
Much of the early research into the cognitive aspects of programming served 
simply to suggest that established theories developed in other problem-solving 
domains could be usefully applied to understand programming behaviour. 
However, more recently, research into programming behaviour has begun to 
contribute more explicitly to the general body of problem-solving theory, and has 
suggested modifications and important extensions to paradigmatic 
problem-solving analyses. 
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In trying to understand programming tasks it should be possible to frame an 
analysis in terms of existing generic models of problem-solving such as those 
proposed by Newell and Simon or by Anderson (described in the next chapter). 
These models are, after all, intended to be generic models of problem-solving, and 
not just models of problem-solving in specific domains. The work reported in this 
thesis adopts the general problem-solving paradigm proposed by these models. 
However, it is suggested that programming tasks display some characteristics that 
are not well catered for by such models. In the next chapter I will first present a 
brief overview of these generic problem-solving frameworks and their application, 
and then attempt to derive some common characteristics of these frameworks 
which will provide a starting point for assessing their validity as models which 
might be used to account for problem-solving behaviour in programming. 
Preempting this discussion somewhat, I will suggest three major features of 
programming tasks that are not well represented by generic models of 
problem-solving. Firstly, programming places significant demands upon cognitive 
resources and programmers appear to be unable to elaborate an entire sequence of 
problem-solving steps without engaging in a closely linked series of planning and 
execution cycles. It will be suggested that existing models of problem-solving and 
planning do not emphasise sufficiently the close link between planning/operator 
selection and execution. 
Secondly, existing models of human problem-solving typically describe situations 
in which problem-solving operators are applied directly to objects in the world 
(albeit, in many cases, an artificial symbolic world) - for instance, in solving 
puzzles or playing games. However, programming is rather different in that a 
programmer may use any one of a range of programming languages to implement 
a solution to a problem. Moreover, these languages display different kinds of 
characteristics which may or may not support a particular problem-solving 
approach. 
Finally, in considering problem-solving in programming one needs to take 
account of the environment in which programs are typically constructed. For 
instance, compare writing a program using pen and paper with, say, dictating a 
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program (uncommon, but possible) or using a line-editor. Each of these 
environments has different characteristics, and these characteristics may, to a 
greater or lesser extent, support preferred problem-solving strategies. 
A central issue raised by this thesis is that these features of programming tasks are 
not adequately represented by generic problem solving-models. In addition, it 
seems that these models or frameworks generally tend to emphasise aspects of a 
problem-solvers' knowledge representation and the way in which this determines 
strategy and have neglected to consider characteristics of the task or of the 
environment in which the task is undertaken. Studies of problem-solving in 
programming are now beginning to address these issues and have considered in 
some detail the way in which task characteristics, and in particular the notational 
features of languages, can affect problem-solving behaviour. 
The work reported in this thesis attempts to link together findings that have 
emerged from studies of knowledge representation in programming and issues 
stemming from a consideration of the notational properties of programming 
languages. Until now these issues have been addressed in isolation. The central 
concern of this thesis is to provide a broader view and more detailed 
understanding of the problem-solving processes involved in programming. In 
particular, interest is directed towards understanding the way in which knowledge 
representation in programming develops, its relationship with different forms of 
programming strategy and the extent to which these are supported, or otherwise, 
by programming language and task characteristics. 
The following chapter begins by outlining a number of generic theories or 
frameworks which have been advanced as models of human problem-solving. In 
fact, the main emphasis of this section is to provide a broad overview of human 
problem-solving from the perspective of two major theories or frameworks -
namely, Newell and Simon's General Problem Solver (GPS) and Anderson's 
Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT *). There are clearly other frameworks and 
models which might provide an equally cogent account of human 
problem-solving. However, the application of GPS and ACT* has been extensive, 
and these frameworks have proven to be of great predictive value. Moreover, 
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while both frameworks provide a general description of the architecture of 
cognition, they differ substantiality in emphasis, and these differences provide 
important foci for a comparison of these theories. 
The second chapter then moves on to consider more specific issues relating to 
problem-solving in programming. The intention of this section is to consider the 
common characteristics of problem-solving tasks and to illustrate why 
programming should be considered as a problem-solving activity. Subsequently, 
the application of generic problem-solving frameworks is considered in the context 
of programming. An attempt is then made to suggest that there are some important 
characteristics of typical programming tasks that are not well catered for by 
existing problem-solving models. While this chapter is broadly concerned with 
domain independent problem-solving frameworks, subsequent chapters provide a 
review of some of the more important empirical and theoretical work which has 
addressed more directly the problem-solving processes involved in programming. 
Subsequent chapters are organised into three distinct themes - knowledge 
representation, strategy and notational features. The ease with which this emerged 
appears to reflect or belie the narrowness of traditional concerns in the psychology 
of programming. That is to say, very few studies actually attempt to suggest links 
between these different themes. This thesis represents a step in the other direction, 
and will hopefully provide a bridge between these various lacunae. 
The third chapter considers expert-novice differences and knowledge 
representation, and reviews a number of studies originating in the programming 
domain. In the fourth chapter interest is directed toward understanding the nature 
of problem-solving strategies in programming, while chapter five considers the 
way in which programming language features (specifically notational factors) have 
been shown to affect problem-solving strategy. Each of the next six chapters 
reviews a specific experiment carried out to examine a particular hypothesis or a 
small collection of related hypotheses. 
These empirical studies are reported in the order in which they were carried out, 
since initially no overarching model or framework existed which could be used to 
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neatly construe their theoretical development. However, as early studies in this 
series of experiments started to lead to the development of a model of 
problem-solving in programming, the theoretical focus of the work became 
clearer. It seems more appropriate to report the studies in this way rather than 
attempt to reconstruct the early experiments such that they fit with the model. 
While the early experiments in this series were generally exploratory, later studies 
make specific predictions stemming from the model proposed in this thesis. While 
allusion to the model is made in the context of reporting these experiments, the 
model itself is presented in the last chapter which attempts to draw together the 
results of the individual studies to suggest how features of a programmers 
knowledge representation develop and appear to interact with certain salient 
language features to determine particular forms of problem-solving strategy. 
This model suggests a number of significant extensions to existing theories of 
problem-solving behaviour in programming, and in particular it addresses issues 
relating to the development of programming knowledge. The empirical work 
reported in this thesis illustrates how knowledge representation develops and how 
it changes with increasing programming expertise. Concern is directed primarily to 
exploring the adequacy of schema or plan-based theories of programming 
knowledge. The simple model of schema acquisition that is proposed by these 
theories to explain the development of expertise is challenged and a more complex 
model which emphasises knowledge restructuring processes is proposed. 
This model suggests that knowledge representation is not uniform, but that as 
expertise develops certain features of a programmer's knowledge representation 
achieve prominence. For example, it is suggested that those aspects of a particular 
schema that directly encode the role of that schema will be more easily accessible 
than its other components. On this view, programming expertise is not seen to 
develop simply via the acquisition of a greater number and range of schemata, 
although this clearly is an important facet in the development of expertise. Rather, 
the emphasis of the model suggests the importance of knowledge restructuring, 
and empirical evidence for this phenomenon is cited. 
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For instance, in experiment five (reported in chapter 10) involving a program 
recognition task, it is shown that expert programmers respond to the presence of 
focal lines (i.e., those lines that directly encode the role of a particular plan or 
schemata) more quickly than they respond to non-focal lines. In the case of 
intermediates and novices no difference in response times to focal or non-focal 
lines is apparent. In addition, while intermediates and experts can detect plan 
violations with about the same frequency, experts detect such violations 
significantly faster than intermediates. These findings are taken as evidence for 
the idea that while both intermediates and experts are able to access the same range 
of plan structures, experts seem to be able to access the salient parts of these plan 
structures with great ease, perhaps suggesting that more experienced programmers 
structure their knowledge rather differently. 
The mechanisms that give rise to this restructuring processes appear to be 
associated with a programmers design experience. The first experiment reported in 
this thesis suggests that design training may encourage programmers to think 
about problems in a more structured fashion, and may facilitate the construction of 
a mapping between the problem domain and structures in the language domain. It 
remains unclear whether design training and design methodologies simply reflect 
expert cognitive structure, and thereby describe or in some way facilitate naturally 
occurring problem-solving strategies or whether design training actually 
determines or predisposes a particular cognitive structure and set of related 
strategies. 
In addition, the restructuring processes described by this model may suggest 
reasons for the adoption of particular forms of problem-solving strategy. In 
particular it may account for the transition from depth-first to breadth-first 
strategies that have been commonly observed in studies of the development of 
problem-solving expertise. Hence, expert programmers may develop a solution in 
a hierarchical fashion, starting from the implementation of lines of code that 
represent focal plan elements before expanding these to include subsidiary plan 
components. In the case of novices, and possibly intermediates, it is suggested 
that the uniform nature of their representation of plan knowledge does not allow 
for the differentiation of focal and non-focal plan elements and it is shown how 
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this might lead to the adoption of strategies which display depth-first 
characteristics. 
Moreover, it is argued that features of certain programming language notations 
may provide support for the implementation or the comprehension of focal plan 
elements. For instance, languages such as Pascal have been described as 
"role-expressive" in that their rich lexical structure appears to facilitate the 
discriminability of the individual program components that might be expressed in 
that language. This has important implications for the model proposed here since 
we might predict that there will be an interaction between language structure (i.e., 
the extent to which a particular language might be described as "role-expressive") 
and expertise. Hence, we might expect experts to perform better using 
"role-expressive" languages such as Pascal where focal structures will be more 
readily perceived, while the performance of experts and non-experts in plan related 
tasks may not differ significantly in less "role-expressive' languages such as 
BASIC. Indeed, one of the experiments reported later in this thesis supports this 
prediction, and suggests that there is a strong interaction between language 
structure and expertise. 
It will be suggested that the model of knowledge restructuring proposed here 
provides a parsimonious interpretation of a large body of existing empirical studies 
which have addressed problem-solving issues in programming. The model 
suggests ways of integrating previously distinct areas of research and indicates 
how aspects of a programmer's knowledge representation may interact with 
language and task features to determine programming strategy. In addition, the 
model has a number of distinct parallels with work in other domains, and this 
suggests that the model may be generalisable to other knowledge-intensive 
problem-solving tasks. 
In summary, there are a number of identifiable aims relating to the work reported 
in this thesis. Firstly, an attempt is made to explore the cogency of extant 
problem-solving models or frameworks in terms of their application to 
programming. Secondly, the existing psychological work on problem-solving in 
programming is reviewed and evaluated. This review is grouped into three 
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sections- knowledge representation, strategy and language features- in order to 
reflect the thematic concern anci historical development of this work. A number of 
experimental studies are then reported which address some of the shortcomings of 
existing work and provide the basis for a model of programming behaviour which 
attempts to bridge previously isolated areas of research, thus leading to a more 
unified framework for understanding programming behaviour. Finally, an attempt 
is made to relate this model to work in other problem solving domains and to 
illustrate briefly the cognitive mechanisms that might underpin the knowledge 
restructuring processes that are central to the model. 
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Cllmjpter 2. ModleHs of jproblem soHvnng behaviour and! their 
appllicatiollll to pll"'gramming tasks 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a broad, yet necessarily brief, review of two important 
problem-solving frameworks, Newell and Simon's General Problem Solver 
(GPS) and Anderson's ACT*. The primary intention of this chapter is to 
examine the general applicability of these frameworks in terms of their ability to 
account for the complex problem-solving processes that underpin programming 
behaviour. It will be suggested that there are certain salient characteristics of 
programming tasks that are not well catered for by existing models of human 
problem-solving. This discussion provides both a basis for our characterisation 
of programming as a problem-solving activity and a foundation for the work 
reported later in this thesis. 
Newell and Simon's problem and state space analysis of human problem 
solving is first introduced to provide a general background to the discussion 
presented in this chapter. This analysis is of some historical interest, but it 
appears to be of little significance in terms of its contribution to our 
understanding problem solving in the programming domain. This is because the 
focus of this work is upon relatively well-defined domains which involve little 
domain specific knowledge. This can be contrasted with the programming 
domain, where problems are generally ill-defined and where problem-solving 
activities are highly knowledge intensive. Despite the fact that the Newell and 
Simon model does not appear to be strictly relevant to our understanding of 
programming, it does provide the basis for a more general discussion of the 
underlying cognitive processes that appear to be involved in programming 
activities. In addition, this model serves as an important counterpoint to 
alternative models of human problem solving that have been concerned more 
specifically with problem-solving in ill-defined domains and/or with knowledge 
intensive problem-solving processes. 
This chapter then moves on to consider the ACT* model proposed by John 
Anderson. This model appears to provide a more applicable framework for 
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understanding problem-solving in programming. Indeed, the model has been 
applied with some success to analyses of skill acquisition and problem-solving 
in the context of symbolic programming languages such as LISP. The model of 
problem-solving proposed by Anderson is important in a number of ways. 
Firstly, it demonstrates explicitly how skill in a domain can be acquired. 
Secondly, it shows how both domain specific knowledge and general 
problem-solving methods can be used to guide problem-solving activities. 
Finally, the model suggests a set of mechanisms which can be used to explain 
how problem-solving performance changes with developing expertise. All three 
of these features are relevant to the issues discussed in this thesis and hence the 
ACf* model is described here in some detail. 
The final part of this chapter attempts to delineate some of the general features of 
programming tasks that models such as ACT* and GPS do not address. The 
reason for doing this is that this thesis suggests that the individual features of 
programming behaviour that have been proposed as component elements in 
models of problem-solving in programming cannot be considered in isolation. 
Hence, in order to understand programming behaviour we need to consider the 
interaction between domain knowledge, features of the device which the 
programmer uses to create a program and features of the programming language 
itself which may, in tum, tend to support or to undermine particular forms of 
programming behaviour. Only a broad characterisation of programming tasks is 
able to provide a perspective on the complexity of this form of behaviour and 
this chapter provides a general discussion of those issues which are germane to 
the characterisation of programming tasks that is suggested by the work reported 
in this thesis. 
2.2 Newell and Simon's General Problem Solver and the problem and state 
space hypotheses 
Simon (1979) presents a generic model of problem-solving activity which 
suggests a tripartite analysis of problem-solving behaviour. Simon suggests that 
we consider problem-solving behaviour as an interaction between an 
information processing system, i.e., the problem-solver, and a task 
environment, i.e., the task as described by the experimenter. In approaching a 
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problem-solving task, the problem solver represents the situation as a problem 
space which includes information on the problem's initial state, its goal state, 
and the problem-solving operators that may be applied with the intention of 
reducing the distance between the initial state and the goal state. 
Newell and Simon (1972) suggest that when people engage in problem solving 
behaviour they pass through certain correlative knowledge states. Hence, they 
begin with a representation of the initial state and search through the space of 
alternative states until they reach a knowledge state which corresponds to a 
representation of the goal for the problem. The transformation from one 
knowledge state to the next is governed by the application of problem solving 
operators. Since a problem of any complexity is likely to involve a large number 
of alternative paths, problem solvers can recruit heuristic methods in order to 
search the problem space more efficiently. 
These processes are perhaps best illustrated using an example. The "Tower of 
Hanoi" puzzle represents the kind of problem to which this model has typically 
been applied and as such it provides a useful and 'well-constrained' vehicle for 
demonstrating the application of Newell and Simon's framework. The initial 
state of the Tower of Hanoi problem specifies a certain configuration of three 
disks of different diameter placed upon the first of three vertical pegs. Initially, 
these disks are placed on the peg in size order, the largest at the bottom and the 
smallest at the top. The goal state for this problem is reached when all the disks 
are piled in the same order on the last peg. 
There are, however, certain restrictions on the way in which disks can be 
moved, i.e., only one disk can be moved at a time and a larger disk cannot be 
placed upon a smaller disk. The application of problem-solving operators, 
which is guided by these constraints, may give rise to a variety of alternative 
intermediate states between the initial state and the goal state. Since a human 
problem solver is unable to explore each of these alternatives in parallel, and 
because exploring every alternative in a serial fashion would be too time 
consuming for any problem of reasonable complexity, the problem solver needs 
to rely upon heuristic methods to guide search through the problem space. 
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One important heuristic method proposed by Newell and Simon is means-end 
analysis (Newell and Simon, 1972; Newell, Shaw and Simon, 1958). Here the 
problem solving process procedes by noting the difference between a current 
state and the goal state, creating a sub-goal which reduces this difference and 
then selecting and implementing an operator that solves the sub-goal. The 
means-end heuristic proposes that the problem solver must first evaluate the 
difference between the current state and the goal state. Secondly, the problem 
solver must establish a subgoal which reduces this difference and then execute 
the operator to achieve this subgoal. This process continues until the problem is 
solved. In contrast to an exhaustive search of the problem space, means-end 
analysis cannot guarantee a solution although it does reduce the number of 
alternative states the problem solver has to consider at any one time. Even a 
simple three ring Tower of Hanoi problem has a total of twenty-seven different 
states, and the adoption of heuristic search processes such as means-end 
analysis appears to be one way of obviating the limitations of working memory 
in problem-solving contexts. 
2.2.1 Modelling transformation problems 
Polson and his colleagues (Atwood and Polson, 1976; Jeffries, Polson, Razran 
and Atwood, 1977; Atwood, Masson and Polson, 1980) have conducted a 
number of studies of transformation problems 1, such as the Tower of Hanoi, 
which suggest that subjects have a limited understanding of such problems 
when they are first presented. Polson and his colleagues also suggest that 
problem solving performance is exacerbated by the inability of problem solvers 
to plan a sequence of moves if there are more than about three possible 
successive states. 
From their experimental evidence, Polson and his Colleagues have developed a 
computational model of human problem solving that solves simple 
transformation problems (Atwood and Polson, 1976). The model incorporates a 
three-stage process of interactions between means-end analysis and memory 
processes. The model proposes that information about problem states visited as 
the problem solver works towards a solution are stored in long-term memory. 
Since the problem solver is likely to sometimes forget which states they have 
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visited, the probability that the model will remember a particular state that it has 
previously encountered is set arbitrarily at .9. Working memory holds 
information about the current state of the problem, its successor states and the 
state evaluation information that guides the means-end analysis. 
In stage 1, the model selects moves according to the following criteria: 
- A move that would lead directly to the goal state is always taken 
- A move that leads back to the start state is never taken 
- Illegal moves are always rejected 
If none of these situations appertain, then the proposed move will be taken if it 
does not lead to a state that is seen as too far from the goal, and it gives rise to a 
new state of the problem. In stage 2, the model generates successors in tum and 
selects the first move that will lead to a new problem state. If none of the 
successor states leads to a new state, then stage 3 is entered. In stage 3, the 
number of successor states determines how a move is chosen. If working 
memory is not overloaded, then the best available move will be taken, i.e., the 
move that reduces the distance between the current state and the goal state by the 
greatest amount (that is, the move with the lowest means-end value). If 
working memory is overloaded (that is, there are more than three successor 
states), then the model selects a move at random. 
This model is important since it supplements the Newell and Simon state-space 
analysis by providing a full process model of human problem solving for 
transformational problems. In addition, it specifies the various heuristic methods 
used by problem solvers and includes assumptions about performance 
constraints. In general, the model proposed by Atwood and Polson sets forth 
the following proposals: 
- When planning moves, subjects only look ahead to a depth of one move. 
- Moves are evaluated by a means-end analysis 
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-Subjects employ anti-looping heuristics by avoiding moves that return them to 
immediately preceding states 
- There are limitations on the number of successor moves that can be stored and 
evaluated 
This model of problem-solving has some predictive capacity and appears to be 
generalisable, at least within a broad class of transformational problems that are 
considered. For instance, one specific prediction that arises from the model is 
that subjects will only plan one move ahead in order to reduce working memory 
load. Atwood , Masson and Polson (1980) tested this hypothesis by suggesting 
that a reduction in memory load will enable the problem solver to plan further 
ahead. They attempted to reduce working memory load by providing subjects 
with information about all of the possible moves available from any state in the 
problem. Atwood et al found that this manipulation produced a small 
improvement in the subjects' ability to consider alternative moves; however it 
appears that when capacity is freed it is not used to look ahead. Rather, extra 
capacity appears to facilitate the avoidance of states that tend to lead back to the 
initial state of the problem. 
The problem solving framework proposed by Newell and Simon and later 
extended by Polson and his colleagues has proved to be one of the most 
successful general theories of cognition. The Newell and Simon framework 
specifies a well articulated process model of the cognitive substrates of human 
problem solving, and hence it provides an analysis that is amenable to 
computational modelling. In addition, the model has strong predictive value, 
and has spawned a significant amount of research concerned with exploring the 
key predictions of the model. 
2.2.2 Problem-solving in ill-structured or ill-defined domains 
The success of the Newell and Simon model appears to derive largely from its 
concern with specifying the role of domain independent and generic problem 
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solving methods and heuristics. However, it has become clear that there are 
numerous problem solving domains in which problem solvers need to be able to 
recruit large amounts of domain specific knowledge in order to guide their 
problem solving activities. This is especially true of problem domains that might 
be characterised as ill-defined or ill-structured (Newell, 1969; Reitman, 1965; 
Simon, 1973; 1978). 
Newell (1969) defines ill-structured problems as problems which have poorly 
defined goals and no well-defined criteria for evaluating the solution to the 
problem, involving the integration of multiple sources of knowledge, and with 
no predetermined solution path. In contrast to this, the problems typically 
addressed by Newell and Simon's model have well defined goal and start states, 
and the relevant problem solving operators are specified in the problem 
description. For instance, the legal moves in the Tower of Hanoi problem are 
derivable from the problem specification, the initial state is given and the goal 
state is known. 
In contrast, it appears that programming tasks display many of the 
characteristics of ill-structured problems (Guindon, 1988; 1990; Rist, 1989). 
For example, there are no unique solutions to programming problems - different 
programs utilising different solution methods may give rise to the same results. 
As we shall see later in this thesis, programming skill also appears to depend 
upon the utilisation and integration of multiple sources of knowledge (Brooks 
1983; Pennington 1987a and b). The Newell and Simon analysis appears to 
apply to only a very narrow class of puzzle-like problems and its ability to 
account for problem-solving in complex real-world domains such as 
programming is doubtful. 
A similar problem is also reflected in VanLehn's (1990) criticism of the 
problem/state space analysis in terms of its application to subtraction problems. 
He suggests that the state space hypothesis requires the problem solver to have a 
test which can inform the search process when the final state or the goal state is 
achieved. He rules out various possibilities for this test such as asking a teacher 
or an expert, using superficial approximate tests or adding the answer to the 
subtrahend to see if it equals the minuend. VanLehn suggests that the last of 
these tests is implausible since it is infrequently observed, and the second 
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because it would lead to a much larger class of systematic errors than have 
actually being found in studies of subtraction. The first test he claims, cannot be 
used when students are being tested, and that during testing it would be 
implausible to assume that students search a problem space that is different to 
the one they searched while learning. Similar criticisms of the problem/state 
space hypothesis are also evident in the context of programming tasks, since 
there is not always a clear test that a programmer can apply to inform them 
whether their program is correct. 
In addition to the domain restrictions on the applicability of the Newell and 
Simon model that are discussed above, there are other reasons for believing that 
the framework they present is unable to account fully for programming 
behaviour. In particular, the model proposed by Newell and Simon does not 
account for the development of problem-solving skill. It might be argued that 
any model of human problem-solving should provide some account of how 
problem-solving skills are acquired and how the nature of problem-solving 
performance changes with the acquisition of these skills. The Newell and Simon 
framework has been elaborated more recently to include a specific model of 
learning (Anzai and Simon, 1979), however the emphasis of their model has 
always been concerned with describing and modelling domain independent 
problem-solving heuristics, rather than on skill acquisition. 
While the Newell and Simon model does not appear to be of immediate 
relevance to our discussion of problem-solving in programming, it was a major 
pioneering achievement and remains important for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
the analysis presented by Newell and Simon proposes a specific nomenclature 
for describing problem-solving. The terminology they set forth has become 
almost standard in discussions of problem-solving, and for this reason it has 
been important to introduce this terminology here. Secondly, our discussion of 
the Newell and Simon model has required us to distinguish between different 
classes of problem, i.e., between well-structured and ill-structured problems. 
This has enabled us to introduce a preliminary characterisation of typical 
programming tasks and has illustrated that programming should be considered 
to be a problem-solving activity. Finally, the Newell and Simon model provides 
an important counterpoint to Anderson's ACf*, which, in contrast to Newell 
and Simon's approach, places emphasis upon problem-solving in knowledge 
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intensive domains and suggests mechanisms which may underpin the 
development of problem-solving skill. 
2.3 Anderson's ACT* model of problem-solving 
Anderson's (1983) ACT* (Adaptive Control of Thought) framework specifies a 
generic cognitive architecture which has been used to account for a range of 
cognitive functions, from pattern recognition to problem-solving. In addition, it 
has provided a basis for theories of skill acquisition in a number of domains 
including text editing (Singley and Anderson, 1985; 1988) , geometry 
(Anderson, Greeno, Kline and Neves, 1981) and computer programming 
(Anderson and Reisner, 1985; Pirolli and Anderson, 1985; Pirolli and 
Bielaczyc, 1989). Anderson's framework provides a detailed description of the 
processes which govern skill acquisition and which lead to the performance 
differences that have typically been associated with skill development. Since a 
primary aim of this thesis is to attempt to specify the processes that give rise to 
the performance differences that are observed to accompany the development of 
programming expertise, a discussion of the ACT* framework is of particular 
relevance. 
ACT* has three main structural components; a declarative memory, a production 
(or procedural) memory and a working memory. Figure 2.1 is a schematic 
representation of the ACT* architecture showing its major structural components 
and their interlinking processes. 
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Figure 2.1 A schematic representation of the ACT* framework 
The declarative memory of ACT* is represented as a semantic network (Collins 
and Loftus, 1975) of interconnected nodes which have different activation 
strengths. These nodes represent cognitive units or chunks which can be such 
things as propositions (hate, Bill, Fred) strings (one, two, three) or spatial 
images (a triangle above a square). Each of these cognitive units encodes a set of 
elements in a particular relationship. Anderson restricts the size of these 
cognitive units to five elements, and more complex structures are formed by 
constructing a hierarchical network of simple elements. 
The procedural memory of ACT* is basically a production system (Hunt and 
Pol track, 197 4, Young 1979). Production systems consist of a collection of IF 
(state)- THEN (action) rules, which specify various condition-action pairs and 
some global procedure for instantiating rules and for performing a consequent 
action. The condition of the production rule specifies some data pattern, and if 
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elements matching these patterns are found in working memory, then the 
production will 'fire'- i.e., operate. The action part of the rule specifies what to 
do in that particular state. A typical production rule, informally stated, might 
take the following form: 
IF person 1 is the father of person 2 
and person 2 is the father of person 3 
THEN person 1 is the grandfather of person 3. 
This production would apply if 'Fred is the father if Bill' and 'Bill is the father 
of Tom' were active in working memory. This rule would enable the system to 
infer that Fred is the grandfather of Tom and would deposit this fact in working 
memory. Since production systems are computationally universa12 they are able 
to model any class of cognitive activity that we are able to specify. Indeed, 
production system models have been used by various researchers to explain a 
wide range of cognitive processes (for instance, see Brown and Van Lehn, 
1980; Kieras and Bovair, 1981). 
The third main structural component in Anderson's model is working memory. 
In fact, working memory is not a separable component in this model, but rather 
it represents that information in declarative memory that is currently active. 
According to Anderson (1983) "Working memory consists of information that 
the system can currently access, consisting of information retrieved from 
long-term declarative memory as well as temporary structures deposited by 
encoding processes and the action of productions" (p. 19). 
Most of the processes shown in figure 2.1 involve working memory. Encoding 
processes deposit information derived from the outside world into working 
memory, while performance processes convert commands contained in working 
memory into action. Anderson claims that, unlike the other processes specified 
by ACT*, these two processes are not central to the framework. The storage 
process basically modifies the contents of declarative memory by either creating 
a permanent record in declarative memory of the contents of working memory or 
by altering the strengths of existing records in the declarative system. The 
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retrieval process retrieves information from declarative memory. The storage 
and retrieval of information in declarative memory can be effected in a number 
of ways. For instance, when the rules in the production memory match the 
contents of working memory they are executed. The process of production 
matching, followed by execution that is specified by these processes is called 
production application. Production memory can also be applied recursively, 
such that new productions can be formed by examining existing productions. 
Anderson is careful to suggest that this general framework does not constitute a 
theory, since it makes no specific predictions about behaviour. Anderson 
suggests that a predictive theory must specify in greater detail the properties of 
the storage, retrieval and production application processes that are central to the 
ACT* framework. In fact most of Anderson's book 'The architecture of 
cognition' is devoted to a consideration of these issues, and it is not feasible to 
review them here in any detail. However, one important aspect of the ACT* 
framework is its ability to account for skill acquisition, and it is to this we now 
turn. In addition to outlining the general theoretical principles of skill acquisition 
in ACT*, the next section of this chapter shows how ACT* has been applied to 
skill acquisition in a programming context. 
2.3.1 ACT* and skill acquisition 
A central tenet of the ACT* theory is that skill learning consists largely of a 
process which transforms declarative knowledge into procedural knowledge and 
then modifies this procedural knowledge via application processes. This 
declarative/procedural knowledge distinction is clearly one of the fundamental 
elements of Anderson's theory of skill acquisition. Broadly speaking, 
declarative knowledge is knowledge that is open to introspection and can 
therefore be reported and is not tied to the situation in which it is used. In 
contrast, procedural knowledge is applied automatically, often cannot be 
reported and can only be applied in specific situations. 
Stated broadly, Anderson views skill acquisition as a move from the use of 
declarative knowledge structures to procedurally based knowledge that can be 
applied rapidly and automatically in specific situations. More specifically, 
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Anderson claims that the acquisition of cognitive skills consists of three 
successive stages of learning; a declarative stage, a procedural stage and a tuning 
stage. 
The first stage of skill acquisition involves the accumulation of domain relevant 
facts which are incorporated into declarative network structures. This 
knowledge will be used in conjunction with domain independent heuristics, 
such as means-end analysis. For instance, when learning chess, the novice 
would acquire a number of rules or facts which characterise the legal moves for 
each piece. Similarly, in learning programming, the novice programmer may 
rely exclusively upon the programming knowledge they have acquired from 
textbooks. One feature of declarative knowledge is that it does not require the 
problem-solver to use it in some specific manner, as would be necessary if that 
knowledge were represented in a procedural fashion. However, before 
declarative knowledge can be used it must be retrieved and kept active in 
working memory. The ACT* framework suggests that the slow pace and 
tentative nature of problem-solving during this declarative stage can be attributed 
to the need to activate and access information in long-term memory (Anderson, 
1982). Moreover, the loss of information from working memory can account 
for many of the errors made by novice problem solvers (Anderson and Jeffries, 
1985). 
As problem solvers become more experienced, Anderson claims that declarative 
knowledge becomes proceduralized. During this so called transitional stage, 
productions are created from the declarative knowledge acquired during the first 
phase of skill acquisition. In this second stage, successful sequences of activity, 
produced by the application of weak method heuristics to declarative knowledge 
are complied into new domain-specific productions. This compilation process 
governs the transformation from the interpretive application of declarative 
knowledge to procedures that apply this knowledge directly (Neves and 
Anderson, 1981). Knowledge compilation has adaptive value in the sense that it 
eliminates the retrieval process, and by doing so it has the effect of not only 
speeding up performance but also reducing the load on working memory. 
The knowledge compilation processes in ACT* take two distinct forms: 
composition and proceduralization. Composition (Anderson, 1976; Lewis, 
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1978) takes a sequence of productions that follow each other in solving a 
particular problem and collapses them into a single production that has the same 
effect as that sequence. Proceduralization (Anderson, 1982) takes place when a 
particular piece of declarative knowledge is used repeatedly in the context of a 
particular subgoal and results in the creation of a production rule which 
represents the declarative information as its condition and the result of the 
execution of this declarative information as its action. 
In the final stage of skill acquisition, any additional learning is attributed to the 
tuning of procedures. Basically, this tuning process involves an improvement in 
the choice of procedures for performing a given task. Since one can characterise 
all problem-solving tasks as involving search through a problem space, then the 
tuning of this search procedure, such that it leads to the discovery of optimal 
solutions, will presumabley improve problem solving performance. Anderson, 
Kline and Beasley (1980) have proposed three learning mechanisms which may 
be employed in this search tuning process. They suggest a generalisation 
process by which production rules become broader in their range of 
applicability, a discrimination process in which their range is narrowed, and a 
strengthening process by which successful rules are strengthened and poorer 
rules weakened. 
2.3.2 Applying the ACf* framework - Skill acquisition in LISP 
Anderson, Conrad and Corbett (1989) describe an analysis of student learning 
with their LISP tutor which adopts the general principles of the ACf* 
framework. Anderson et al suggest that there are basically three claims that can 
be derived from the ACf* model that are relevant to the instruction of a skill 
such as LISP. According to the ACf* theory a skill like LISP programming can 
be represented as a set of production rules. For instance, the following piece of 
code, which implements a function that inserts the second element of one list at 
the beginning of another list, can be represented as a series of productions: 
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Hence the code; 
(defun insert-second (lis 1 lis2) 
(cons (car (cdr lis 1)) lis2)) 
becomes the production rule set; 
p-defun 
p-name 
p-params 
p-insert 
p-second 
p-tail 
p-var 
IF the goal is to define a function 
THEN code defun and set subgoals 
1. To code the name of the function. 
2. To code the parameters of the function 
3. To code the relation calculated by the function 
IF the goal is to code the name of the function 
and = name is the name 
THEN code = name 
IF the goal is to code the parameters of the function 
and the function accepts one or more arguments 
THEN create a variable for each member of the set 
and code them as a list within parentheses 
IF the goal is to get the second element of a list 
THEN code cons and set subgoals 
IF 
THEN 
1. To code the element 
2. To code the list 
the goal is to get the second element of a list 
code car and set a subgoal 
1. To code the tail of a list 
IF the goal is to code the tail of a list 
THEN code cdr and set a subgoal 
1. To code the list 
IF the goal is to code an expression 
and a function parameter has the expression as a 
value 
and = name is the name assigned to that 
parameter 
THEN code= name 
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Anderson et al have derived about 500 production rules of this kind to encode the 
skill of programming in LISP. Although the ACT* theory holds that the 
knowledge of a skilled programmer will be represented in this way, this is not the 
case for a novice programmer. Anderson et al suggest that one cannot present 
these rules to a student and expect the student to directly encode them as 
production rules. Rather, information must initially be encoded in declarative 
form. Anderson et al, on the basis of informal observation, suggest that during 
learning, students rely to a greater extent upon exemplar descriptions of the 
functions of LISP constructs rather than upon rule-based descriptions. Some 
empirical support for the efficacy of exemplar-based approaches to teaching 
programming is presented by Boyle and Drazkowski (1989). 
Once the student has acquired some declarative knowledge of the domain, the 
knowledge compilation process converts the initial interpretative use of this 
declarative knowledge into a procedural production rule form. Anderson, Boyle, 
Farrell and Reisner (1987) provide an example of this compilation mechanism in 
the context of skill development in LISP programming. In their model there is a 
function that will retrieve function definitions from long-term memory and apply 
them in appropriate contexts. For instance, in the following production, relation 
and function are variables which allow the production to match different data: 
IF 
THEN 
the goal is to code a relation defined on an argument 
and there is a LISP function that codes this relation 
use this function with the argument 
and set a subgoal to code the argument 
Here, the second line of the condition might match, for instance, 'CAR codes the 
first member of the list'. This rule can be proceduralized to eliminate the retrieval 
of the CAR definition as follows: 
IF 
THEN 
the goal is to code the first member of a list 
use the CAR of the list 
and set as a subgoal to code the list 
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This proceduralization is achieved by deleting the second clause that required 
long-term memory retrieval from the first production. Moreover, the rest of the 
production is made specific to the relationship between first member and the 
function CAR. Once a production has been created that can directly recognise the 
application of CAR, this will result in a reduction in the quantity of long-term 
memory information that needs to be held in working memory. 
Another compilation mechanism that is important in the ACf* framework is 
composition. Basically, composition involves combining a number of successful 
operators into a single macro-operator that has the same overall effect as the 
sequence of individual operators. Anderson et a1 again provide an example of this 
mechanism from LISP. Suppose that one wanted to insert the first member of list1 
into list2. Here the following two operators would apply in sequence: 
IF 
THEN 
IF 
THEN 
the goal is to insert an element into a list 
CONS the element to the list 
and set as subgoals to code the element 
and to code the list 
the goal is code the first member of a list 
take the CAR of the list 
and set as a subgoal to code the list 
Here the first rule would apply and bind an element to 'the first member of list 1' 
and a list to 'list2'. The second production would apply and bind a list to 'list1 '. A 
simple case of composition involves collapsing these two productions into a single 
production: 
IF 
THEN 
the goal is to insert the first member of one list into another list 
CONS the CAR of the first list to the second list 
and set as subgoals to code the first list 
and code the second list 
The result of composing productions in this way would be an increase in coding 
speed since a problem could be coded in fewer steps. McKendree and Anderson 
(1987) have provided some empirical support for this speedup phenomenon for 
frequently repeated combinations of LISP functions. 
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Anderson et al (1989) present a number of empirical studies of their LISP tutor. 
This tutor embodies several design considerations derived from the ACT* model 
of skill acquisition. While it is not appropriate to discuss the design of this tutor 
here, the empirical findings of Anderson et al (1989) are of relevance to the current 
discussion, since they provide some support for their model of skill acquisition in 
LISP. 
In one of their analyses, Anderson et allooked for learning trends amongst their 
subjects who were using the LISP tutor. They found evidence to support the view 
that production rules are modular units of knowledge which can be learned 
independently from other units. Hence, subjects show regular learning curves 
defined on production rules and their independence from other similar rules was 
demonstrated by subjecting the production learning data to factor analysis. They 
also found that these rules are abstract and are not tied to a specific content. 
Hence, production rules can be transferred across contents and languages. They 
suggest that these findings not only provide support for the ACT* model but are 
also contrary to other theories of skill acquisition, such as those proposed by 
schema theory (Rumelhart, 1980; Rumelhart and Norman, 1981) and by 
connectionist approaches (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986; Rumelhart and 
McClelland, 1986). For instance, they claim that schema theory would emphasise 
larger units of knowledge than productions and that connectionist approaches 
would rule out the existence of abstract rules such as those evident in the 
Anderson et al study. 
The ACT* framework has provided a detailed specification of skill acquisition in a 
number of domains and Anderson and his colleagues have constructed 
computational models of skill acquisition which embody the main assumptions of 
the ACT* framework. These models have demonstrated that a learning system 
which starts with only a small number of domain related facts stored in declarative 
memory, together with a number of preexisting problem solving procedures can 
acquire new procedures which can be made responsive to the kinds of situations 
that occur in the domain of learning. ACT* suggests a basic set of learning 
processes and specifies, in effect, a theory of the basic principles of operation built 
into the cognitive system. The main strength of the ACT* framework is that it can 
explain a range of relevant phenomena from the performance differences 
associated with developing expertise to the transfer of cognitive skill. 
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2.3.3 Problems and limitations of the ACT* framework 
In one sense the main problem with ACT* is that it is too powerful. For instance, 
many of the simulations of skill learning which embody ACT* principles often 
perform better than the human subjects that they are intended to model. For 
example Anderson (1982) describes a simulation of the behaviour of high-school 
students solving two-column proof problems in geometry. While the simulation 
managed to solve the problems that it was presented with, not all the students did. 
This suggests that ACT* may provide a good model of idealised problem solving 
and learning, but not necessarily of the actual problem solving behaviour exhibited 
by real subjects. 
This problem is compounded to some extent by the focus of the ACT* framework 
upon models of appropriate skilled performance rather than upon mistaken and/or 
inappropriate behaviour. The ACT* framework suggests that errors in problem 
solving are either 'systematic' errors derived from defective knowledge or are 
errors which arise from unintended actions or slips (Norman, 1981; Reason, 
1979) during procedure execution. However as Brown, Burton and VanLehn 
have shown, errors can arise because individuals may have 'buggy' procedures, 
i.e., correct procedures with one or more minor perturbations or bugs (Brown and 
Burton, 1978; Brown and VanLehn, 1980; Burton, 1982; VanLehn, 1982, 1990). 
Anderson et al (1987) have attempted to build buggy procedures into their LISP 
tutor and these procedures are used to account for student errors. However, even 
with the inclusion of buggy procedures, it is still possible that there are other 
mechanisms which can produce regular errors. 
For instance, it is possible that a problem solver may simply have no idea how to 
solve a particular problem and hence may adopt a coping strategy to produce a 
response. This problem suggests that we may require richer representations of 
skill than are presently afforded by models such as ACT*. Experts in some 
domain can readily cope with novel problems; are often able to transfer their skills 
to very different domains and can argue and reason about the subject matter of 
their domain and the nature of their expertise. As we shall see later, in the 
programming domain, these skills are clearly important. However, the ACT* 
model addresses none of these abilities, since it concentrates upon a parsimonious 
explanation of performance in the context of well practised and familiar tasks. 
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Payne (1988) suggests that frameworks such as ACf* fail to consider the 
importance of non-procedural conceptual representations in problem solving and 
that "even skills with a large procedural component rely on a great deal of 
conceptual knowledge, and that the content and structure of the conceptual 
knowledge may continue to develop with expertise, alongside'the procedural 
methods" (pg 76). However, as we have seen, the ACT* framework suggests 
that non-procedural knowledge ceases to play a role in skill after the initial novice 
stage. In chapter 3 a number of studies are reviewed which place a strong 
emphasis upon the role of conceptual knowledge in programming expertise. It 
appears that in programming, as well as in other domains, non-procedural 
knowledge plays a vital role in expertise, and that the ACf* framework is limited 
it terms of its ability to account for expertise in programming or similar knowledge 
intensive domains. 
2.4 Can existing models of problem-solving account for the complexity of 
programming behaviour? 
The two problem solving frameworks that have been reviewed in this chapter 
appear to display a number of general limitations which suggest that they may be 
unable to account for the complexity evident in programming tasks. For instance, 
we have characterised programming problems as ill-structured tasks which are 
highly knowledge intensive. The state space analysis of problem solving 
suggested by Newell and Simon would appear to be unable to account for problem 
solving behaviour in ill-structured domains, and as such it provides an 
inappropriate model for attempting to understand the full range of 
problem-solving activities involved in programming. 
The ACf* model is advanced as an alternative framework for understanding 
problem solving and skill acquisition in knowledge intensive domains. 
Consequently, this model should provide a more appropriate framework for 
understanding programming behaviour. However, as we have seen, the ACf* 
framework fails to suggest a role for non-procedural or conceptual knowledge in 
problem solving. Since many studies of programming highlight the importance of 
such knowledge (see review in chapter 3) in the development of expertise, it may 
be doubted whether models such as ACf* provide sufficient flexibility to 
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characterise the many facets of expertise which have been demonstrated in a range 
of studies. 
The limitations of the two frameworks that have been described above not only 
present problems in terms of an analysis of programming behaviour, since they 
are clearly of significance in other problem solving domains. However, it is 
apparent that there are certain salient properties of programming tasks which 
appear to be very specific to the problem solving activities that occur in this 
domain. Moreover, extant problem solving frameworks do not appear to provide a 
basis that can fully account for the effects that these features of programming tasks 
can have on problem solving behaviour. The next section of this chapter 
concentrates upon a discussion of these issues. This provides a basis for a 
characterisation of programming activates which not only considers the nature of 
the programmer's task, but in addition, highlights the role in problem solving of 
programming language features and of the tools used by programmers to create 
programs. This multifaceted view of problem solving in programming reflects the 
broad approach adopted by this thesis. 
2.4.1 The inseparability of planning and execution 
The dominant view of problem-solving suggests that the problem-solving activity 
is a top-down focused process that starts with high-level goals which are 
subsequently refined into subgoals and ultimately into achievable action. This 
process is often referred to as successive refinement or problem decomposition. 
Recall that the model of problem-solving suggested by Newell and Simon starts 
with a specification of the goal state and attempts to reduce the difference between 
the initial or the current state of the problem by applying operators or by creating 
subgoals. In routine skill, this decomposition process can take place without 
problem solving since action sequences can be remembered as prepackaged 
methods for achieving specific goals (Newell and Simon, 1972; Card, Moran and 
Newell, 1983). In this situation information from the external world plays a 
limited role by providing feedback information to test the effects of certain 
operators against goals (Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960; Norman, 1986). 
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This account of human problem solving has clearly been successful. However it 
under emphasises the role of perception in cognitive skill and the extent to which 
the external world can act as a resource to support problem solving behaviour. A 
number of researches have shown that the 'external display' upon which a task is 
enacted can serve as a repository for search control knowledge and can therefore 
reduce the working memory load that is normally required to carry out a given 
task. One can compare the use of external displays with classical models of 
problem solving where the problem solver must maintain a stack of subgoals. The 
importance of external memory props has been demonstrated by several 
researchers who have suggested that actions are often enacted before plans are 
complete (for example see, Green, Bellamy and Parker, 1987; Young and Simon, 
1987). In addition, an important parallel development in AI models of planning is 
the idea that planning cannot be easily separated from execution (Agre and 
Chapman, 1987; Ambros-Ingerson, 1987; Chapman, 1987; 1989). For instance, 
Ambros-Ingerson (1987) highlights the importance of 'knowledge getting 
actions', which are built into plans and specify where additional planning 
information can be obtained, generally from external sources. Larkin's (1989) 
recent analysis of 'display-based' problem solving similarly stresses the 
importance of obtaining information about the current problem state from the 
display. 
In the programming domain, Green et al (1987) have proposed a model of 
programming behaviour - their so called 'Parsing/Gnisrap model - which suggests 
that because of working memory limitations, programmers must dump 
information onto an external medium (i.e., a VDU screen) when overload is 
threatened and then later parse that information back into a cognitive representation 
when it is subsequently required. The Parsing/Gnisrap model is described in 
greater detail in chapter 4, but one important contribution of this model is the idea 
that planning and execution in programming are inextricably bound together. The 
existence of such a phenomenon poses problems for classical models of problem 
solving in terms of their ability to account for problem solving behaviour in 
programming.There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, such models fail to 
recognise the importance of external media in problem solving and secondly, they 
suggest that planning and plan execution (or operator selection and execution) are 
separate processes, whereas, in fact, in many complex domains, they appear to be 
very closely linked. 
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2.4.2 The effects of programming language features on programming behaviour 
Programming tasks are clearly rather different from the kinds of tasks that are 
typically studied in problem solving analyses. One major difference is that 
programming involves the use of a specialised language which is employed to 
implement the various problem solving operators necessary to solve a particular 
problem. In traditional problem solving studies, operators are applied directly to 
objects in the world, and it is not necessary to employ a metalanguage to describe 
or to express these operators. One can of course describe games such as chess 
using a formal notation. However, it is likely that the various problem solving 
strategies or methods which are employed while playing a game of chess may well 
be different to the methods and strategies used if one has to describe and 'play' the 
game using an abstract formal notation3. 
While we might attempt to characterise programming languages as in some sense 
analogous to the formal language that can be used to describe chess moves, there 
does not appear to be a close programming analogy with the more typical situation 
where problem solving operators are applied directly to objects in the world. Some 
writers have claimed that one way of making programming more 'natural' might 
be to use graphical notations, in which graphical objects representing various 
programming constructs can be manipulated in various ways to construct a 
program (Badre and Allen, 1989; Cunniff and Taylor, 1987a and b; Cunniff, 
Taylor and Black, 1986). Others have suggested that natural language might 
provide a better means of specifying algorithms (Biermann, Ballard and Sigmon, 
1983). There is a great deal of current debate surrounding the use and the general 
efficacy of these various notations (Dyck and Mayer, 1985; Fitter and Green, 
1979; Green, 1982; Gaiotti and Ganong, 1985). However what is fairly clear is 
that different notations may support different kinds of problem solving tasks to a 
greater or a lesser extent. 
For instance, Adelson (1984, and see review in chapter 3) has shown that the way 
in which programming information is presented (i.e., as different types of 
flowcharts or as text) can have a marked effect upon subjects' ability to answer 
different kinds of program comprehension question. Hence, it appears that 
subjects may be able to extract different forms of information more readily from 
different notations. This phenomenon does not only arise when comparing text 
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with graphical presentation, since other studies have demonstrated that different 
text-based notations can support different kinds of programming tasks. 
For example, Green, Bellamy and Parker (1987) have shown that programmers 
rarely generate programs in a strictly linear fashion, where the final text order of 
the program mirrors its generative order. Moreover, this study demonstrated that 
the extent of this non-linearity is related in part to the programming language that 
subjects use. Green et al claim that some notations facilitate linear generation while 
others do not. Additional support for this is provided by Bellamy and Gilmore 
(1990) who found that Pascal programmers adopted a non-linear style of program 
development, while BASIC and PROLOG programmers exhibited a more or less 
linear style . They claim that "the task of translating from the plan structure to the 
linear structure of Pascal places far too high a mental load even on expert 
programmers, doing simple problems. In other words, the Pascal programming 
language fails to support plan generation" (pg 68). They go on to suggest that 
programming plans (that is plans that represent stereotypical tacit programming 
knowledge) "are dependent upon the programming strategy of the particular 
programmer. This in turn is influenced by the notation, taught strategies and the 
programming environment used during learning to program" (pg 68). Hence, it 
appears that certain notational properties of programming languages can affect the 
problem solving strategies exhibited during program generation. 
In addition, language features also appear to affect the comprehension of 
programs. For example, Gilmore and Green (1988) have shown that programmers 
can extract certain forms of information from some notations more easily than they 
can from others. They introduce the term "role-expessiveness" to describe the 
extent to which certain notations may make particular programming languages 
more discriminable from others. They suggest that one primary element of 
role-expressiveness relates to the ease with which programmers are able to extract 
certain forms of information from a given program text. They claim that this 
process will be facilitated if the programmer is able to discriminate between the 
structure she is searching for and other structures that surround it. For example, 
Gilmore and Green claim that Pascal is more role-expressive than BASIC since 
Pascal has a rich set of lexical cues, making structure more discriminable, and in 
BASIC the same piece of code may be used for more than one purpose, which can 
lead to structure confusion. Role expressiveness is clearly not the only notation 
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feature that might contribute to particular kinds of programming strategy. In fact, 
Green (1989) has outlined a number of so called notational dimensions, which he 
claims may determine the strategy employed by programmers when engaged in 
particular tasks. 
Hence, another problem with classical accounts of problem solving behaviour is 
that such accounts fail to generalise to problem domains in which problem solving 
operators need to be expressed in some metalanguage. As a consequence, such 
models cannot account fully for the problem solving behaviour exhibited by 
programmers which appears to be heavily influenced by certain properties of the 
notation of the particular language being used. 
2.4.3 The effects of problem solving environments on behaviour 
There appear to be two major cognitive demands that distinguish computer use, 
including normal programming tasks, from the puzzle solving concerns 
traditionally addressed in studies of problem solving (Payne; 1987; 1990). Firstly, 
when using a computer system, operators cannot be applied directly. Rather they 
must be effected via a task language which maps operators into action sequences. 
Secondly, the structure of the problem space is clearly more complex, since in 
addition to representing goals and subgoals in the task domain, it must also 
accommodate some representation of the device. In programming terms we might 
the distinction between the 'device language', which the programmer uses to issue 
commands to the editor or its equivalent and the 'task language' which represents 
rules that describe the target domain (Green, Bellamy and Parker, 1987). In 
addition, we need to consider the medium by which the user interacts with a task 
(i.e., the interaction medium), e.g., pen and paper, VDU etc. The characteristics 
of each of these elements of interactive behaviour are likely to play a role in the 
determination of programming behaviour or strategy. 
This is amply illustrated in Green's discussion of a system designed to receive 
spoken Pascal code, using an isolated-utterance speech recognizer (Green, 1989). 
Green claims that "the system worked reasonably well - i.e., if one dictated Pascal 
code into it, the recognition rate was quite acceptable. However, because the 
speech recogniser relied upon the constraints of Pascal to make the recognition 
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problem tractable, the program had to be syntactically correct at all times. The 
design of the system made it preferable to dictate the program in text order, from 
start to finish. Unfortunately, because of certain characteristics of the Pascal 
notation, it is pretty well impossible to dictate impromptu Pascal without any 
omissions ... Pascal is not a suitable notation for this environment" (pg. 444). 
Green, Bellamy and Parker (1987) have demonstrated that programmers rarely 
generate their programs in a strict linear order. Hence, one might hypothesise that 
if programmers are constrained to a linear generation strategy, then this will 
seriously affect their performance. In chapter 11 an experiment is reported in 
which programmers were required to use an editor which did not allow any 
backward movement. Hence, like the speech input system discussed by Green, 
programmers were forced into a situation where they had to generate their 
_{)rograms in a linear fashion. Unlike the speech input system, this editor displayed 
the program generated to date, and hence reduced the demand on working memory 
to some extent. However, programmers still made many errors. Indeed, when 
programmers had to use this environment, the performance of expert programmers 
was reduced to the level exhibited by novices. This decrement in performance 
serves to illustrate the effect that device characteristics and interaction medium can 
have on performance, and suggests a major limitation of traditional problem 
solving frameworks which fail to consider the effects of the device and interaction 
medium on behaviour. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has been concerned with a review of two important problem solving 
frameworks and has placed particular emphasis upon the ability of these 
frameworks to account for problem solving behaviour in programming. While 
neither of these frameworks appears to provide an account of programming 
behaviour that can capture its full richness, they do at least provide a starting point 
from which one can attempt to begin to characterise programming behaviour. This 
chapter has suggested that we cannot view programming as an activity which 
simply involves the application of generic problem solving methods and nor can 
we model its full complexity by simply suggesting a large collection of 
condition-action rules and some means of applying them. Rather, programming 
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behaviour appears to depend upon the use of complex planning and problem 
solving strategies which in tum may be supported or otherwise by certain 
notational features of programming languages and by features of the device space. 
As Bellamy and Gilmore ( 1990) suggest: 
" To understand the psychology of complex tasks such as programming, we need 
to consider planning strategies in particular task contexts. Theories of planning 
and problem solving have spent too long with their heads in the sand, ignoring the 
role the external world plays in determining behaviour. If psychology is going to 
make significant contributions both in theoretical and applied areas of research, we 
need investigations of how features of the external world determine behavioral 
strategies. Only then will we be able to produce artifacts that support effective task 
strategies" (pg 69-70). 
The work reported in this thesis broadly supports this view, but perhaps more 
importantly, it suggests that we need to consider not only the role of the external 
world in the determination of programming behaviour, but also the way in which 
representations of programming knowledge interact with language features to give 
rise to particular forms of strategy. This tripartite view of programming behaviour 
is reflected in the concerns of subsequent chapters, where these issues will receive 
further attention. In chapter 3, we review the extensive literature on knowledge 
representation in programming, while chapter 4 concentrates upon the nature of 
the problem solving strategies which appear to underpin programming behaviour. 
In chapter 5, concern is directed towards a review of studies which have 
suggested that programming language features play a major role in the 
determination of programming strategy. This provides a basis for the experiments 
reported in chapters 6- 11, which in tum provide support for the tripartite analysis 
of programming behaviour advanced in this thesis. 
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Notes 
1 Greeno (1978) introduces the term 'transformation problem' to characterise 
those problems which transform one situation into another. Hence, the Tower of 
Hanoi problem is transformational in that one can identify various moves which 
transform one state into another. Other examples of transformational problems are 
the water jugs problem (Atwood and Polson, 1976) and the missionaries and 
cannibals problem (Simon and Reed, 1976) 
2 Production systems are computationally universal in the sense that they can be 
implemented as a Turing Machine and according to the Church-Turing thesis, any 
behaviour that can be precisely specified will be in the class of things that can be 
computed by a Turing Machine. 
3 For instance one cannot easily extract perceptual groupings from a formal 
symbolic representation of chess positions and moves and the ability to do this 
would appear to be a central element of skill in this domain. 
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Chapter 3. Knowledge Representation and Expert/Novice 
Differences in Programming and in Related Domains 
3.1 Introduction 
A large number of studies concerned with the nature and development of expertise 
in programming and in other problem solving domains have highlighted 
significant qualitative differences between the way in which experts and novices 
organise and structure their knowledge about a particular domain. Studies of 
expert/novice differences in programming have drawn extensively from theories of 
expertise in other domains. For instance, a number of studies, following de 
Groot's ( 1965) seminal work on expertise in chess have attempted to relate skill 
differences in programming to the ability of experts to recognise and represent 
meaningful chunks of code (Barfield, 1986; Shneiderman, 1976). Other theories 
of programming skill have adopted generalised production system architectures to 
explain certain salient attributes of expert performance, including phenomena that 
are typically associated with skill development such as knowledge restructuring 
and compilation (see chapter 2). 
A number of other important studies have drawn analogies with work in the text 
comprehension domain (Detienne and Soloway, 1990; Soloway and Ehrlich, 
1984). Studies of knowledge representation in text comprehension have been 
germane to both the development of theoretical accounts of the content of tacit 
programming knowledge and to descriptions of the organisation and structure of 
this knowledge. More recently the importance of hybrid representations has been 
highlighted. This hybrid approach suggests that programmers can recruit 
knowledge from a variety of diverse sources in order to guide problem-solving 
and, in addition, that a simple uniform view of knowledge representation in 
programming is not sufficient to account for the behavioral complexity of this 
task. 
This chapter will provide a thematic review of existing studies which have been 
concerned with the relationship between knowledge structure and expertise in 
programming. Existing work on knowledge representation in non-programming 
domains will not be comprehensively reviewed since many studies of expertise in 
programming have served to replicate the basic findings of research in other 
domains. Hence, the main aim of the present chapter is to provide a broad review 
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of existing research into knowledge representation and skill differences in 
programming. However, this focus on programming research provides a cogent 
and extensive overview of some of the more general findings to emerge from the 
problem-solving literature concerned with domains such as Chess, Physics and 
Mathematics. 
This does not mean to say that work in such domains has nothing more to 
contribute to a study of problem-solving and skill differences in programming. 
Rather, it will be suggested that a great deal of theoretical understanding still 
remains to be gained from an analysis of problem-solving in these kinds of 
domain. Moreover, it should be noted that while many early programming studies 
appear to draw upon previous problem-solving research only in as much as they 
attempt to replicate its basic findings, more recent work is beginning to contribute 
more explicitly to our theoretical understanding of general problem-solving skills 
in addition to providing a description of the content and structure of knowledge 
representation for programming tasks. 
This chapter begins by reviewing some of the early work on skill differences and 
knowledge representation in programming. These studies serve to provide 
important supplementary support for the now well known finding that experts tend 
to represent domain knowledge in terms of meaningful chunks, while novices tend 
to derive cognitive structures from salient surface features of problems. More 
recent work has elaborated in greater detail the nature of these different grouping 
strategies, while studies of programming that claim allegiance to the text 
comprehension paradigm have specified the content of the stereotypical knowledge 
structures that are brought to bear during problem-solving. 
This chapter concludes with an evaluation of these studies in terms of their 
contribution to our understanding of problem-solving in programming. It will be 
suggested that many of these studies have failed to elicit information about 
cognitive structure and content that can be generalised between programming 
languages and paradigms. The main criticism of such work is that theories and 
principles have often been derived from studies of the comprehension of a single 
programming language and that the implications drawn from such studies do not 
necessarily apply in the case of different languages or different programming 
paradigms. 
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Another aim of this chapter is to provide an overview and background to a number 
of the empirical studies reported in this thesis which have addressed issues relating 
to the generalisability of existing studies. This empirical work will not be 
discussed in detail in the present chapter but will be briefly mentioned in the final 
section in order to place it in the context of other work and to illustrate its historical 
anticedents and development. This chapter attempts to draw out links between the 
individual experimental studies reported in this thesis, and concludes by 
suggesting that a more comprehensive understanding of the cognitive aspects of 
programming will arise only when programming skill is interpreted in a broad 
ecumenical context. That is, in a context which empahsises not only aspects of a 
programmer's knowledge representation but also considers the development of the 
strategic aspects of programming skill and the way in which the notational 
properties of certain languages might act to facilitate or to constrain programming 
behaviour. 
3.2 Expert/Novice differences and chunking skills 
The idea that experts develop 'chunks' of knowledge that represent important 
functional units or structures within a particular domain is common psychological 
currency (Miller, 1956; Chase and Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965; Egan and 
Schwartz, 1979; Larkin, McDermott, Simon and Simon, 1980; Reitman, 1976). 
Within the programming domain, a range of studies have suggested that 
programming expertise might be characterised by the programmer's ability to 
decompose and represent programs in terms of 'chunks' of knowledge which are 
based upon semantically meaningful elements of programs. For example, 
Shneiderman (1976) has shown that the standard results obtained in the now well 
known chess studies are replicable in the context of programming. Shneiderman 
found that experts could recall more lines of program code than novice 
programmers when that program was organised in executable order. Conversely, 
when the program was ordered randomly no significant differences in recall 
performance between the two groups were evident. 
A number of other studies, employing more complex recall procedures and 
stimulus material, have provided additional support for the 'chunking' hypothesis 
(Bateson, Alexander and Murphy, 1987; Barfield, 1986). For instance, Barfield 
(1986), employed three levels of program organisation (executable order, random 
lines and random chunks) in a free recall experiment to explore differences in 
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knowledge representation for programmers of different skill levels. Barfield found 
that novice programmers recalled the same number of program lines regardless of 
program organisation. Conversely, the intermediate group demonstrated superior 
recall when the program was presented in executable order as opposed to the 
random line and random chunk conditions. Barfield suggests that this indicates 
that executable order facilitates chunking for intermediate level programmers. 
Experts, on the other hand, demonstrated high recall performance in both the 
executable order condition and in the random chunk condition. However, when 
the program is completely randomised the performance of the expert group drops 
to a similar level to that exhibited by intermediates. Barfield suggests that since the 
memory capacity of the experts is the same as that for other groups, the superior 
recall in the random chunk and executable order conditions must arise because of 
the experts familiarity with particular units of code that perform the same function. 
3.3 Knowledge structures: content and formation 
The studies reviewed above demonstrate that the superior organisation of 
programming knowledge in long term memory is one of the central factors in 
expert performance. However, these studies fail to specify in detail the nature of 
that organisation. For instance, one question that is left unresolved relates to the 
content of expert knowledge structures. In addition, the chunking studies 
described above do not address issues concerned with the mechanisms which may 
underlie an expert's ability to create and represent meaningful chunks of 
knowledge. As a consequence, two central questions appear to emerge from these 
studies; How are chunks formed and what sort of information do such structures 
typically represent? 
3.3.1 The organisation of programming knowledge by novices and experts 
McKeithen, Reitman, Rueter and Hirtle, (1981) describe a study which attempts 
to address the issues raised by these questions. They report two experiments. The 
first experiment replicates the classic expert-novice difference in short term recall 
for programmers who viewed either a coherent or a scrambled version of a 
program. This experiment produced results which parallel those of Barfield ( 1986) 
and of Sheiderman (1976) reported above. In a second experiment, McKeithen et 
al., attempted to extend the interpretation of this basic phenomenon by inferring 
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details of a subject's organisation of programming concepts by constructing 
hierarchical representations of the relations among programming language 
keywords. 
For this experiment, McKeithen et al. employed a technique developed by Reitman 
and Rueter (1980) which produces a hierarchical representation of information 
from regularities in the orders in which items are recalled over many trials. This 
technique capitalises upon the fact that people tend to recall all items of one chunk 
before moving on to the next chunk (Cohen, 1966). McKeithen et al. examined 
the way in which programmers form chunks by presenting their subjects with a 
number of cards each of which had written upon it a word derived from the set of 
ALGOL W reserved words (for instance, ELSE, REAL, NULL etc.). Novice, 
intermediate and expert subjects were asked to learn each of the words presented 
on the cards such that they could subsequently recall them without the aid of the 
cards. Subjects were then asked to attempt to recall the words they had learnt 
during 25 scheduled trails. Some of these trials were cued in that subjects were 
presented with a reserved word and were then asked to recall other words "that go 
with it". Most of the trials, however, were uncued and subjects could recall words 
in the order they wished. 
McKiethen et al. analysed the recall order for each subject using an algorithm 
developed by Reitman and Rueter (1980). This algorithm involves searching 
subject's recall strings for all groups of items that always appear contiguously, 
regardless of recall order. For example, a number of groups of contiguously 
recalled items (ABC, BC, DEFG, DEF, EFG, DE, EF and FG) can be derived 
from the four recall strings in figure 3.1. These groups can be represented either 
as a lattice under set inclusion or as a parenthesised expression. Consistency in the 
order of recall of groups (such as an ordered set of chunks or a list) appears in the 
lattice as overlapping groups: e.g., DEFG, DEF, EFG, DE, EF and FG indicate 
that DEFG is always ordered. Inspection of the original recall strings can 
determine whether the order is always the same (i.e., a unidirectional chunk) or 
one order and its reverse (a bidirectional chunk). Unidirectional chunks can be 
represented in the tree diagrams by using a single-headed arrow notation, and 
bidirectional chunks by double-headed arrows. In the parenthetic representation, 
square brackets denote a unidirectional chunk and angle brackets a bidirectional 
chunk. Nondirectional chunks, whose constituents can appear in any order, are 
indicated by the absence of an arrow in the tree diagram and by curved brackets in 
the parenthetic expression. 
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a. Recall Strings 
A B c D E F G 
D E F G c B A 
D E F G B c A 
B C A D E F G 
b. Lattice of Chunks 
A 
A B C D E F G 
~~ 
A B C D E F G 
B 
"' /' " DEF EFG 
B C D ~ ~f'F G 
A < { ~ /------ 'f/ ~ 
- ~
root 
c. Ordered Tree 
c D E F G 
d. Expression 
((A (B C)) [d e f g]) 
Figure 3 .1. Example analysis of recall strings by the Reitman -Rueter technique. 
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Figure 3.2 shows the organisation of reserved words for a novice programmer 
and for a typical expert programmer. McKiethen et al. found that beginning 
programmers appear to utilise a range of different mnenomic techniques. For 
instance, some novice subjects appeared to be using an encoding strategy based 
upon orthography, while others seemed to be using common natural language 
sequences such as DO-FOR-WHILE or BITS-OF-STRING. Experts, on the 
other hand, appear to cluster together words based upon common structures used 
in ALGOL (i.e., WHILE-DO or IF, THEN, ELSE), while intermediates appear 
to employ a mixture of strategies and to base their organisation on both ALGOL 
structures and natural language chunks. 
The results of the McKeithen et al. study provide an impressive demonstration that 
differences in knowledge organisation, as reflected by recall order and 
memorisation strategy, are strongly correlated with differences in programming 
skill. McKeithen et al. do not claim that particular forms of knowledge 
organisation produce expertise, since any support for this hypothesis would need 
to be derived from a demonstration of within-subject skill changes with 
instruction. However, one might hypothesise that learning particular forms of 
organisation would led to the enhancement of programming skill. 
Moreover, McKeithen et al. suggest that their findings may support the claims 
made by protagonists of structured programming, since it is possible that an 
expert's mental organisation of a program may correspond to the forms of 
organisation produced by applying structured programming techniques. Hence, it 
appears that the Reitman - Rueter technique for analysing recall order that is 
adopted by McKeithen et al. may provide the basis for exploring the purported 
cognitive advantages of adopting structured programming principles. The main 
contribution of the McKeithen et al. study is that it provides evidence for the way 
in which programmers group together related pieces of information in order to 
form knowledge structures that can best guide problem solving in programming. 
Their work provides a natural extension to some of the earlier chunking studies by 
outlining the different strategies used to group information and by illustrating the 
way in which particular strategies are associated with different levels of skill. 
43 
~--BITS 
CASE 
SHORT 
__.,.~iii::::-- STEP 
STRING 
IF 
IS 
-~--OF 
OR 
~~ii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~DO ELSE LONG 
---------------!::::~====STEP 
END 
Figure 3.2. Typical novice (above) and expert (below) knowledge organisation 
found in the McKeithen eta/ study. The novice's organisation is apparently based 
on orthography, while the expert's is based upon the meaning of words in the 
programming language. 
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The results of the McKeithen et al study suggest that experts group program 
statements according to broad semantic categories while novices use familiar 
surface features such orthography. In other problem solving domains similar 
finding have emerged. For instance in Physics problem solving it has been shown 
that novices typically represent only the surface (or concrete) features of a problem 
whereas experts represent abstract physical principles (Chi, Glaser and Rees, 
1981; Chi, Feltovich and Glaser, 1981). Similar findings have also emerged in 
studies of mathematics (Schoenfeld and Herrmann, 1982). 
3.3.2 Abstract and concrete representations of programming knowledge 
In the programming domain, Adelson (1981) has attempted to extend these 
findings by characterising some of the properties of the abstract and concrete 
representations that are formed during program comprehension. Adelson (1981) 
found that expert programmers used abstract conceptually based representations 
when attempting to recall programs, whereas novices used syntactically based 
representations. Using a multi-trial free recall procedure, Adelson asked novice 
and expert programmers to recall 16 lines of program code that had been presented 
randomly. Although the subjects had not been told that the 16lines could be 
organised either conceptually into three programs or syntactically into five 
categories according to the control words they contained, an analysis of the recall 
for each group showed that experts had clustered the lines into complete 
programs, while the novices clustered lines according to syntactic category. This 
finding simply serves to replicate the results of the McKiethen et al (1981) study 
reported above. Adelson (1984; 1985) later extended this basic paradigm to 
explore in more detail the nature of the organisational groupings produced by 
expert and novice programmers, by characterising some of the properties of 
abstract and concrete representations. 
For example, Adelson (1984), reports an experiment in which expert and novice 
subjects were given tasks that required them to form and use both abstract and 
concrete representations. Subjects were presented with a stimulus set consisting of 
eight PPL (Polymorphic Programming Language, described as similar to APL and 
PL/1) programs with two types of flowchart and two types of questions for each 
of the eight programs. The flowcharts were constructed such that one described 
the output resulting from program execution, while the other described how the 
program functioned. 
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Adelson suggests that flowcharts that represent what a program does (i.e., in 
terms of its expected output) should be considered as abstract representations, 
since they describe the results obtained without specifying the method used to 
achieve them (e.g., in order to sort a set of items alphabetically one might use a 
variety of methods such as a merge sort, shell sort or bubble sort). Conversely, 
the flowcharts that describe a program's function are referred to as concrete in the 
sense that they represent procedural information without providing any general 
descriptive information about expected results. Adelson suggests that these two 
categories of abstract and concrete representation have strong parallels to the more 
common distinction that is drawn between procedural and declarative knowledge 
(Anderson, 1983; Winograd, 1974). 
In addition to being presented with a program and a flowchart describing that 
program (Figures 3.3 and 3.4), subjects were presented with a number of 
questions relating to either concrete or abstract features of the program. For 
example - "Is the field wider than it is long?" (abstract question, what the program 
does), "which border of the field is filled in first?" (concrete question, how the 
program works). 
The level of abstraction of the flowchart was crossed with the level of abstraction 
of the question to create four conditions for subjects of different levels of 
expertise: two appropriate set conditions, in which the level of abstraction of the 
flowchart matched the level of abstraction of the question, and two inappropriate 
set conditions where the level of abstraction of the flowchart did not match the 
level of abstraction of the question. Hence, in the appropriate set conditions, 
subjects saw either an abstract flowchart followed by an abstract question or a 
concrete flowchart followed by a concrete question. In the two inappropriate 
conditions, subjects were presented with either an abstract flowchart followed by a 
concrete question or a concrete flowchart followed by an abstract question. The 
two dependent variables used in this experiment were comprehension time (the 
time it took a subject to state that they had understood the flowchart well enough to 
go on and study the program and answer the associated question) and error rates 
on the questions. 
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PROORAM 
$MAKEFIELD; I;J 
[1] ... DATA DEFINITIONS IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT 
[2] ... $GRID = [1 : ] ROW 
[3] ... $ROW = [1 : ] CHAR 
[4] LINE - MAKE (ROW, 40,') ... CREATE THE FIELD 
[5] FIELD - MAKE (GRID, 20, LINE) 
[6] FOR I - 1:19:20 DO% ... FILL IN TOP AND BOTTOM 
(FOR J - 1 :40 DO FIELD [I,J] -'B) ... BORDER 
[7] FOR I- 2:19 DO% 
(FOR J - 1:39:40 DO FIELD [I,J] - 'B ... FILL IN SIDES 
make a field of 20 rows; 
each row composed of 40 characters; 
each character a space 
, 
mark the edges of the field 
with character b's 
,, 
stop 
Figure 3.3. Program described in the following flowcharts. The flowchart above 
is an abstract flowchart in that it describes what the program does. 
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LINE<- A ROW OF 40 SPACES 
FIELD<- A GRID OF 20 LINES 
Figure 3.4. An example of a concrete flowchart. 
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I <- I+ 19 1----____J 
J <- J+39 1----l 
I <- 1+1 
Adelson found that both types of flowchart reduced program comprehension time 
significantly. In addition, the abstract flowcharts were comprehended more 
quickly than the concrete flowcharts. No differences in comprehension times were 
evident between the novice and expert groups for the concrete/abstract conditions. 
In terms of the data relating to errors, Adelson found that experts performed more 
accurately in the inappropriate set condition in response to concrete questions 
while novices performed more accurately in response to the abstract questions. In 
the appropriate set conditions, experts answered both the concrete and the abstract 
questions more accurately than novices. 
Adelson suggests that these results support the idea that novice programmers 
represent the concrete or procedural aspects of a problem while experts tend to 
form more abstract declarative representations. It is worth noting here the contrast 
between Adelson's findings and Anderson's suggestion that experts employ 
procedural knowledge and novices, declarative (see chapter 2). In the 
inappropriate set conditions, where the level of abstraction of the flowchart and the 
question do not match, the flowcharts will inappropriately prepare subjects to 
represent the program at one level of abstraction or the other. Adelson reasons that 
if the level that is actually appropriate is the subjects' natural or preferred level, 
then they would still be able to perform well. That is they would be able to 
accurately and quickly form a representation of the program that is appropriate to 
answering a particular question, and be able to process the information contained 
in this representation despite the misleading set. Conversely, if the appropriate 
level is not natural to the subject, the effects of the inappropriate set condition plus 
the non-naturalness of the representation will combine to impair performance. 
Adelson claims that the patterns of results in the appropriate set conditions provide 
information about the natural level of representation for each group. Hence, a 
condition in which a group's performance is good is a condition in which the 
required representation is natural, and a condition in which a group's performance 
is poor is one in which the required representation is not natural. Hence, since the 
novice group perform better in the concrete condition, while the expert group 
perform more accurately in the abstract condition we can infer that novices 
represent programming knowledge in concrete terms and experts in abstract 
fashion. 
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This finding provides additional support for the idea that novices and experts 
represent domain knowledge differently. In programming, experts appear to focus 
upon the declarative aspects of a problem while novices place emphasis upon a 
problems procedural aspects. Some support for this distinction can also be derived 
from work in other domains, suggesting that this finding may be generalisable to 
other areas of expertise. For instance, Brown and Burton (1978) found that school 
mathematics teachers who were expert in performing elementary arithmetic 
operations, experienced difficulty verbalising these operations. 
The importance of different forms of representation is strikingly evident in 
Adelson's (1984) study in the context of those conditions where novice 
performance actually surpasses that of experts. Adelson claims that experts have 
learnt that during comprehension it is more profitable to focus upon high-level 
abstract elements of a program rather than on low-level implementation details. 
She claims that this point will also be valid for very high-levellanguages in which 
the distinction between what is abstract and what is concrete may not map onto the 
distinction between what a program does and how it functions. However, Adelson 
provides no evidence for this conjecture, and more recent research (Cooke and 
Schvaneveldt, 1988; Gilmore and Green, 1988) has suggested that the cognitive 
structures that have been observed in this and similar studies may be specific to the 
particular programming language used in the studies. 
3.4 Are representations of programming knowledge language independent? 
Cooke and Schvaneveldt (1988) have observed that the stimulus material used by 
Adelson, and for that matter by the majority of researchers studying programming 
expertise, has consisted of either program statements or reserved programming 
words. They suggest that this kind of material does not provide an ideal means of 
eliciting information about a subject's semantic knowledge which should, by 
definition, be language independent. This would be predicted by other models of 
programming. For instance, according to Shneiderman's (1980) 
syntactic/semantic model, syntactic knowledge is specific to each programming 
language, while semantic knowledge represents general programming concepts 
that are not language-specific. 
Cooke and Schvaneveldt (1988) also suggest another important methodological 
limitation of studies of programming expertise. They argue that these studies have 
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tended to categorise individuals with some programming expertise as the least 
experienced programmers, thus ignoring completely naive programmers with no 
programming experience at all. Cooke and Schvaneveldt suggest that the cognitive 
structures of individuals prior to any exposure to domain-related material may 
reveal preconceived notions, misconceptions or prior knowledge that might be of 
interest to those involved or interested in education. Presumably these 
preconceived notions etc. may play an important role in the development of 
programming skill and knowledge representation. 
Cooke and Schvaneveldt (1988) report a study in which they attempted to address 
some of the limitations of previous work that have been outlined above. In 
particular, their study examined the organisation of a set of abstract programming 
concepts for subjects of various levels of skill, including a naive group who 
possessed no programming experience whatsoever. Cooke and Schvaneveldt 
(1988) presented their subjects with a set of 16 programming concepts derived 
from an introductory computer science text book. Subjects were asked to assign 
ratings, on a scale of zero to nine, to each concept based upon their familiarity 
with that concept. The subjects were then asked to undertake a relatedness rating 
task, where they were informed that there are a number of dimensions along 
which the concepts could be related (e.g., frequency of co-occurrence, generality, 
importance). An assignment of a zero score for a pair of concepts indicated that the 
pair were highly unrelated, while a score of nine indicated that the pair were highly 
related. 
These data were then used to construct network representations that indicated the 
strength of the relatedness measure coexisting between concepts. These networks 
were constructed using the Pathfinder algorithm (Dearholt, Schvaneveldt and 
Durso, 1985; Schvaneveldt, Durso and Dearholt, 1985) which produces a 
network, from empirically derived relatedness measures, in which items or 
concepts are represented as nodes and the relationships between items are 
represented as links between nodes. 
A weight corresponding to the strength of the relationship between nodes is 
associated with each link and is taken to represent the inverse 'psychological' 
distance between nodes. The Pathfinder scaling technique has been applied to a 
number of domains including the design of menu systems (Roske-Hofstrand and 
Paap, 1986). A number of studies have shown that Pathfinder networks are 
psychologically meaningful. For instance, such networks have been shown to 
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have predictive value in that they can account for a subjects free recall performance 
better than other scaling techniques (Cooke, Durso and Schvaneveldt, 1986). 
The results of the Cooke and Schvaneveldt study indicated that the networks that 
were derived from the estimates of relatedness performed by their four 
experimental groups differed systematically with experience. The naive group 
appeared to base their structuring upon the meaning of the terms in natural 
language. This provides additional support for the finding of McKiethen et al who 
demonstrated that natural language associations are instrumental in the 
organisation of recall for novice programmers. In addition, the intragroup 
correlations between networks produced from the naive subjects' relatedness 
estimates proved to be high, suggesting a shared conceptual structure. In the case 
of the advanced group, conceptual organisation appeared to be based upon the 
meaning of the concepts in the programming domain. The intermediate network 
representation was rather similar to the network obtained for advanced subjects, in 
that the two networks shared many common features. One of the more interesting 
findings of this study was that the relatedness rating correlations demonstrated that 
intragroup agreement did not increase in a linear fashion with increasing expertise. 
Rather, agreement tended to decrease from the naive to the novice level and then 
gradually increase from the novice to the advanced level. 
The fact that naive subjects shared some common domain knowledge, albeit 
inappropriate to the programming task itself, is interesting in that it suggests that 
naive subjects have a mental model of programming just as the non-expert may 
have a naive mental model of physics (Gentner and Gentner, 1983). In other 
non-programming domains it has been demonstrated that inappropriate models can 
lead to serious conceptual difficulties during learning (Norman, 1983). The results 
of the Cooke and Schvaneveldt study suggest a means of identifying the source of 
beginning programmers misconceptions and thereby may contribute to 
instructional practice by explicitly focusing on the formation of appropriate 
conceptualisations. It is interesting to note that subjects with some, albeit limited, 
programming experience (i.e., the novice and intermediate groups) did not share a 
common conceptual structure. 
Cooke and Schvaneveldt suggest that this decline in agreement may be due to 
variations in teaching strategy, the use of particular text books etc. However, once 
concepts become well-learned, these variations in programming experience no 
longer appear to matter. They suggest that the advanced network representation 
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can be considered to be an explicit goal state in the learning process, while the 
naive representation corresponds to the state prior to learning. An analysis of 
intermediate states may indicate conceptual misunderstandings that have arisen 
during the learning process and Cooke and Schvaneveldt suggest that this will 
have implications for the adoption of particular teaching or training strategies. 
The studies that have been reviewed above have a number of implications for our 
understanding of the way in which knowledge representation changes with 
increasing expertise. In particular, they indicate that expert and novice 
representations have some very specific but differingproperties. For instance, 
experts have been shown to group information in a semantic fashion, while 
novices group information according to the surface features exhibited by a 
program. Adelson has demonstrated that experts tend to represent the declarative 
information relevant to a particular program, while novices focus to a greater 
extent upon a program's procedural content. 
While these studies have been important in terms of describing the more general 
features of programmers' knowledge representations, they do not provide an 
indication of the detailed content of these knowledge structures. There is, 
however, a growing body of literature that has focused explicitly upon a 
description of the kinds of tacit knowledge that programmers appear to be able to 
recruit to guide problem-solving. These studies have drawn analogies with work 
in text comprehension to suggest that problem-solving in programming is 
mediated by the possession of script or schema-like knowledge structures that 
provide specific techniques for commonly occurring programming procedures that 
are both language and problem independent. 
3.5 Knowledge Representation in programming: Analogies with text 
comprehension 
3.5.1 Introduction 
A number of important analogies have been drawn between work in the text 
comprehension domain and theories of knowledge representation in programming. 
Clearly there are certain common features of these domains that make this analogy 
plausible. For instance, programming involves the construction of text-like 
structures which are used to instruct a computer. The use of programming 
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languages might therefore been seen to be similar to our use of the written word 
for communicative purposes 1. 
Here, perhaps the most important analogy is with notion of a 'schema'. Schemas 
are proposed as knowledge structures which consist of a set of propositions that 
are organised in terms of their semantic content. There are two primary principles 
upon which most schema theories are built. Firstly, that cognitive processing is 
guided and limited by the application of prior knowledge. Secondly, that schemas 
contain relatively abstract knowledge which is largely independent of any one 
event. Moreover, in most theoretical accounts of schema use such structures are 
thought to be organised hierarchically, and to facilitate reasoning via the 
instantiation of default values in situations where information is not present in the 
task domain. 
Schema-based mechanisms for cognitive control offer a method for limiting the 
amount of inputted information, or bottom-up control, that is needed to perform a 
task. Moreover, schemas provide top-down control by using prior knowledge to 
restrict the range of possible operations that might be undertaken. Hence, either a 
perceptual input or a cognitive goal or process may evoke a schema with a related 
semantic content. 
Such theories have appeared in a number of forms. For instance Minsky, from an 
AI perspective, uses the term 'frame' (Minsky, 1971). Schank and Abelson 
identify a particular type of schema known as a 'script' composed of a sequence of 
abstracted actions which occur in the context of common events, with slots for 
specific instances (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Schank and Abelson also identify 
'plans', which are executed in order to determine the inferences that are required in 
order to understand situations for which there are no stereotypical event 
sequences. Hence, scrips denote sequences of actions that have occured on 
numerous occasions (e.g. visting a restaurant), whereas plans describe the 
production of novel action sequences (e.g. robbing a bank). 
Schema theories have been used to account for a wide range of cognitive 
behavours, such as language understanding, memory and problem solving. As 
such, we might regard such theories as fairly powerful, however there is a danger 
that this explanatory potential may result in the concept becoming too nebulous to 
be of any real value as a predictive mechanism. Too some extent this problem is 
reflected in some of the criticisms of schema-based theories of programming that 
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are proposed by this thesis. In particular, it is argued that schema theories of 
programming knowledge must specify explicity the mechanisms that mediate the 
acquisition and use of programming knowledge. 
Soloway and his colleagues (Detienne and Soloway, 1990; Soloway and Ehrlich, 
1984; Soloway, Ehrlich, Bonar and Greenspan, 1982; Soloway, Ehrlich and 
Gold, 1983; Spohrer, Soloway and Pope, 1985), drawing upon the work of 
Schank and others (Schank, 1980; 1981; Schank and Abelson, 1977), have 
proposed that programmers possess and are able to access abstract schematic 
plan-based structures that represent stereotypical programming knowledge. A 
number of other authors have attempted to provide a more formal specification of 
plan knowledge in programming. For instance Rich, Shrobe and Waters (Rich, 
1981; Rich, Shrobe and Waters, 1979; Waters, 1979; 1982) have developed a 
large collection of plans based upon their intuitions about programming. It is likely 
that there are hundreds (possibly thousands) of these plans which can be used to 
guide problem-solving in programming, and as in other domains this repertoire of 
plans provides a set of standard methods for achieving certain types of goals. 
Ehrlich and Soloway (1984) suggest that such plans provide high-level structures 
that serve to chunk together related pieces of information. Such plan structures are 
regarded as similar to Schank and Abelson's (1977) notion of scripts (See above). 
Scripts are used to explain how people can understand stereotypic sequences of 
events such as eating at a restaurant or going to a doctor. By analogy to this, 
Ehrlich and Soloway claim that plan knowledge in programming consists of a 
catalogue of stereotypic action sequences. These action sequences describe the 
programmer's tacit knowledge of the domain. The possession of such tacit 
knowledge structures has been shown to be an important factor in distinguishing 
experts from novices in other domains (Collins, 1978, Larkin et al, 1980; Polya, 
1973) and it would seem reasonable to suggest that expert programmers are able to 
recruit similar knowledge in order to guide their problem solving activities. 
Previous studies of the programming activity, such as those described above, have 
sought to establish that experts not only have more knowledge about programming 
than their less experienced counterparts, but that experts can be distinguished from 
novices in terms of their better organisation of knowledge. The work of Soloway 
and his colleagues has extended previous work by describing the typical content 
of expert knowledge structures and as such has provided a valuable insight into 
the way in which tacit knowledge can guide problem solving activities. 
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3.5.2 Programming Plans and Discourse Rules 
Soloway and Ehrlich (1984) introduce the notion of the programming plan to 
provide a description of those program fragments that are thought to represent 
stereotypic action sequences in programming. They suggest that expert 
programmers possess two main kinds of plan: Plans that relate to aspects of a 
program's control flow and plans that represent facets of variable use. An example 
of a control flow plan might be a plan that accumulates and keeps track of a 
running total (see figure 3.5). Soloway and Ehrlich suggest that such a plan might 
be used in variety of programs which may have been constructed to implement 
solutions to a wide range of problems. In this sense, such plans should be 
regarded as both language and problem independent. Hence, programs are 
constructed on the basis of generalised plan knowledge and specific plans are 
created in response to the requirements and constraints of a particular problem. 
The use of the term plan may seem rather odd here, since as we have seen, plans 
are usually taken to denote the action sequences that are required in the context of 
novel events. As we remarked above, perhaps a more useful description would 
equate the notion of plans with the concept of a 'script'. 
The composition of plans, according to Soloway and Ehrlich, is mediated by 
so-called rules of programming discourse (see also, Leventhal, 1987; 1988), 
which are proposed to be directly analogous to conversational discourse rules. An 
example of a program discourse rule is that variable names should normally reflect 
their function2. Hence, a program might be correct in that it produces the right 
results but may be difficult to read because it violates certain rules of discourse. 
3.5.3 Empirical Studies 
Soloway and Ehrlich (1984) report a number of empirical studies to support their 
contention that programmers are able to recruit tacit plan knowledge during 
problem solving and that the possession of such plan knowledge can be used to 
distinguish experts from novices. These studies employ two major experimental 
paradigms. Firstly, a fill-in-the-blank task, where subjects are presented with a 
program fragment with one or more lines omitted, their task being to supply the 
missing line/sand secondly a straightforward free recall task. Both sets of studies 
compared performance in these two tasks in response to the presentation of plan or 
unplan-like programs. 
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In this context, a plan-like program was constructed such that its component plan 
structures were consistent with certain rules of programming discourse. An 
unplan-like version (Soloway and Ehrlich's term) of the same program can be 
constructed by introducing violations to one or more of its consituent plan 
structures (see figure 3.6). It should be noted that in all cases both the plan and 
unplan-like versions were executable programs, and in the majority of cases 
computed the same values. This can be contrasted with the experimental materials 
used in a number of earlier studies which consisted of program statements 
presented in random order. 
Version A 
PROGRAM Yellow (input, output), 
V AR I INTEGER 
Letter, LeastLetter Char, 
BEGIN 
LeastLetter = 'a', 
FOR I = 1 TO 10 DO 
BEGIN 
READLN (Letter), 
If Letter > LeastLetter 
THEN Leastletter =Letter, 
END, 
Writeln (Leastletter), 
END 
Version B 
PROGRAM Green (input, output), 
V AR I INTEGER 
Letter, LeastLetter Char, 
BEGIN 
LeastLetter = 'z', 
FOR I= 1 TO 10 DO 
BEGIN 
READLN (Letter), 
If Letter < LeastLetter 
THEN Leastletter =Letter, 
END, 
Writeln (Leastletter), 
END 
Figure 3.5 a. These programs both represent a search plan, however in the second 
case (Version b) the program violates the discourse rule which suggests that "a variable 
name should reflect its function". 
Version A 
PROGRAM Pink (Input, Output), 
CONST 
MaxSentence = 99, 
NumOfConvicts = 5, 
VAR 
ConvictiD, I, Sentence INTEGER 
BEGIN 
END 
FOR I = 1 to NumOfConvicts DO 
BEGIN 
READLN (ConvictiD, Sentence), 
IF Sentence > MaxSentence 
THEN Sentence= MaxSentence, 
WRITEIN (ConvictiD, Sentence), 
END 
Version B 
PROGRAM Gold (Input, Output), 
CONST 
MaxSentence = 99, 
NumOfConvicts = 5, 
VAR 
ConvictiD, I, Sentence INTEGER 
BEGIN 
END 
FOR I = 1 to NumOfConvicts DO 
BEGIN 
READLN (ConvictiD, Sentence), 
WHILE Sentence > MaxSentence 
DO Sentence = MaxSentence, 
WRITEIN (ConvictiD, Sentence), 
END 
Figure 3.5 b. The basic plan represented by this program involves resetting variables to 
boundary conditions. The discourse rule violated in version B is "An IF should be used 
when a statement body is guaranteed to be executed only once and a WHILE used when a 
statement body may need to be executed repeatedly". 
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Fill-in-the-blank tasks 
In their first study, Soloway and Ehrlich presented novice and advanced 
programmers with a number of plan-like and unplan-like program fragments in 
which certain critical elements had been omitted (figure 3.6). The subject's task 
was to fill in the blank line with a piece of code that they thought best completed 
the program. According to Soloway and Ehrlich, subjects who engage in this task 
will need to infer the intention of the program based upon their knowledge of the 
problem and upon their tacit plan knowledge and this should create expectations 
about what would constitute an appropriate way of completing the program. A 
similar technique has been used in text comprehension work in order to explore 
subjects' underlying knowledge of typical real world events (Bower, Black and 
Turner, 1979; Kemper, 1982) and these studies suggest that this technique does 
provide an appropriate means of eliciting subjects' tacit knowledge about a 
particular domain. 
Soloway and Ehrlich reason that if advanced programmers possess and use 
programming plans then they should be able to recognise program fragments in 
plan-like versions of programs as examples of particular plans and consequently 
they will complete the blank line in that program with code that corresponds to the 
role expressed by that plan. In the case of unplan-like programs, the advanced 
programmer will not be able to infer the program's plan structure and they will 
consequently be less likely to fill in the missing line correctly. Novice 
programmers, who, it is claimed, have not developed a full repertoire of plans 
and programming conventions, will not be guided by plan structures and hence 
should perform with similar levels of accuracy in response to both plan-like and 
unplan-like programs. 
Soloway and Ehrlich's results provide support for these hypotheses. Firstly, 
experts were able to complete blank lines in programs more accurately than 
novices (61% correct response vs 48% correct response). In addition, subjects 
completed the plan-like versions correctly more often than the non-plan like 
versions. Finally, there was a significant interaction between program version 
(plan-like or unplan-like) and expertise. 
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Version A 
PROGRAM Brown (input, output), 
VARNum REAL, 
I INTEGER, 
BEGIN 
FORI= 1 TO lODO 
BEGIN 
Read (Num), 
IF Num < 0 THEN Num = -Num, 
Writeln (Num, Sqrt (Num)), 
END 
END 
Version B 
PROGRAM Green (input, output), 
VARNum REAL, 
I INTEGER, 
BEGIN 
Num=O 
FORI= 1 TO lODO 
BEGIN 
Read (Num), 
IF Num < 0 THEN Num = -Num, 
Writeln (Num, Sqrt (Num)), 
END 
END 
PROGRAM Brown (input, output), 
VARNum REAL, 
I INTEGER, 
BEGIN 
FORI= 1 TO lODO 
BEGIN 
END 
*********** 
IF Num < 0 THEN Num =-Num, 
Writeln (Num, Sqrt (Num)), 
END 
PROGRAM Green (input, output), 
VARNum REAL, 
I INTEGER, 
BEGIN 
Num=O 
FOR I = 1 TO 10 DO 
BEGIN 
END 
*********** 
IF Num < 0 THEN Num =-Num, 
Writeln (Num, Sqrt (Num)), 
END 
Figure 3.6. An example of the experimental materials used by Soloway and Ehrlich 
( 1984 ). The basic plans in this example are a guard plan and a variable plan. Version a is 
plan-like, while version b is unplan-like in that it includes two incompatible discourse 
rules. 
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Moreover, the difference in performance between the novice and expert subjects 
for plan-like programs was significant, while in the case of unplan-like programs, 
no difference was evident. Indeed, in the case of unplan-like programs, the 
performance of the expert group was reduced to that exhibited by the novice 
group. These results provide strong support for the idea that expert programmers 
use plan knowledge to guide their comprehension of programs. This knowledge 
provides a basis upon which expectations about program function can be 
constructed. Moreover, when these expectations are violated, expert performance 
is reduced drastically. 
Program Recall 
In a second study, Soloway and Ehrlich examined subjects' recall of plan-like and 
unplan-like programs. Soloway and Ehrlich employed the same stimulus materials 
in this study as in their fill-in-the-blank tasks, however only expert programmers 
participated. Subjects were presented with a program which they were 
subsequently asked to recall verbatim. Half of these programs were plan-like and 
the other half were unplan-like. Figure 3.6 shows examples of the programs used 
in this study. Notice that the programs are identical except for two 'critical' lines. 
These lines are described as critical in the sense that they convey information as to 
whether the program is plan-like or unplan-like. Subjects were presented with a 
program three times. During the first trial subjects were requested to recall as 
much of the program as possible. During the second and third trials, they were 
asked to either add to their original recall or change any part of their recall that they 
felt was in error. 
They key prediction made by Soloway and Ehrlich is that programmers would 
recall the critical lines from plan-like programs earlier than the critical lines from 
the unplan-like programs. The idea that the representatives of a particular category 
are recalled first in free recall studies is a well documented psychological principle 
(Crowder, 1976). Soloway and Ehrlich, employing this principle, suggest that if 
expert programmers make use of tacit plan knowledge and discourse rules to 
encode a program when it is presented, then the critical lines in plan-like programs 
will be recalled early in a free recall task, since these lines are considered to be the 
key representatives of a particular plan. In the case of unplan-like programs, 
critical lines do not bear a relationship to the program's plan structure and hence 
are of the same level of significance as other lines in the program. Hence, one 
would not expect these lines to be recalled any earlier than others. 
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Once again Soloway and Ehrlich's results provide support for the idea that the 
problem solving activities of expert programmers are mediated by the possession 
of stereotypical plan structures. The results from their recall experiment showed 
that subjects recalled more critical lines from plan-like programs than from 
unplan-like programs. There was also a significant interaction between version 
and trial, suggesting that the critical lines in plan-like programs are recalled earlier 
than in the unplan-like programs. 
In summary, the idea that plan knowledge plays an organising role in memory 
suggests a number of features that appear to be central to program comprehension. 
Firstly, the comprehension process appears to proceed by the recognition of 
patterns that implement known plans. Secondly, plans will be activated by partial 
pattern matches and confirming details will either be sought or assumed. Hence, 
plan structures are seen to guide problem-solving via both the application of 
known methods and through the creation of expectations about the typical form 
and behaviour of these methods. 
3.5.4 Other work on plans 
Interactions between everyday knowledge and programming language constructs 
The close analogy between studies of schema theory in text comprehension and in 
programming research has led to a number of other predictions about the role of 
tacit knowledge in programming. For instance, work in the text comprehension 
domain carried out by Bower et al. (1979) has shown that when texts violate the 
stereotypical sequences dictated by a script structure, subjects will tend to reorder 
the text during recall tasks so that it conforms to structures suggested by their tacit 
real world knowledge. In addition, Schank (1979) has proposed that the 
inferences that are typically made during text comprehension are affected by 
schema-congruent expectations. According to Schank, the salience of a particular 
text structure to a given reader is partly determined by its relative congruity or 
incongruity with that reader's schematic knowledge. 
In a similar vein, Soloway, Bonar and Ehrlich (1983) found that programmers 
show a tendency to order program statements in a manner dictated by their 
everyday knowledge even though this ordering leads to bugs in their programs. 
61 
For instance, this study showed that the process/read loop construct in Pascal (see 
figure 3.7) is a major source of bugs because it mismatches the normal course of 
events in the real world, i.e., normally we would first need to get an object (read 
it) in order to process that object in some way. 
programEl; 
var Count, Sum, Number : integer; 
Average ; real; 
begin 
Count:= 0; 
Sum :=0; 
Read (Number); 
while Number<> 99999 do 
begin 
Sum := Sum+ Number; 
Count : = Count + 1; 
Read (Number) 
end; 
if count> 0 
then 
begin 
end 
Average := Sum/Count; 
Writeln (Average); 
end 
else 
Writeln (' no numbers input: 
average undefined'); 
program Pascal L; 
var Count, Sum, NewValue: integer; 
Average: Real; 
begin 
Count:= 0; 
Sum :=0; 
loop 
Read (newValue); 
if New Value= 99999 then leave: 
Sum := Sum+ NewValue; 
Count:= Count+ 1; 
again 
if Count > 0 
then 
begin 
end 
Average:= Sum/Count 
Writeln (Average); 
end 
else 
Writeln ('no numbers input: 
average undefined') 
Figure 3.7 a. Two programs illustrating different looping strategies. Program Elisa 
normal Pascal program, utilising a PROCESS/READ strategy, while the program on the 
right is written in Pascal Land uses a READ/PROCESS strategy. 
Read (first value) 
while Test (ith value) 
do begin 
Process (ith value) 
Read (i +1st value) 
end 
loop 
do begin 
Read (ith value) 
Test (ith value) 
Process (ith value) 
end 
Figure 3.7 b. Schematic representations of, on the left, the process/read strategy typical of 
Pascal, and on the right, the read/process strategy embodied in Pascal L. 
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In addition, this study showed that subjects wrote correct programs more often 
when they used a language that facilitated their preferred (i.e., read then process) 
cognitive strategy. For instance, the language Pascal L uses a loop .. .leave .. again 
construct (see figure 3.7) and this language appears to facilitate the construction 
correct programs for intermediate and expert programmers. Additional support for 
the idea that everyday knowledge can create misleading expectations for beginning 
programmers is provided by Eisenstadt, Breuker and Evertsz (1984) who 
demonstrated that novice programmers can recruit plans based upon 'real-world' 
algorithms, but that difficulties arise when there is not a straightforward mapping 
between these algorithms and the kinds of operations that are allowed in a 
particular programming language. 
Plan violation and program complexity 
Additional support for the role of plan structures in comprehension has been 
derived from the idea that if plan structures are a key feature in program 
comprehension - the thesis suggested by Soloway and Ehrlich, and supported by 
their empirical research - then the extent to which a program violates normal plan 
composition should provide a measure of the understandability of that program. In 
order to explore this hypothesis further, Soloway, Ehrlich and Black (1983) 
compared three program analysis techniques- Halstead's Volume metric 
(Halstead, 1977), propositional analysis (Atwood and Ramsey, 1978) and plan 
analysis (Soloway and Ehrlich, 1984) - in order to determine the extent to which a 
measure of plan violation can predict program comprehension. 
Soloway et al (1983) took three versions of a program intended to solve the same 
problem and subjected the programs to the three analysis techniques mentioned 
above. The main difference between the three versions of the program was that the 
plan composition in two of the programs violated a number of rules of 
programming discourse. Soloway et al suggest that programmers will expect other 
programmers to follow these rules of discourse. Hence, plan or discourse rule 
violations will make programs to more difficult to comprehend. The question that 
Soloway et al address is whether the results of the three different methods of 
program analysis they consider can distinguish comprehensible programs (i.e., 
programs that conform to plan structure) from less comprehensible programs (i.e., 
programs that violate plan/discourse rule structure). 
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The first analysis technique, Halstead's Volume Metric, involves calculating the 
total number of operations (N 1) and operands (N2) in a program and the number 
of unique operations (n1) and operands (n2). These measures are then combined 
according to the following equation: 
The resulting number is intended to provide a measure of the size and broad 
complexity of a program. In addition, one might assume these factors to be a 
reasonable predictor of comprehensibility. While some studies have shown that 
Halstead's Volume Metric can predict programmer performance (eg., Sheppard, 
Borst and Love, 1978), Soloway et al found that the volume metric calculated for 
their three programs was equivelent. Hence this metric does not appear to provide 
a good basis for measuring the relative comprehensibility of different programs. 
Next, Soloway et al subjected the three programs to a propositional analysis. This 
form of analysis was derived from text comprehension work carried out by 
Kintsch and van Dijk (1978) who have suggested that texts can be decomposed 
and analysed in terms of their constituent propositional structure. The assumption 
here is that a text with a complex propositional structure will be more difficult to 
understand than a text with a simpler propostional structure. In the text 
comprehension domain there is considerable empirical support for the validity of 
this assumption (Kintsch and Keenan, 1973; Kintsch, Kozminski, Streby, 
McKoon and Keenan, 1975). In the context of programming, Soloway et al. 
suggest that programs will be more complex, and therefore more difficult to 
understand, when they have a) more propositions (defined by Soloway et alas the 
composition of a predicate (or operator in the context of programming) and its 
associated arguments (or operands)) and b) more levels of nesting. However, as 
with the volume analysis, this propositional analysis failed to distinguish between 
the plan-like and the unplan-like programs. 
This study suggests that plan analysis may constitute a useful method for 
assessing the comprehesnisbility of programs. The study also provides additional 
implicit support for the idea that plans play a focal role in program comprehension. 
Soloway et al readly admit that it is not clear how one might calculate a number 
that accurately reflects the violation or non-violation of discourse rules3. 
However, they suggest that the plan analysis should be seen as providing 
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qualitative rather than quantatative information about program comprehensibility, 
and that a numerical rating system does not typically point out the specific source 
of program complexity. They suggest that a qualiative analysis can be used to 
pinpoint specific areas of program complexity and also give a definitive 
prescription as to how this complexity might be ameliorated. 
3.5.6 Plan theory: Automated plan analysis and the development of intelligent 
tutoring systems 
Further evidence for the plan-based view of programming is provided by a study 
in which novices' errors were analysed in terms of the goal and plan structures 
inherent in their programs. Johnson, Soloway, Cutler and Draper (1983) 
characterised bugs by examining the differences between the actual and the 
intended plan structure of a program. From this they were able to provide a two 
dimensional analysis of program bugs according to the component of the plan 
which is affected by the bug and the type of bug or error. For example plan 
components include, updates, declarations, initialisations etc, while error types 
include, misplaced, spurious, missing etc. Using this classification technique, 
Johnson et al were able to analyse successfully 783 novice bugs into 29 of the 
possible 32 bug categories. This suggests once again that the analysis of programs 
into plan structures represents a valid framework for exploring the the nature of 
cognition in programming, since it enables one to predict the kinds a plan-based 
errors novices are likely to make. 
Knowledge-based program analysis- PROUST 
This analysis led to the development of PROUST (Johnson and Soloway 1985, 
Johnson, 1988; 1990; Littman and Soloway, 1988), a system that analyses 
novices' programs automatically to derive a non-algorithmic, or plan-based, 
description of the program. PROUST employs a knowledge base of programming 
plans and strategies, together with a description of the bugs that are commonly 
associated with these plans and strategies. PROUST carries out an 'intention' 
based analysis of programs, i.e., it frames its analysis in terms of both the 
intended functions of the program and in terms of the programmers intention as to 
how a particular function should to be achieved. According to Johnson, it is 
difficult to determine the intended function of a program simply by inspecting the 
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code, since there is no way of knowing whether what a programmer produces is 
what that programmer had in mind. PROUST derives information about the 
program's intended function by forming a description of the problem that was 
assigned to the programmer. In this context, problem descriptions consist of a set 
of goals to be satisfied and sets of the data objects that these goals apply to. 
For instance, for a program which calculates and reports the average daily rainfall 
over a certain period, the problem description defines a data object, ?DailyRain, 
which acts as a parameter to a number of the goals in the problem description. One 
of these goals Sentinel-Controled Input Sequence, forms a goal which requires a 
series of values to be read, and stops when a specific value (the sentinel) is 
reached. Figure 3.8 shows the goal decomposition of a problem in PROUST's 
problem description notation. 
From this problem description, the task of identifying the intentions underlying a 
program involves discovering firstly, how the goals in the problem description 
relate to the goals that are actually implemented in the program and secondly, what 
the programmer intended by implementing these goals. PROUST starts by 
assuming that the student's goals match, or are some variant of, the problem 
description's goals. If no plausible attempt to implement a particular goal can be 
found in the code, then PROUST retracts its initial assumption and asserts that the 
student omitted the goal. 
Clearly, programmers might implement the same goal in many different ways. For 
small programs it may be possible to enumerate all the different ways of 
implementing a goal, but for more complex problems the variety of different goal 
implementations will be too great. In PROUST's case the system constructs a 
description of the intentions underlying each individual student solution. To do 
this PROUST employs a knowledge base of programming plans. PROUST 
combines these plans into possible implementations for each goal, and then 
matches the plans against the code. If PROUST is unable to match its goal 
decomposition of the problem with its decomposition of the students solution, it 
attempts to account for this mismatch between the plans and the code. To do this 
PROUST uses its knowledge base of plan-difference rules, which suggest bugs 
and misconceptions that may account for the mismatch. For example such a rule 
might take the following form: 
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"IF a while statement is found in place of an if statement, 
AND the while statement appears inside of another loop 
THEN the bug is a while-for-if bug, probably caused by a confusion about the 
control flow of embedded loops." 
Johnson (1988) reports an empirical evaluation of PROUST which gives some 
idea of its strengths and weaknesses as a system for analysing bugs and 
misconceptions in novice programs. Figure 3.9 shows the results of running 
PROUST on a corpus of 206 solution to the same programming problem. 
?Daily Rain isa Scalar Measurement. 
Achieve the following goals: 
. 
Sentinel - Controlled Input Sequence (?DailyRain 99999); 
Input Validation (?DailyRain, ?DailyRain < 0); 
Output (Average (?DailyRain)); 
Output (Count (?DailyRain)); 
Output (Guarded Count (?DailyRain, ?DailyRain > 0)); 
Output (Maximum (?DailyRain)); 
Figure 3.8. A problem to calculate the average and maximum rainfall over a given 
time represented in PROUST'S problem description notation. 
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Total number of programs 206 
Number of programs receiving full analysis: 167 (81%) 
Total number of bugs: 598 (75%) 
Bugs recognised correctly: 562 (94%) 
Bugs not recognised: 36 (6%) 
False alarms: 66 
Number of programs receiving partial analyses: 31 (15%) 
Total number of bugs: 167 (21%) 
Bugs recognised correctly: 61 (37%) 
Bugs not reported: 36 (6%) 
False alarms: 20 
Number of programs PROUST did not analyse: 9 (4%) 
Total number of bugs: 32 (4%) 
Figure 3.9. Results of PROUST's analysis of206 programs written to 
solve the same problem. 
PROUST managed to analyse 81% of the programs completely, that is, it was able 
to derive a consistent model of the intentions underlying the programs. In these 
cases, PROUST successfully located 94% of the bugs that were identified by the 
experimenters. This result is impressive since it demonstrates that PROUST can 
detect bugs more successfully than traditional manual code inspections such as 
walkthroughs (Myers, 1978). 
Bridge - A plan-based programming tutor 
The success of the PROUST system provides additional support for plan-based 
accounts of program understanding since it demonstrates that plan-based 
descriptions of programs can provide a good basis for predicting and locating 
bugs and misconceptions. One natural extension of the PROUST work has 
involved using its output as a base for an interactive tutorial environment. 
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Since PROUST runs only in batch mode on a finished program, it is unable to 
provide a great deal of feedback to students about their progress. However, 
Bridge (Bonar and Cunningham, 1988; Bonar and Liffick, 1990), a prototype 
tutorial environment for novice programmers, is able to provide interactive 
feedback to students of programming. The architecture of the Bridge system will 
not be discussed in any detail here. However, the philosophy underlying the 
Bridge approach to plan teaching is germane to our discussion on 
knowledge-based theories of programming expertise. 
The fundamental assumption underlying the Bridge system is that teaching plans 
to students will improve their basic ability to understand and generate programs. 
Bonar and Cunningham contrast this with the kind of instruction students receive 
from programming texts, which introduce a programming language by discussing 
the syntax and semantics of each statement type . They suggest that this approach 
exacerbates a common novice tendency to adopt a syntactic matching strategy 
while problem-solving, such as that observed in physics novices (Chi et al. 1981 ). 
For instance, Bonar (1985) showed that novices work linearly through a program, 
choosing each statement based upon the syntactic features of previously 
encountered statements. Bonar and Cunningham suggest that one way of 
overcoming such a syntactic strategy is to teach novices the standard techniques 
for implementing common tasks, i.e., programming plans. 
Bonar and Cunningham have carried out a limited evaluation of Bridge. This 
evaluation addressed student attitudes to the Bridge system and considered the 
problems they had interacting with the tutor. However, the evaluation did not 
directly examine the efficacy of Bridge as a programming tutor. It is interesting to 
note that while Bonar and Cunningham do suggest that their students were 
reasonably successful at developing outline solutions using plan-based concepts, 
they often had some difficulty translating this into a program. They suggest that 
"Matching between the Phase 2 output and Pascal code was problematic, 
however. Because there is not always a simple match between a plan component 
and Pascal code, students will sometimes make a reasonable selection that Bridge 
doesn't accept". (pg 409). This appears to suggest that knowing plans alone may 
be inadequate to explain the performance of programmers. Rather, what appears to 
be important is understanding how plans are used. This brings us to the role 
strategy in programming expertise and this issue is receives further consideration 
in chapter 4. 
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3.5. 7 Elaborations of the plan theory - Rist's theory of schema creation in 
programming 
Recently, Rist (1986 a and b; 1989) has attempted to outline the mechanisms that 
might underpin plan use. Rist has proposed a model of program generation which 
traces the evolution of a program through a number of stages. An explicit feature 
of Rist's model concerns the identification of levels of abstraction in program 
structure. It is claimed that programs are built from simple knowledge structures 
that are merged and combined to form more complex structures. 
At the lowest level of detail , individual fragments of knowledge are combined to 
form a single line of code. The next stage in the development of a program is to 
create a programming plan which, as we have seen, provides 'canned' solutions 
for common goals such as calculating a running total or reading some data value. 
Next, these plans need to merged into the final program structure. Rist is primarily 
interested in the processes that underlie the plan generation activity and central to 
his theoretical explanation is the idea of focal expansion. 
Focal expansion describes the process of generating a programming plan from a 
so-called 'focal line'. In Rist's account, each programming plan has an associated 
focal line that directly encodes the goal of that plan. For instance a 'running total 
loop plan' will be associated with the focal line 'count:=count+ 1'. The complete 
plan will also consist of an initialisation component and some means of reading 
data values into the plan. The design of a program is seen to progress through 
various stages beginning with the implementation of a focal line, its extension to 
form a complete plan and finally to the creation of an entire program through a 
process of plan merger. 
Rist's model is described in more detail in chapter 4, where an attempt is made to 
explore the role of strategy in program comprehension and generation. However, 
there are specific aspects of Rist's model that are germane to the present 
discussion and in particular his description of the different levels of abstraction in 
plan-based knowledge representation. 
Rist suggests that programming plans can be described as a collection of schemata 
which are represented as slot-and-filler mechanisms. In addition these schemata 
represent programming knowledge at various levels of abstraction. For instance, 
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Programming Plans - or PPlans, in Rist's terminology - represent the lowest level 
of plan abstraction and are similar to the basic plans described by Soloway and 
Ehrlich ( 1984 ). PPlans have slots for the goal of the plan and for the code that it 
generates. Complex Program Plans -CCPlans - are built from a number of PPlans 
to achieve higher-level goals. Rist also describes other types of plans- for 
instance, Abstract Plans (APlans) which are thought to represent knowledge of 
different types of loop or sort techniques. Specific Plans (SPlans) represent 
specific routines such as bubble or shell sort, and Global Plans (GPlans) represent 
global procedures including "validate", "initialise" or "update". 
Rist's work provides a number of important extensions to plan-based theories. 
Firstly, it suggests a role for different categories and levels of plan knowledge. 
Whereas the Soloway and Ehrlich description of programming knowledge appears 
to suggest that plan representations are uniform and internally undifferentiated, 
Rist's approach asserts that plans can occur at different levels and that certain 
salient elements of each plan schemata guide the program generation activity. 
Secondly, Rist makes an explicit attempt to demonstrate how plans are 
implemented during code generation. One of the major limitations of existing plan 
theories is that the fail to specify the mechanisms that guide the implementation of 
plans during coding. In chapter 4, where Rist's work is elaborated in greater 
detail, the role of schema creation and focal expansion in plan implementation are 
discussed. These provide the basic mechanisms that control the transformation of 
plans into code and appear to provide a promising basis for an extension of 
plan-based theories of programming expertise. 
3.5.8 Assessing claims about programming plans: Problems and limitations of the 
plan theory 
The work of Soloway and his colleagues, and Rist's subsequent extension of 
plan-based programming theory, has clearly contributed to our understanding of 
the use of tacit knowledge in guiding problem solving in programming. In 
addition, this work has provided a useful means of describing the content of such 
knowledge structures and has been influential in the design of automated program 
analysis systems and intelligent tutoring aids. However, more recent work has 
questioned the basic adequacy of the plan theory. For instance, Pennington (1977 
a and b) has conducted a number of studies (described below) which suggest that 
programmers form multiple representations from a program's text structure, and 
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that the nature of the representation that programmers actually develop is largely 
dependent upon features of the task that they are engaged in. Such representations 
include plan knowledge, but may also carry information relating to state and 
control flow. These studies question the centrality of the plan concept in program 
comprehension, but they do not provide sufficient evidence to reject plan theories. 
However more recently, a number of studies have questioned the basic theoretical 
claims that underlie plan-based approaches to program comprehension. 
What claims do plan-based theories of program comprehension make? 
Claim 1: Plans are language and problem independent 
In order to assess the validity of plan-based theories of program comprehension it 
is necessary to make clear the theoretical claims that this approach advances. One 
of the major claims of plan-based theories is that programming plans will be both 
language and task/problem independent. Programming plans are taken to represent 
generic knowledge structures that in some sense represent the deep structure of a 
problem, hence a generic running total plan might be used in a variety of programs 
intended to solve a wide range of problems. In this way programs are seen to be 
constructed from these generic plans, which are then tailored according to the 
particular circumstances of a given problem. For example, the expert programmer 
wishing to compute facts about vehicle control will be able to access, say, a 
generic count plan , from their extensive repertoire of programming plans, and 
then instantiate this with variable names relevant to the particular situation, i.e., 
"count the vehicles". However a number of recent studies suggest the 
development of plan structures, or the ease with which plan structures might be 
comprehended or extracted from the program text, appears to be inextricably 
bound up with the way in which programming is taught, and this finding appears 
to pose serious implications for plan-based theories of programming expertise (see 
chapter 6). 
The relationship between teaching and plan acquisition is problematic because if 
the acquisition of plan structures is the primary characteristic of programming 
expertise, as suggested by Soloway and Ehrlich, then differences in teaching 
strategy and educational background should not affect the nature of that expertise. 
Gilmore and Green ( 1988) highlight this problem with an analogy to instruction 
and expertise in chess: 
72 
"If the acquisition of plan structures is the defining quality of expertise, then 
differences in teaching strategy etc. should not affect the nature of expertise. For 
example, it is reasonable to argue that the nature of expertise in chess does not 
depend upon teaching strategies , because the nature of attack and defence and the 
configurations that represent them are inherent in the game. Similarly 
programming plans are assumed to be inherent in the problem, not in the language 
or the teaching, and the development of such schemata/plans is dependent on 
experience, not on teaching". 
In chapter 6, experimental work is reported which suggests that the ability to 
extract plan structures from program texts is largely dependent upon the design 
experience possessed by the programmer, and that this design experience helps the 
programmer to construct a mapping between structures in the problem domain 
(plans) and structures in the language domain (programs). Additional evidence for 
this idea is presented by Stone, Jordan and Wright, (1990) who provide 
experimental support for the idea that instruction in structured programming 
principles can improve debugging performance by increasing a programmer's 
comprehension of program goals and plans4. Taken together these findings appear 
to pose significant difficulties for plan theories of programming, since educational 
background and differences in teaching strategy per se should not affect the nature 
of plan knowledge or the acquisition of plans and their use. 
Soloway and Ehrlich suggest that programming plans should be considered as 
schemata, however schema theory suggests that schemata acquisition is performed 
via an inductive process in which specific experiences are concatenated into 
generic schemata (Rumelhart and Norman, 1981). Schemata are not taught 
explicitly and we are certainly not taught procedures which facilitate the inspection 
and integration of schemata. However, while the work reported above does not 
suggest that plans are taught explicitly, it does indicate that differences in teaching 
strategy may influence the kinds of representations that programmers build and the 
way in which programmers use these generic representation. 
Another problem with the plan theory is that all of the reported empirical work on 
program comprehension that has been used to provide support for plan-based 
theories has used programs written in a single language (usually Pascal or one of 
its close variants). However, the plan theory gains much of its theoretical force 
from the claim that plan structures are language independent. For instance 
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Soloway and Ehrlich claim that their experiments support the idea that "plan 
knowledge play(s) a powerful role in program comprehension" (p. 609) (my 
emphasis). However, their work was concerned only with the role of plans in the 
comprehension of Pascal or Pascal-like programs, the assumption presumably 
being that these effects will generalise to very different languages. Anderson 
(1985) claims that plans will be equally useful to expert Basic programmers as to 
expert Pascal programmers, but no evidence is cited for this. Indeed, until 
recently, there have in fact been few attempts to discover whether programmers 
using languages other than Pascal employ similar plans. 
Gilmore and Green have recently called into question the generality of the 
programming plan as a description of the main type of cognitive representation 
employed by the expert programmer. Gilmore and Green (1988) have carried out a 
number of studies5 which suggest that the notation of certain programming 
languages may make those languages amenable or otherwise to the identification 
and use of plans. This suggestion is based upon the finding that Basic 
programmers are unable to benefit from cues to plan structure (i.e., when such 
structures are colour highlighted) while debugging programs, while debugging 
success for Pascal programmers appears to be facilitated significantly by plan 
structure cues. Basic programmers appear not to employ and abstract plan-based 
representation of a particular program during program comprehension, but tend to 
rely more extensively upon control flow information implicit in the text structure 
of the program. Gilmore and Green claim that Basic is less "role-expressive" than 
other languages. That is, Basic programs are less discriminable from each other 
than are say Pascal programs. In the case of Pascal, they argue that features of the 
notation of the language, in particular its role expressiveness and lexical richness, 
make it easier for the programmer to infer the role of a particular statement and to 
discover the relationship between groups of statements. 
This research calls into question the basic theoretical claim of plan theorists, which 
suggests that plan structures constitute a source of knowledge that is language 
independent. Indeed, if the plan theory is not generalisable to languages other than 
Pascal then clearly it is of significantly less utility and therefore interest. In chapter 
5 a distinction is drawn which emphasises the different views which have 
emerged with respect to plan theories. One view, the traditional view of plans, 
suggests that programming plans are universal natural structures that characterise 
the expert programmer's mental representation of a program. In this sense such 
plans are thought to represent the deep structure of a programming problem. 
74 
Alternatively, we may claim that programming plans might best be regarded as 
artifacts of the particular notational properties that certain languages display. 
Claim 2: The major defining characteristic of programming expertise is the 
possession of plans 
The above discussion also has implications for the second major claim of the plan 
school: that is, that the possession of plan structures forms the basis for 
understanding programming expertise. The studies carried out by Gilmore and 
Green and by Davies that have been briefly reviewed above found that although 
their expert subjects displayed the same level of debugging performance, some of 
these subjects based their debugging strategies upon plan knowledge while others 
employed different forms of information. Hence in terms of debugging 
performance, programmer's behaviour may be equivocal, and it seems that plan 
knowledge, in this context at least, does not provide a cogent means of defining 
expertise. One of the main problems with the plan theory is that it seems that plans 
are used both to explain expertise and to provide the only empirical measure of that 
expertise. Note that in the studies carried out by Soloway and Ehrlich, no 
independent measures of expertise were established. 
In chapter 7, I report a study which suggests that while the existence of plans may 
be used to differentiate novices from experts, an analysis of plan structures does 
not appear to provide a means of teasing out more subtle distinctions between 
levels of expertise. In particular, this study suggests that intermediate 
programmers appear to possess the same range and number of plan structures as 
their more experienced counterparts. However, intermediates and experts use 
plans rather differently. For example, while experts and intermediates are able to 
detect violations to plan structures with equal proficiency, intermediates take much 
longer to detect these violations in comparison to experts. 
This finding suggests that the procedures for detecting plan violations may be 
compiled in the case of expert performance, thus leading to increased detection 
speed. Hence, the evidence concerning plan use seems to provide little support 
for the idea that the possession of plans can be taken as a defining characteristic of 
expertise. In terms of the plan theory, one would presumably expect plan 
structures to be gradually accumulated as a programmer becomes more 
experienced. However, the lack of a clear discontinuity in the number and range of 
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plans used by intermediates and novices suggests that this view is invalid. More 
importantly perhaps, this experimental work suggests that we need to consider not 
only a simple enumerative view of the relationship between plans and expertise, 
but that we also need to stress the importance of those factors that control plan 
use. This brings us to a consideration of the strategic aspects of programming 
behaviour which will be considered in more detail in chapter 4. 
In the Architecture of Cognition (1983), John Anderson proposes a number of 
specific criticisms of schema theory that parallel some of the criticisms made here 
in response to plan-based theories of programming. Here, Anderson is concerned 
specifically with a comparison of the findings and the predictions of schema 
theory with his production system model of skill acquisition - ACT* (see chapter 2 
for a detailed description of this model). He suggests that the major problem with 
schema theory is that it blurs the distinction between declarative and procedural 
knowledge and fails to explain the evident contrast between these two forms of 
knowledge. Anderson suggests that there are good reasons to have both 
declarative and procedural knowledge. Declarative knowledge is flexible and can 
be accessed in many ways, while procedural knowledge is rigid but efficient. 
Schemata, he suggests "are more declarative in nature and have similar flexibility" 
(pg 39). He goes on to suggest that : 
"The condition-action asymmetry of production systems is committed to the idea 
that efficiency can be achieved by capitalizing on the structure and direction of 
information flow. One can only go from the instantiation of the condition to the 
execution of the action, not from the action to the condition. This contrasts with 
schemata ... where it is possible to instantiate any part and execute any other part. 
The asymmetry of productions underlies the phenomenon that knowledge 
available in one situation may not be available in another. Schemata, with their 
equality of access for all components, cannot produce this" (pg 39, my emphasis) 
Another criticism that Anderson levels against schema theories is that such theories 
do not specify effective mechanisms for schema acquisition. He claims that 
technically, it is difficult to construct learning mechanisms that can deal with the 
full range of schema complexity. Anderson claims that "Empirically, it is 
transparent that learning is gradual and does not proceed in schema-sized jumps." 
(pg 39) 
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As we have seen these two criticisms of schema theory also apply to plan-based 
views of programming, and they serve to illustrate at least two of the central 
problems of the plan-based approach. The work reported later in this thesis 
attempts to extend and modify existing plan-based views of programming by 
suggesting a plan restructuring and control mechanism based upon experimental 
data concerned with plan comprehension and use. It will be suggested that this 
restructuring mechanism leads to asymmetrically structured schemata or plans 
which may have compiled elements, but in which certain salient plan structures 
remain accessible throughout the problem-solving activity. 
3.6 Hybrid Models 
Another apparent problem with much of the work that we have reviewed so far is 
that it considers knowledge representation in programming to be of a broadly 
uniform nature. For instance, analyses of programming behaviour based upon 
plan knowledge suggest that data flow and functional relationships will be central 
to program comprehension. However, this assumption has been challenged by 
Pennington (1987a) who carried out a series of experiments which suggest that 
programmers are able to form a number of diverse representations of a program 
text, and that the development of these representations appears to be broadly 
influenced by the demands of particular tasks. 
Pennington was primarily interested in investigating whether procedural (control 
flow) or functional (plan knowledge) relations dominate programmers' mental 
representations of programs. She suggests that various types of knowledge about 
programming enable programmers to detect and represent the variety of relations 
that are implicit in a program text, and that the detection of these relations is a 
necessary condition of program understanding (Green, 1980; Green, Sime and 
Fitter, 1980; Pennington, 1985). 
Pennington suggests that computer programs, like other forms of text, contain 
implicit information that must be detected in order to fully understand the program. 
For example, the sequence of statements in a program provides information about 
the sequence in which the program will be executed. Another type of information 
relates to the data flow of the program which is concerned with the changes or 
constancies in the meaning or value of program objects throughout the course of 
the programs execution. The notion that programmers abstract such information 
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from the implicit text structure of the program has close analogy to the idea that 
natural language texts are understood in terms of their underlying referential, 
causal, or logical relations (Kintsch, 1974; Meyer, 1975; Trabasso, Secco and van 
den Broeck, 1982). 
Pennington suggests that four main types of abstraction can take place. The first 
abstraction involves inferring a program's goals , i.e, what the program is 
supposed to accomplish or produce. Pennington suggests that this abstraction is of 
a functional nature and will contain little explicit information about how these 
goals will actually be accomplished. A second abstraction involves extracting 
information from the text about processes that transform the initial data objects into 
the outputs of the program, i.e., a data flow abstraction. A third abstraction might 
involve the production of a control flow representation, indicating the passage of 
execution control. A final abstraction, may involve extracting information about 
the program action that will result when a particular set of conditions is true. This 
abstraction resembles a decision table in which each possible state of the world is 
associated with its consequences. 
In her experimental studies, Pennington provided a number of different types of 
comprehension question. Each type of question was phrased such that it accessed 
a different type of information from the program (e.g., Will an average be 
computed? (function); is the last record in ORDER_FILE counted in 
COUNT_CLIENTS? (sequence); will the value of COUNT_CLIENTS affect the 
value of ACTIVE_AVG? (data flow); When TEXT_EXIT is reached, will 
ORDER_REC_ID have a particular known value? (state)). Subjects were given a 
program to study and were told that they would be asked to respond to 
comprehension questions and be given a subsequent memory test. Following their 
study of the program text, subjects were asked to respond to each of the 
comprehension questions. They then carried out a free recall task where they were 
asked to recall as much of the program as possible, in whatever order occurred to 
them. Finally, the subjects participated in a complex priming task in which the 
time taken to recognise an individual line from the program was recorded. 
Pennington was interested in exploring a number of hypotheses. However, her 
specific concern addressed the hypothesis that if programmers form plan-based 
representations of programs, then they should recognise lines faster when they are 
preceded by lines derived from the same plan structure. This hypothesis is based 
upon the assumption that activation of an item in the memory structure will activate 
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items close to it, and especially those in the same cognitive unit. Hence, response 
time to the target preceded by an item in the same cognitive unit should be faster 
than the response time to an item not in the same cognitive unit (Anderson, 1983; 
McKoon and Ratcliff, 1980); that is, a priming effect should be apparent. 
Pennington's results suggest a number of problems with plan-based theories of 
programming expertise. Firstly, her subjects made fewer errors on the 
control-flow questions compared to the data-flow and the function questions. 
Moreover, the effect of priming was greater when the primes were derived from 
the same control structure as opposed to being derived from the same plan 
structure. Hence, it appears that representations of control flow appear to dominate 
a programmer's representation of a program, and that representations of function 
and data-flow, which are more naturally allied to plans, are not as important as a 
basis for organising memory structures. 
Pennington replicated these findings in a second study to which an additional stage 
was added. In this second experiment, her subjects were required to make 
modifications to a program and half were asked to provide verbal protocols while 
carrying out this task. Pennington discovered that after the modification phase the 
dominant representations were concerned with data-flow and function, and this 
was especially true for those who had supplied protocols. These results suggest 
that a programmer's task goals may also influence the structural relations that 
dominate mental representations in comprehension 
Pennington concludes by stating that her results "strongly support a view of 
program comprehension in which abstract knowledge of the program text plays 
the initial organising role in memory for programs, and that control flow or 
procedural relations dominate in the macrostructure memory representation" (p. 
337). She further claims that these results are consistent with the results found in 
prose text comprehension which suggest that knowledge of narrative and 
expository text structures guides comprehension and plays an important role above 
and beyond other content-schematic factors (e.g., Cirilo and Foss, 1980; 
Haberlandt, Berian and Sandson, 1980; Mandler and Johnson, 1977). 
Pennington's work suggests that knowledge representation in programming takes 
on a hybrid form with various sources of knowledge contributing to the 
development of memory organisation. Hence, certain forms of knowledge may 
play an important organising role during different stages of comprehension. 
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Moreover, it appears that the kinds of tasks undertaken by programmers may 
influence the nature of the mental representation of a program. This view clearly 
does not rule out a role for plan-based knowledge structures in program 
comprehension. It does however, challenge their centrality as structures that are 
hypothesised as being fundamental to program comprehension. Hence as 
Pennington suggests "While plan knowledge may well be implicated in some 
phases of understanding and answering questions about programs, the relations 
embodied in the proposed plans do not appear to form the organising principles 
for memory structures." (p. 327). 
3.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has served to provide a broad review of the extensive literature 
concerned with knowledge representation in programming. To a large extent the 
focus of work in psychological studies of programming has paralleled the 
concerns expressed in other problem-solving areas. For instance, early studies of 
programming concentrated upon the general structural aspects of knowledge 
representation, and provided important supplementary support for the chunking 
hypothesis that originated in other problem-solving domains such as chess and 
physics. Later studies began to focus more explicitly upon a description of the 
content of expert and novice knowledge structures. The concern of these later 
studies appears to mirror the trend apparent in other problem-solving domains, 
where interest began to be directed toward understanding the nature of generic 
knowledge structures and their role in problem-solving and comprehension. This 
is perhaps best exemplified by the work of Schank and his colleagues in their 
development of schema theory and the subsequent application of this theory to 
program comprehension by Soloway and others. 
More recently, the centrality of the plan concept has been challenged by studies 
which suggest that programmers can extract many different forms of programming 
knowledge from a given text structure. In addition, the studies reported later in 
this thesis, and outlined briefly here, highlight some major theoretical difficulties 
with plan-based theories of programming expertise and program comprehension. 
It appears that there is still much scope for further research into knowledge 
representation in programming. For example, we know little about the 
mechanisms that are involved in plan acquisition. In addition, while plan-based 
theories provide a detailed description of programming knowledge, they have little 
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to contribute to our understanding of the way in which plans are used. One 
intention of this thesis is to provide a general theoretical framework within which 
these issues can be addressed. 
While this chapter has sought to suggest that studies of programming expertise 
have broadly paralleled studies of expertise in other domains, it should be noted 
that some of the outstanding features of expertise that have been observed in 
non-programming domains have not found a place in general accounts of 
programming behaviour. For instance, most descriptions of knowledge 
representation in programming appear to suggest that such representations are 
uniform and that all parts of the representation are equally accessible. However, 
there is substantial evidence to suggest that the development of expertise is 
associated with changes in the way in which knowledge is represented. 
For instance, it has been observed that a significant part of the development of 
skill in a particular domain involves the transformation of declarative knowledge 
into procedural knowledge (Anderson, 1982; 1983; 1987; Neves and Anderson, 
1981; and see review in chapter 2). However, most theories of the development of 
programming skill do not make a distinction between these two forms of domain 
knowledge. For instance, the plan theory of programming appears to suggest that 
the knowledge expressed by plans has both declarative and procedural elements. 
Hence, a plan may specify the actions necessary to compute a particular procedure 
or it may describe, in a stereotypic fashion, the contents of that procedure. 
Characterising programming knowledge in this way clearly does not lead to a 
theoretical explanation of skill development in programming that is congruent with 
alternative accounts of skill development in similarly complex domains. 
A fundamental aspect of the framework suggested by this thesis is that as skill 
develops knowledge may be both proceduralised and/or restructured. Hence, it is 
suggested that certain key elements of plans remain accessible even though other 
elements of the plan may be compiled and proceduralised. The experiments 
reported in this thesis provide support for the idea that certain salient elements of 
plans are used to guide skilled problem solving behaviour in programming. For 
instance, in a study of program generation reported in chapter 8, expert 
programmers were observed to develop their programs by instantiating a focal 
plan element and then accreting the rest of the plan around that focal element. In 
chapter 10, an experiment is reported which demonstrates that expert programmers 
can access these focal plan elements both more quickly and more accurately than 
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novices or intermediates. In addition, a third experiment (reported in chapter 7) 
has shown that while experts and intermediates can detect plan violations with 
about the same frequency, expert programmers detect such violations with greater 
rapidity than intermediates. 
These findings are interpreted within a general framework which suggests that a 
critical factor in the development of expertise in programming is not simply related 
to the development of a larger catalogue of plan knowledge, as suggested by the 
plan theorists. Rather, expertise appears to be related to the way in which plan 
knowledge is structured. Similarly, in other domains, such knowledge 
restructuring processes have been proposed as central elements in theories of skill 
acquisition (for instance, Kay and Black's (1984) work on text editing and 
Lewis's (1981) work on algebra). In addition, Cheng (1985) has taken these ideas 
further by suggesting that the enhanced performance exhibited by experts in 
certain domains, and accounted for by classical problem solving theories in terms 
of knowledge compilation and proceduralization, can be equally well interpreted 
by proposing a knowledge restructuring mechanism which can restructure task 
components so that they are coordinated, integrated or reorganised into new 
perceptual or cognitive units. 
This thesis attempts to relate this knowledge restructuring process (elaborated in 
the final chapter of the thesis) to a subject's exposure to design experience and to 
the way in which this experience may impact upon a programmer's knowledge 
organisation in relation to programming tasks. In addition, an attempt is made to 
illustrate how this knowledge restructuring process, in concert with the effects of 
certain notational features, can give rise to particular forms of strategy. This leads 
to the development of a model of programming behaviour which suggests possible 
ways in which external task and language features might interact with a 
programmers internal representation of programming knowledge. It will be 
suggested that this model accounts parsimoniously for existing experimental data 
and that it is not open to the kind of criticism that is typically levelled at plan-based 
theories of programming expertise. 
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Notes 
1 It should be noted that this analogy considers programs as communicative 
entities. However the analogy loses strength if one considers the dual nature of 
programs: that is, they can be executed for effect as well as being read as 
communicative entities. 
2 See Kernighan and Plauger (1978) for a collection of rules derived from actual 
programming practice. Soloway and Ehrlich equate these rules with their notation 
of program discourse rules. 
3 Note that the Soloway et al study used programs where the experimenters had 
deliberately violated certain discourse rules. It is likely that it would be more 
difficult to assess accuratly the extent to which arbitarily generated programs 
violate certain rules in more naturalistic contexts. 
4 Readers are refered to chapter 6 for a more detailed description of these studies 
5 Readers are refered to chapter 5 for a more detailed description of these studies 
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Clluapter 41. Stu.ndlfies of tlhle stmtegic aspects of jpll"ogrammi~rng slknnn 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed issues stemming from what we might refer to as 
knowledge-based theories of programming expertise - that is, theories of expertise 
that have been concerned with the content and structure of programming 
knowledge. However, as we have seen, one major limitation of many of these 
knowledge-based theories is that they often fail to consider the way in which 
knowledge is used or applied. Hence, such theories have tended to concentrate 
simply upon the description or characterisation of declarative and/or procedural 
knowledge structures with the primary intention of demonstrating novice/expert 
differences in knowledge representation. However, such theories have failed to 
elaborate the cognitive mechanisms that may be thought to underpin the utilisation 
of such knowledge and have, by and large, ignored the strategic elements of 
expertise which are likely to play an important role in any comprehensive theory of 
programming skill. 
To take one example, proponents of the plan theory of programming have devoted 
considerable effort to providing a detailed description of the kinds of knowledge 
structures that are thought to underlie expertise. However, the plan theory does 
not suggest how plans might be used. Hence, it might be claimed that the plan 
theory simply presents a theory of plans rather than a theory of planning. 
The main assumption of plan-based theories is that the cognitive processes 
underlying programming are relatively straightforward (Gilmore 1990). Based 
upon ideas from artificial intelligence, it is suggested that these processes should 
be considered to be general problem-solving skills (cf. ACT*; Anderson (1983), 
and SOAR; Laird, Newell and Rosenbloom, 1987), which are possessed not only 
by experts but also by novices. Hence, the development of expertise is seen to be 
associated with the gradual accumulation of plan knowledge over time, rather than 
with the development of processes or heuristics which may govern plan use and 
application. Kolodner (1983) encapsulates the main problem with 
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knowledge-based theories of expertise: "even if a novice and an expert had the 
same semantic knowledge ... , the expert's experience would have allowed him 
(sic) to build up better episodic definitions of how to use it". 
An alternative to knowledge-based theories is to suggest that expertise in 
programming may involve the development or acquisition of complex task-specific 
cognitive or problem-solving strategies (Shneiderman and Mayer, 1979). Two 
interpretations of this view are possible. One interpretation, may be to suggest that 
the development of expertise involves the acquisition of strategies rather than 
declarative knowledge. This view suggests that even if we were able to teach 
expert knowledge structures to novices, this would not make them into experts 
since they will not have acquired strategies for utilising this knowledge (See 
Neisser (1976) for a more general discussion of this issue in the context of other 
problem solving skills). 
Alternatively, one may adopt a less strict position and suggest that expertise has 
both knowledge-based and strategic components. One might for instance argue 
that features of a programmer's knowledge representation determine the form of 
strategy that they adopt. This is the position suggested by the work reported in this 
thesis where an attempt is made to demonstrate the relationship between the 
development of expertise and the adoption of particular forms of strategy. 
Moreover, in contrast with existing work, this thesis is not simply concerned with 
characterising the forms of strategy that are seen to be associated with particular 
levels of skill. 
Rather, it is concerned with explaining why these strategies emerge. In particular, 
attention is directed toward exploring the relationship between the development of 
structured representations of programming knowledge and the adoption of specific 
forms of strategy. It will be suggested (see the final chapter of this thesis) that a 
know lege restructuring process occurs during the acqusition of expertise which 
results in the differential accessibility of various knowledge structures. Moreover, 
it is hypothesised that this gives rise to different forms of strategy. Hence, the 
work reported in this thesis represents an attempt to adopt a rather different 
perspective on the relationship between expertise and the emergence of particular 
forms of programming strategy. This approach provides an explanation for the 
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differences in strategy that have been observed in studies of programming 
behaviour and attempts to relate these strategic differences to an explicit model of 
knowledge representation in programming. 
This chapter considers a number of studies which have been concerned with the 
role of strategy in programming. These studies have tended to explore either the 
strategic aspects of program comprehension or the role of strategy in program 
generation. A number of studies have been concerned only with the strategies 
employed by experts, while others have attempted to associate differences in 
strategy with different levels of expertise. A number of other studies have been 
explicitly concerned with the kinds of difficulties experienced by novices, and in 
particular with those difficulties that arise because of an absence of elementary 
problem-solving strategies or because of a reliance upon inappropriate strategies. 
This chapter attempts to represent these different concerns and is composed of 
three sections. The first section deals with studies of program comprehension 
strategy, while the second reviews studies of generation strategy. A third section 
deals more explicitly with studies of novices, and attempts to highlight the fact that 
novices can display strategic as opposed to, or in addition to, knowledge-based 
programming difficulties. 
4.2 Strategies involved in program comprehension 
4.2.1 Brook's model of program comprehension 
One of the earliest theoretical explorations of the strategic aspects of program 
comprehension was outlined by Brooks (1977; 1983). Brooks presents what he 
calls a sufficiency theory which is intended as a description of the processes by 
which a programmer attempts to understand a program. A sufficiency theory, 
according to Brooks, should provide a description of a set of mechanisms and 
relationships that are sufficient to explain at least the most salient aspects of 
program comprehension behaviour. Brooks presents a number of behavioral or 
empirical differences that he claims any model of program comprehension should 
be able to account for. These sources of variation include the following: 
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1. The effects of differences in the task performed by the program on 
comprehension. Why do programs that perform different computations differ in 
comprehensibility, even though the intrinsic properties of these programs (e.g., 
length, complexity etc) are the same? 
2. The effects of variation in program text. Why, and under what conditions, do 
programs written in different languages vary in comprehensibility even though 
they perform the same computation? 
3. The effects of different programming tasks. Why might the comprehension 
process differ depending upon the nature of the task the programmer is 
undertaking. For instance, modifying a program as opposed to debugging it? 
4. The effects of individual differences. Why might one programmer find a 
particular program easier to comprehend than another programmer? 
Brooks then goes on to propose a model to explain these sources of variation. 
Brooks claims that the mechanisms suggested by this model are sufficient to 
explain the variability in the extent to which particular programs can be 
understood. He suggests that in this respect the model takes the form of a theory 
demonstration approach (Miller, 1978). 
Brooks outlines three main elements of his model of program comprehension in 
terms of a set of domain mappings and processes. He suggests that the 
programming process involves constructing mappings from a problem domain 
into the programming domain. This mapping process may also involve a number 
of intermediate domains . To illustrate this mapping process he considers a 
cargo-routing problem. Here, objects in the problem domain are cargoes that have 
specific destinations which must be reached within particular time and cost 
constraints. Before a program can be constructed to solve a routing problem, the 
programmer must assign numbers to the various cost and time elements, and 
identifiers (which might also be numbers) to the cargoes and destinations. This 
results in what Brooks refers to as a new knowledge domain, where the domain 
objects have become numbers. Next, an algorithm must be selected to carry out 
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the required computation. This gives rise to a further domain in which 
mathematical objects, such as trees or arrays, are constructed and in which various 
operations are specified, such as matrix inversion. Yet another domain emerges 
when the program itself is constructed and these mathematical objects are 
implemented as data structures and as primitive programming language operations. 
Finally, the execution of the program results in a further domain in which objects 
become the contents of memory locations and operations are implemented as 
low-level machine code instructions. 
Brooks claims that the task of understanding programs requires programmers to 
construct or to reconstruct enough salient information about these domains in 
order to provide a basis for generating various mappings between the domains. 
This construction or reconstruction process involves the programmer acquiring 
two main forms of information. One form of information is contained within each 
domain. That is, information about the basic set of objects in the domain and their 
relationships. The second form of information relates to the relationships between 
objects and operators in one domain and those in nearby domains. 
Brooks suggests that this construction/reconstruction process is expectation driven 
and consists of confirming/refining various hypotheses which are generated from 
the programmer's knowledge of the task domain and other related domains. 
According to Brooks, this process begins with a primary hypothesis which is 
generated when the programmer obtains any information about the task that the 
program performs. This primary hypothesis specifies the global structure of the 
program in terms of its inputs, outputs, data structures and processing sequences. 
The next stage in Brooks' model involves verifying or validating this primary 
hypothesis. This verification process will normally involve finding evidence for 
the hypothesis in the program code or in its associated documentation. Brooks 
further claims that since the primary hypothesis will almost always be global and 
non-specific, the programmer will have to generate a number of subsidiary, and 
less detailed, hypotheses which can be verified against information obtained from 
the code and the documentation. Brooks claims that these subsidiary hypotheses 
can be regarded as forming a hierarchical structure where those hypotheses lower 
in the hierarchy represent specialisations of those occurring above. 
88 
Brooks asserts that to minimise memory load, these subsidiary hypotheses will 
normally be created in a top-down, depth first manner. Hence, the comprehension 
process begins with the creation of a primary, and then a number of subsidiary 
hypotheses about the program's function. Initially these are based upon the 
programmers knowledge of the domain and of similar programs. Eventually, these 
subsidiary hypotheses become sufficiently detailed to enable the programmer to 
directly verify them against program text or documentation. The success or failure 
of this verification process can then be used to guide the formation or the 
modification of other subsidiary hypotheses. Hence, the condition that causes the 
hypothesis refinement process to terminate occurs when the level of detail of a 
hypothesis is sufficiently close to the program text or documentation to enable a 
specific comparison. More specifically, this process terminates when the 
operations or data structures specified in the hypothesis are ones that the 
programmer can associate with features or details visible in the program text which 
are typical indicators of the particular operation or structure in question. 
Brooks refers to the features that typically indicate the occurrence of certain 
structures or operations within the code as 'beacons'. For example, a typical 
indicator for a procedure that sorts array elements might be a section of code in 
which the values of an array element are interchanged. Clearly, there might be 
multiple beacons for a single structure or conversely the same beacon might 
represent a variety of structures or operations. 
In summary, Brooks' theory of program comprehension holds that 
comprehension is a top-down, hypothesis driven activity. According to this 
theory, the programmer does not study a program line-by-line, but instead forms 
hypotheses about program function based upon high-level domain and 
programming knowledge. These hypotheses, once suitably decomposed, are then 
verified against the program text by searching for beacons which indicate the 
presence of particular functions or structures. A particular hypothesis is verified 
when the expected beacons are found. If these are not found, the program text 
might be searched more thoroughly. If this more detailed search fails, the 
hypothesis is weakened and will be revised or discarded. One major difference 
between Brooks' theory and the studies described in the previous chapter is that 
this theory recogises the more global level of program structures and suggests, in 
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turn, an interaction between knowledge structures and information that is derived 
more directly from the program. 
Brooks claims that his theory of program comprehension can account for the 
sources of variation in program comprehension outlined earlier. For instance, 
there is considerable evidence that the type of control structures used to express 
programs can have a marked effect upon their comprehensibility (Green, 1977; 
Soloway, Ehrlich, Bonar and Greenspan, 1982). Hence, the text structure of the 
program may contribute to the ease with which hypotheses can be verified. An 
even more powerful source of variation may be related to the tasks the program is 
intended to perform. Hence, if as suggested by Brooks, program comprehension 
involves reconstructing the relationship between the original problem and the 
program text, then ease of comprehension will depend to a large extent upon the 
complexity of the original problem. In support of this, Brooks cites a study by 
Curtis, Sheppard, Milliman, Borst and Love, ( 1979) which showed significant 
differences in the comprehensibility of programs with the same software metric1 
value. 
The theory also suggests at least three distinct factors that might contribute to 
individual differences in program comprehension ability- programming 
knowledge, domain knowledge and comprehension strategies. Firstly, a 
programmer's ability to confirm hypothesis against code or to refine hypotheses 
appropriately will depend to a certain extent upon the programmer's knowledge of 
typical programming idioms and algorithms. 
Secondly, since Brooks' theory suggests that domain knowledge is critical to the 
formulation of high-level hypotheses, one might predict that a programmer will 
have great difficulty generating useful hypotheses if that programmer does not 
understand the problem the program is intended to solve. To the author's 
knowledge this prediction has not been tested; however it does suggest that 
documenting the rationale behind the specification for a program may aid 
comprehension by illustrating salient features of the problem domain. 
Finally, interprogrammer variation may arise from differences in the strategies 
employed by programmers to locate information in the program text. For instance, 
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two programmers attempting to validate the same hypothesis may use different 
strategies. One programmer may attempt to validate it by tracing the subroutine 
calling hierarchy, while another might attempt to locate input and output functions. 
Brooks claims that while these strategy differences may not account for as much 
individual programmer variation as programming and domain knowledge, they 
may play a role in explaining pathological cases of programmers who are 
exceptionally successful or unsuccessful at program comprehension. 
4.2.2 Empirical support for the Brooks model 
Brooks' theory of program comprehension provides a detailed and wideranging 
account of the strategies thought to be employed by programmers when they 
attempt to understand a program. However, while Brooks cites existing 
experimental work in support of the theory, no specific empirical evidence for the 
model is proposed. More recently a number of studies have been undertaken 
which address specific hypotheses derived from Brooks' model. For instance, 
Wiedenbeck (1986a and b) and Wiedenbeck and Scholtz (1989) have provided 
evidence for the idea that programmers use beacons to guide their problem-solving 
behaviour during program comprehension. 
The role of beacons in program comprehension 
For instance, in one of these studies (Wiedenbeck and Scholtz, 1989) a 
comparison was made between the comprehension of programs containing 
beacons and other similar programs which did not contain a beacon. Wiedenbeck 
and Scholtz constructed two versions of a Shellsort program, one containing a 
beacon line which swapped various values in a standard manner (i.e., t := a[j]; a[j] 
:= a[j + i]; a[j + i] := t;). A second 'disguised' version of the program introduced a 
whole second array, which was a copy of the first and served as a temporary 
storage for the swap value. The swap was performed by assigning the values to be 
swapped into the appropriate locations of this second array, then later copying the 
second array back into the first. Wiedenbeck and Scholtz claim that this second 
version is almost identical to the first, but that in the second case the beacon is 
disguised. 
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Novice and advanced subjects were given the programs to study for a short period 
and were then asked to carry out three tasks. The first task involved describing the 
function of the program. The second task involved subjects judging their 
confidence in having understood the program and a third task required subjects to 
recall the program verbatim. The first task was intended to demonstrate the 
subjects' understanding of the program and the confidence rating was used to 
provide a supplementary comprehension measure, since subjects might perform as 
well on the disguised version, but be less sure of themselves in respect to their 
understanding of the program. The recall measure was introduced to determine 
whether subjects remembered the swap better when it was presented in its more 
typical form. 
Wiedenbeck and Scholtz found that the advanced group was better at determining 
program function than the novice group and that, overall, subjects were more 
accurate in determining the function of the normal (no-disguise) version. They 
argue that these differences appear to arise as a consequence of the superior 
comprehension performance of the advanced subjects on the no-disguise version. 
Similar findings emerged in the case of the confidence rating task. Here advanced 
subjects were significantly more confident of their function judgments than were 
novices, and confidence was higher for function judgments in the no-disguise 
version than in the disguise version. In the recall task, there was a trend for 
subjects to recall the swap lines in the no-disguise version better than in the 
disguise version (67% vs 40% correct recall); however this difference was not 
significant. 
This experiment provides some evidence for the role of beacons in program 
comprehension and suggests that at least part of Brooks' model maybe correct. 
The idea that program comprehension behaviour is guided by beacons which serve 
to highlight important code structures is central to the model of program generation 
presented later in this thesis. The model proposed in this thesis places emphasis 
upon the process of knowledge restructuring that appears to be associated with the 
development of expertise. The model proposes that certain focal elements of 
plan-based knowledge structures will be more easily accessible and that these focal 
elements will tend to be generated first during program development. 
Subsequently, these focal structures will be further expanded to form a complete 
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solution. Correspondingly, we might consider program beacons to form an 
external analogue of these internally represented focal structures. Hence, the ease 
with which particular languages support the expression of beacons is likely to 
affect comprehension success. 
Strategic differences in program comprehension 
While the studies reported above by Wiedenbeck and her colleagues have served 
to provide a direct test of one aspect of Brooks' theory, other work has indirectly 
addressed issues stemming from the ideas on program comprehension that are 
presented by Brooks. For instance, Pennington (1987b) has carried out a study 
looking at the way in which differences in comprehension strategy can affect the 
level of comprehension achieved by expert programmers. Pennington carried out 
a detailed protocol analysis of the verbalisations of 40 professional programmers 
who were asked to study and modify a program. After a 45 minute study period 
her subjects were asked to summarise the program they had studied and respond 
to a number of comprehension questions. 
Pennington analysed her subjects' verbal protocols by classifying each statement 
in the program summary according to two explicit dimensions. Firstly, statements 
were classified according to their type, i.e., as a procedural, a data flow or a 
function statement. Secondly, each statement was classified in terms of its 
referent. For instance, a statement might refer to specific program operations or 
variables. Pennington classifies such statements as detailed statements. 
Alternatively, statements might refer to a program's procedural elements, and 
Pennington calls these program level statements. Domain level statements refer to 
real world objects such as cables or buildings and, finally, statements with no 
explicit referent were classified as vague statements. 
The program comprehension questions were used to classify the subject 
population into an upper (Ql) and a lower (Q4) comprehension quartile. 
Pennington then looked at the differences between these two groups in terms of 
the protocol classification scheme described above. With respect to the statement 
type classification, Pennington found no reliable differences between the Q 1 and 
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Q4 groups. However, analysis of the referent classification illustrated a number 
of important differences between the upper and lower quartile comprehenders. 
Specifically, the Ql group produced fewer statements at both the detailed level and 
at the vague level. 
To explore the Ql and Q4 differences further, Pennington sorted the program 
summaries produced by her subjects into three different "summary strategy" 
groups according to the proportion of statements at different levels in each 
summary. The first group (nine subjects) was composed of those programmers 
whose summaries predominantly consisted of statements corresponding to the 
program level. These summaries were referred to as program level summaries. 
The second group (twenty subjects) showed a more even distribution over 
program and domain levels, and their summaries were referred to as 
cross-referenced summaries. Finally, a third group (eleven subjects) produced 
summaries that included a high proportion of domain or vague statements and 
these were called domain summaries. 
Pennington suggests that to construct program summaries, subjects must retrieve 
information from one or more memory representations and that consequently we 
may assume that these summaries reflect at least some properties of the subject's 
mental representation2. Pennington claims that abstract knowledge of a program 
text structure plays an initial organising role in memory for programs, and at this 
stage tends to dominate the macrostructure (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983) memory 
representation that Pennington refers to as a program model. A second 
representation is created at later stages in program comprehension that reflects the 
functional structure of the program and is expressed in the language of the real 
world domain to which the program is applied. This Pennington calls the domain 
model. 
It appears that Pennington's work supports the idea initially proposed by Brooks 
that a significant factor in program comprehension involves creating a successful 
mapping between the problem and the programming domain - in terms of 
Pennington's study, between the domain model and the program model. One can 
identify three distinct strategies employed by Pennington's subjects. One strategy, 
the program level strategy, is characterised by the almost complete absence of 
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order in which the program was written and were expected to be able to describe 
how the program worked. For both of these groups reading times and search 
patterns were collected. A third group of subjects viewed a coherent program, but 
were asked to talk about what they were doing as they inspected the program. In 
this case, only verbal protocols and search patterns were analysed. 
The reading time data and search strategy information collected from the first two 
experimental groups illustrated the varied nature of cognitive processes during 
code comprehension. Reading time data indicated that subjects who viewed a 
coherent program spent an average of around 50 minutes studying the program 
lines, while those reading a scrambled program spent an average of only 6.5 
minutes reading the program. Almost all of the subjects who viewed the coherent 
program made short 'retrogressions' through the code. In order to analyse this 
phenomenon further, Robertson et al, categorised each action performed by the 
subjects as either a forward move (from one line to the next after another forward 
move), backward move (from one line to the previous line after another backward 
move) or as a switch in direction. Switches could in turn be categorised as either 
forward-backward switches (a return to a previous line after a forward move), or 
as backward-forward switches (a return to a subsequent line after a backward 
move). The data relating to these switching episodes indicates that around 11% of 
the subjects activity involved switches in direction, of this 16.6% involved going 
backwards through the code and the remaining 72.4% constituted forward 
movement. 
Search patterns were characterised by segmenting each subject's protocol into 
episodes. An episode consisted of a forward pass through a section of code, a 
forward-backward switch, and a second forward pass. All of the subjects' data 
contained a number of such episodes, and about one third of subjects' activities 
were categorised as being within episodes. Next, Robertson et al analysed reading 
times for the various movement types (i.e, forward, backward, 
forward-backward, backward-forward etc) and for between and within episode 
activities. These data are shown in table 4.1. 
There was a significant difference between the reading times within episodes and 
between episodes, and Robertson et al take this to imply that the 
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"episode/non-episode distinction may be due to the highly goal directed nature of 
processing within episodes" (p. 960). They suggest that between episode 
processes are likely to include more discovery based processing, whereas during 
within episode activity, subjects are searching for particular information. We 
might here draw parallels with Brooks' model and suggest that between episode 
processing may give rise to hypothesis generation, while within episode 
processing may provide a mechanism for hypothesis verification. Although 
Robertson et al do not mention Brooks' model, it does appear that their data 
provides support for the comprehension strategies that Brooks alludes to in the 
context of his model. 
Movement Type 
Forward 
Backward 
Forward-Backward 
Backward-Forward 
First Forward Pass 
Second Forward Pass 
Episode begin 
Episode end 
Between 
Episodes 
408 
141 
1581 
569 
Within 
Episodes 
146 
1027 
410 
387 
225 
348 
411 
Figure 4 .1. Reading times for the various movement types reported by Robertson et al 
(1990) 
The protocol analysis carried out by Robertson et al also suggests that certain 
movement types are associated with particular kinds of problem-solving activity. 
Here, the programmers' verbal comments were classified into six groups: 
Analyse, assume, question, answer, function and strategy. These were defined as 
follows: 
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Analyse - comments which a programmer offered as an explanation of a code 
segment. 
Assume - comments where a programmer made prediction about what she 
expected next in the program. 
Question - a comment that contained a query about the code 
Answer- a comment or statement that could be explicitly linked to an earlier 
question. 
Function - a comment about the function of a particular piece of code. 
Strategy - a comment about what the programmer planned to do next. 
Table 4.2 shows the proportion of comment types within each move category. It 
appears that concern for the functionality of the code was the topic of most of the 
programmers comments. This concern for functionality was apparent for all 
movement types with the exception of the backward movement category. In the 
case of this movement category, questions and strategy were the primary 
concerns. Robertson et al suggest that "the unequal distribution of comment types 
across movement categories shows that programmers had qualitatively different 
things in mind when they moved around in the code" (p. 963) 
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Movement Type 
Comment Forward Backward Forward Backward 
Category Backward Forward 
Analyse .078 .053 0 .057 
Assume .219 .158 .167 .220 
Question .078 .263 .125 .118 
Answer .094 .105 .083 .118 
Function .422 .158 .250 .368 
Strategy .109 .263 .375 .103 
Figure 4.2. Proportion of movement types in eaxh movement category. 
These data might be seen as providing support for other models of program 
comprehension. For instance, Brooks' model places emphasis upon the idea that 
programmers generate and test hypotheses about the function and role of elements 
of code when they attempt to understand a program. However, the nature of these 
hypotheses remains unexplored. The contribution of the Robertson et al study is 
that it provides a detailed analysis of the kinds of questions that are framed by 
programmers during comprehension. This analysis enables us to state more clearly 
the detailed nature of the hypotheses that programmers generate In addition, it 
provides a basis for a more detailed understanding the nature of programmers' 
information seeking activities which are directed towards testing these hypotheses 
and which are are evident in the strategies that they employ during comprehension. 
Widowski and Eyferth (1986) have conducted a study of programmers' searching 
strategies using a methodology similar to that employed by Robertson et al. 
Widowski and Eyferth were interested in comparing the strategies used by novice 
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and expert programmers who were asked to study a program line-by-line through 
a manoeuvrable, single line window. Widowski and Eyferth extended the 
traditional application of the Chase and Simon (1973) chess research which 
compared the performance of novices and experts on well-ordered versus 
randomly-ordered game positions. In the programming domain, the effects of well 
ordered vs random program presentation are well documented (see chapter 3), and 
studies of this effect in programming have replicated the basic finding of Chase 
and Simon who showed that expert performance is drastically reduced in the 
random condition, while novice performance is affected little. This effect is 
thought to be based upon the expert's ability to extract meaningful chunks from 
the materials presented, be they chess positions or programs. 
Widowski and Eyferth suggest that the same effect should obtain in situations 
where programs are well ordered, but which are unconventional or atypical. This 
would be predicted by the Chase and Simon model, since, although a program 
may be well ordered, it may not always be possible for a programmer to 
decompose it into meaningful chunks. In the case of an atypical program, 
programmers may not posses sthe appropriate knowledge structures upon which 
to base their chunking strategies. Hence, in the case of atypical (or semantically 
complex) programs, we might expect novice-expert differences to diminish, since 
experts may not have the knowledge structures necessary to process them. 
Widowski and Eyferth compared the performance of a number of Pascal novices 
and experts who were allowed to view only a single line of a program at a time. 
For the purpose of their experiment, Widowski and Eyferth constructed two pairs 
of programs which differed in their level of semantic complexity or typicality. 
Each pair of programs consisted of a stereotypical (semantically simple) and a 
non-stereotypical (semantically complex) program. Each pair of programs was the 
same length and the programs had an equivalent number of variables. Subjects 
were allowed to study each program for 10 minutes. 
In a subsequent recall study, significant effects of expertise and semantic 
complexity were evident. However, there was no interaction between expertise 
and complexity. Contrary to the hypothesis derived from Chase and Simon's 
model, experts were much better than novices at recalling both typical and atypical 
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programs. Indeed, the difference in novice and expert performance was, if 
anything, greater in the atypical condition. 
Next, Widowski and Eyferth analysed the reading patterns of their subjects in 
order to derive information on the search strategies they used. The basic form of 
measurement used here involved analysing the number of "runs" made by 
subjects. Here, a "run" was evidenced by the subject reading a number of 
consecutive lines before moving either backwards or forwards over more than one 
line in order to read another line. They suggest that this simple unit can reveal 
parts of the program text "that form subjectively meaningful entities" (pg 273). 
Widowski and Eyferth found that experts demonstrated more flexible reading 
strategies that novices. In the case of the stereotypical programs, experts adopted a 
strategy that involved reading the code in long but infrequent runs. In the case of 
the atypical programs, experts read the program in short and frequent runs. They 
suggest that the former strategy reflects a top-down or conceptually driven 
comprehension process, while the latter represents a bottom-up and heuristically 
oriented strategy. For novices, the same comprehension strategy appeared to be 
employed for both the typical and atypical programs. 
The contribution of this study to our understanding of program comprehension is 
twofold. On the one hand, this study demonstrates that experts have a better ability 
to respond to novel situations, even though they may not have the appropriate 
knowledge structures or plans to guide behaviour. Secondly experts appear to 
have a greater range of strategies available to them, leading to greater flexibility in 
performance. Hence, this work provides an interesting counterpoint to plan-based 
theories of programming expertise by suggesting the important role played by 
strategy in program comprehension. 
The studies conducted by Robertson et al and by Widowski and Eyferth have 
demonstrated the importance of the strategic elements of program comprehension. 
However, in order to achieve this, and to render their studies possible, they have 
restricted the task environment to such an extent that one might wish to draw into 
question the ecological validity of their experiments. One way of studying 
comprehension strategies which does not involve undue restriction to the task 
environment might be to examine the eye movement and fixation patterns made by 
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programmers while reading programs for comprehension purposes. However, 
studies of program comprehension which have involved eye movement analyses 
are rare. 
One study of subject differences in program reading has been conducted by 
Crosby and Stelovsky (1989). They asked expert and novice programmers to 
study a short binary search program. The subjects were asked to study the 
program for as long as they needed to understand it and a record of the total 
number of fixations made by the subjects and their associated durations were 
collected. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates two rather distinct reading patterns that emerged in Crosby 
and Stelovsky's study. These diagrams show the eye fixation patterns of two 
subjects superimposed over the algorithm. Each fixation point is represented here 
as a circle, whose size is propotional to the size of the pupil. Figure 4.3 a 
illustrates a typical "left-to-right, top-to-bottom reading strategy", of the kind that 
might be found in studies of nonprocedural text-based prose (Just and Carpenter, 
1980). A rather different reading style is shown in Figure 4.3 b. This subject first 
concentrated on the upper three lines of the algorithm, then skipped a number of 
lines to concentrate on the central portion of the program. Notice that this subject 
repetedly fixated upon certain areas of the algorithm. Crosby and Stelovksy 
suggest that "rereading was not only a frequent practice, but a necessity for 
comprenension. If an internal buffer held the information (as, for instance 
suggested by Bouma and de Voogd's (1974) model of reading), frequent 
rereading would be superfluous" (p. 141). 
Crosby and Stelovsky provide a more detailed analysis of individual scanning 
strategies by producing two dimensional "area/fixation" graphs which indicate the 
sequence of areas perused with respect to time. They found that patterns of eye 
fixations could be categorised, although there was a considerable range of 
individual scanning strategies. Such strategies ranged from linear scans of the text, 
typical of the kind found in prose reading, to highly nonlinear strategies. One 
might expect these differences in strategy to be related in some way to the 
expertise of the programmer, since the nonlinear strategy would appear to be 
highly goal directed, whereas the linear strategy treats each part the program 
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equally. However, Crosby and Stelovsky found no relationship between the use 
of particular strategies and expertise. 
into 3 subarrays*) 
en 
Figure 4.3a. A typical/eft-to-right, top-to-bottom reading strategy. 
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t (* A[left] < X < 
(*choose middle to split A into 3 subarrays*) 
(left + right) div 2; 
found := left = right + 2; 
index := middle; 
end; (*bin Search*) 
Figure 4.3a. A 'Comparative' reading strategy. 
Indeed, the only differences in expertise that were manifest in their study were 
related to the percentage of time spent viewing particular parts of the algorithm. 
Crosby and Stelovsky partitioned the algorithm used in their study into a number 
of areas, which could in turn be grouped into five classes: Comments, 
comparisons, complex statements, simple assignments and keywords. They then 
analysed the average percentage of fixation time spent by the novice and expert 
groups on these five areas. This analysis is shown in figure 4.4. It appears from 
this analysis that experts spend more time reading complex statements, whereas 
novices tend to concentrate upon comments. One might infer from this that experts 
develop their understanding of the program from the program text itself, while 
novices rely to a greater extent upon comments to augment their understanding. 
This would in itself seem to be a reasonable assumption. However, it would be 
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interesting to discover the extent to which experts actually use comments to aid 
understanding. Moreover, if experts tend not to rely significantly upon comments 
during comprehension activities then this would clearly question their utility, 
especially in program maintenance tasks where comprehension clearly plays a key 
role. 
The results of the Crosby and Stelovsky study are rather difficult to account for 
given the large body of literature which has demonstrated a strong relationship 
between particular forms of strategy and expertise. In general, their study failed to 
reveal any significant relationships between viewing strategy and programming 
experience or comprehension. The Crosby and Stelovsky study is interesting since 
it adopts a rather different methodological perspective to the studies of program 
comprehension reported above. Moreover, the results of this study are contrary to 
what one might expect given the results of existing work. In particular, it suggests 
that reading strategy and viewing time do not display any significant correlation 
with programming experience. In contrast, the other studies reported in this 
chapter would predict systematic variations in search strategy associated with 
differences in expertise. It would appear injudicious to reject previous accounts of 
program comprehension simply upon the basis of a single study. However, 
bearing in mind this caveat, it is clear that the Crosby and Stelovsky study raises a 
challenge to existing theories of program comprehension. 
The studies reviewed so far have been concerned primarily with the strategic 
elements of program comprehension. However, there also exists a considerable 
body of literature which has addressed issues relating to the strategic aspects of 
program generation. One problem with knowledge-based theories that was 
highlighted at the start of this chapter, is that while such theories serve to describe 
the content of stereotypical knowledge structures, they have typically not 
attempted to specify the processes that control the transformation of these 
representations into code during problem-solving. Recently however, Rist 
(1986a, b; 1989; 1990) has proposed a model of schema creation in programming 
that describes the way in which plan-based knowledge structures are transformed 
into programs and accounts for the differences in generation strategy that have 
been observed to be associated with differences in expertise. 
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Figure 4.4. Percentage of fixation time spent by the novice and expert groups 
viewing the five areas identified by Crosby and Stelovsky. 
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4.3 Strategies involved in program generation 
4.3.1 Rist's model of focal expansion 
Rist (1989) has proposed a model of program generation which illustrates how 
simple fragments of plan knowledge are composed at various levels of abstraction 
and, in addition, demonstrates how these plan structures are eventually 
implemented as code-based representations. Unlike previous plan-based accounts 
of programming behaviour which suggest that plans have a flat structure 
consisting of a sequence of steps that are simply concatenated to achieve a goal 
(Detienne and Soloway, 1990; Robertson and Yu, 1990), Rist's model assumes a 
more complex plan structure and suggests several distinct mechanisms which 
govern plan composition and use. 
The first stage of plan formation, according to Rist, involves creating a single line 
of code. Rist adopts Mayer's (1987) suggestion that the smallest fragment of 
knowledge used in program comprehension is a transaction. Transactions 
conceptualise a program statement in terms of the operations that take place, their 
location and the object that is acted upon. For example in order to understand the 
line of code, LET B=A + 1, requires 10 transactions. First the integer and 
increment must be defined and stored in temporary memory (4 steps), and then 
added (1 step). Next, the location of the sum must be defined and then deleted 
from temporary memory (3 steps). Finally, control must be transferred to the next 
statement and that statement executed (2 steps). According to Rist, the creation of 
even a single line of code involves a significant amount of reasoning and planning. 
Rist proposes that within a single line of code, there will be a central or focal code 
fragment that represents the most important operation performed by that line . This 
focus is described as that part of the statement that directly implements the current 
goal. In the above example the programmer's goal will be to increment a number, 
hence the code fragment that achieves this (i.e., + 1) becomes the focus of the 
programmers current activity, and other code structures will be built around it. 
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During the next stage of plan development, single lines of code are combined to 
create a programming plan. To do this, the plan focus must be extended to include 
other subsidiary plan elements. Rist suggests that this extension process can take 
two forms; plan creation or plan retrieval. In plan creation, the plan is developed 
backwards from the goal, to the focus of the plan and finally to its extension. 
Here, plan generation begins with the calculation element of the plan and then 
continues with the initialisation and the output. In plan retrieval, plans are 
generated in schema order, such that the initialisation part of the plan will be 
generated first, then the calculation part, and finally its output. 
The next level of plan use describes the process of plan composition to form a 
program. Here, Rist suggests simply that during this stage, basic plans are 
combined to form more complex plans. Rist claims that the visible structure of a 
complete program is created by these complex plans which make up the final form 
of the program. Rist further claims that only at the end of this construction process 
will the abstract form of the solution be apparent. Here, Rist suggests that this 
abstract program structure can be analysed in terms of the 'role structure' of 
various elements of the program. These role structures describe the goals of 
various program elements in terms of whether these goals involve establishing 
some input, making a calculation or relate to output in some way. 
The model of solution design proposed by Rist describes plan generation at these 
four levels and makes two basic claims about the effects of knowledge on 
behaviour. Essentially, if knowledge can be found to guide program design, then 
top-down and forward plan generation will be observed. If knowledge cannot be 
found, then a solution will be created by focal expansion, which characterises 
program generation as a bottom-up process. Hence, the novice, given a goal that 
they have extracted from the problem statement, will retrieve a fragment of code 
that directly implements the current goal, and will then construct the rest of a plan 
around this focal segment. Rist equates the development of expertise with an 
increase in stored knowledge which specifies the required plans. Given this plan 
knowledge, Rist claims that experts simply need to retrieve stored schemata and 
that a programmer's generation strategy will change from focal expansion to 
schema expansion as expertise develops. 
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Rist (1989) reports a longitudinal protocol analysis of a small number of subjects 
(10) who were asked to generate programs to solve a number of problems. Both 
the verbal statements produced by subjects and their resulting programs were 
analysed. The coding scheme used to analyse these protocols described, where 
appropriate, each code fragment or verbal utterance as relating to an "input goal" 
(1), or to a "calculate goal" (C) or to an "output goal"(O) (Spohrer, Soloway and 
Pope, 1985). In addition, an analysis of the program's plan structure was 
undertaken, and the order of emergence of plan elements (expressed as an ICO 
sequence) was established. 
Two sample protocols, illustrating this analysis are shown in figure 4.5. The first 
protocol illustrates the process of focal expansion, where the focal plan element is 
retrieved early during during plan development. According to Rist, this form of 
plan implementation would be observed in the case of novice programmers. Here, 
the order of generation is contrary to what one would expect if the plan was 
retrieved and implemented in schema order (i.e., in ICO order). The second 
protocol shows a program generation episode which reflects forward plan 
expression in schema order (I CO). This protocol represents the type of coding 
strategy thought to correspond to expert coding behaviour. 
The results of this study provide support for the model of code generation 
proposed by Rist. Firstly, the protocol analysis demonstrated that both forms of 
generation strategy, i.e., focal expansion and schema retrieval, were displayed by 
subjects. Secondly, there was a change in the mode of plan expression with 
experience. Evidence for this change in plan expression was established by 
comparing the degree of schema expression in plan creation (i.e., focal expansion) 
versus plan retrieval. This analysis showed that there was a significant increase in 
coding and verbal behaviour that could be accounted for in terms of plan retrieval 
processes associated with programming experience. Correspondingly, there was 
a significant decrease in plan creation with experience. 
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VERBAL STATEMENTS 
(N7) "For rain itself, 
rain is going to equal ... 
I need ... I need something ... 
I need something there that keeps ... 
I'm setting the sum equal to the amount 
of rain from 
before, OK ... sum will be a problem, 
I'll come back to it later ... 
[other goals solved] ... 
OK, do sum gets sum plus rain, or 
even better 
... and now set that to zero" 
VERBAL STATEMENTS 
(N2) "The first thing I want 
to do is to get the original word ... 
You might want to use an array for the 
letters in the word, so you have ... 
Now get the original word, so say 
WHILE ... use a REPEAT loop ... 
give a prompt first ... 
then REPEAT ... 
umm ... you want to read in ... 
you want a counter ... 
initialize a counter, 
and then you want to repeat 
... so you read it in, and 
then let i ... 
... intialize i to 1 
... and then increment it by 1 
... uh-uh, until ... " 
PROGRAM CODE INTERPRETATION 
goal 0 
+ rain focus c 
rainfall:= extension c 
sum extension c 
rainsum:=rainsum+rain focal line c 
rainsum:=O extension I 
PROGRAM CODE INTERPRETATION 
goal 
TYPE letters=array[l ,20] 
of char; V AR word: letters; define a word 
write ('please enter a word'); extention ~ead 
repeat extension 1Ioop 
read( ... focus cread,loop 
i :=0 [before repeat] extension 1count 
read (word[i]); use ocount 
1 := ... focus ccount 
i := 1 [before repeat] 
i := i + 1 
until(word[i] = ' '); use oread 
Figure 4.5 The first Protocol (above) illustrates the process of focal expansion, where the focal plan 
element is retrieved early during during plan development. This form of expansion is claimed to be 
characteristic of novices. Here, the order of generation is contrary to what one would expect if the 
plan was retrieved and implemented in schema order (i.e., in !CO order). The second protocol 
shows a program generation episode which reflects forward plan expression in schema order (!CO). 
This protocol represents the type of coding strategy thought to be used by experts. 
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4.3.2 Studies of change processes - The Parsing/Gnisrap model 
Green, Bellamy and Parker (1987a and b) have attempted to extend Rist's model 
of focal expansion by proposing a comprehensive model of coding behaviour 
which highlights those features of the device, task, interaction medium and user 
knowledge that contribute to the use and the development of particular forms of 
programming strategy. They suggest that there are two important aspects of 
coding behaviour that a model needs to account for. One aspect of coding 
behaviour relates to the fact that code is often not generated in a strict linear 
fashion, where the final text order of the program corresponds to its generative 
order. For instance, Figure 4.6 shows a number of departures from linear 
generation for a typical Basic protocol. Green et al suggest that these departures 
from linear generation indicate problems in the task and the device languages or 
their relationship. They suggest that departures from linear generation are 
significant, since they increase mental workload, may give rise to omissions and 
oversights and, depending upon the editor used to create the program, can involve 
many additional keystrokes to effect successful navigation around the code. 
1 
2 
r----1~6 
3 
7 
L~ 
4 
5 
10 
1 1 
10 Restore 
20 Dim data%(9) 
Dim Reversed%(9) 
30 For 1% = 0 To 9: Read data%(1%): 
40 
Reversed 
% 
(9 - 1%) = data%(1%): 
Print; data%(1); " ": Next 
Print: For 1% = 0 TO 9: 
Print; Reversed%(!%);" ": Next 
50 Data 1 ,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,0 
Figure 4.6. Departures from linear generation for a typical Basic protocol. The 
numbers on the left represent the order of generation. 
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A second aspect of coding behaviour relates to the ease with which information 
can be extracted from the text structure of the program. When programmers adopt 
a non-linear style of code generation they need to be able to read and to 
comprehend earlier parts of the code before they can insert subsequent parts. This 
re-comprehension process is likely to be facilitated if the programmer can easily 
extract relevant information from the program text. 
Green et al introduce the 'Parsing-Gnisrap' cycle to describe the cyclical 
alternation between code generation and recomprehension. The parsing-gnisrap 
model describes two fundamental psychological processes which underpin coding 
behaviour. Firstly, programming text is mentally elaborated from a skeletal plan, 
and when working memory is full, or when overload is threatened, part of this 
text is output to an external medium. When the programmer subsequently needs to 
recover the details of parts of the text that have been externalised, the text must be 
comprehended. To achieve this the text must be parsed in order to recreate the 
original plan structure. Gnisrap is simply the reverse of parsing and involves 
transforming an internal representation into an externally represented text 
structure. 
This model borrows directly from that proposed by Rist in that it suggests that 
expert coding is a forward chaining process which involves matching elements of 
a skeletal plan to programming plans and then expressing these plan elements in 
code-based terms. Rist's model suggests that expert programmers will tend to 
generate code in plan order, where the order of generation will reflect the final text 
order of the program. Conversely, the parsing-gnisrap model makes rather 
different predictions about the order of program generation. These differences 
arise as a consequence of one primary extension to Rist's model. 
The behaviour of the parsing-gnisrap model, unlike Rist's model of focal 
expansion, is fundamentally determined by working memory limitations. In Rist's 
model, programming knowledge is represented as schemata-based structures 
which state the code, its purpose, the role of components within the code, and its 
pre and post conditions. Plans are built by retrieving a focal line and then by 
subsequently extending this focal structure to include the plan's subsidiary code. 
In addition, other schemata may be invoked at this time by matching the 
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preconditions of the present schemata with the pre and post conditions of other 
schemata. According to Rist's model, nonlinearities will only occur when a 
programmer has to interleave a new plan into the existing program. The 
parsing-gnisrap model allows greater flexibility by suggesting that nonlinearities 
can occur within the generation of individual plans. For instance, it suggests that 
the minor parts of plans will often be omitted during generation, and that 
programmers will need to return to complete code fragments after generating later 
parts of the program. 
The parsing-gnisrap model suggests that rather than build up a whole program 
internally and then output it to an external source, programmers will output 
fragments as they are completed, or will dump incomplete fragments when 
working memory becomes overloaded. The model deletes information from 
working memory when it is output to an external source. Hence, when the 
programmer subsequently needs to refer to an existing code fragment, it will need 
to be parsed such that its original plan structure can be recreated. 
The behaviour of the parsing-gnisrap model (and correspondingly the behaviour 
of the programmer being modelled) depends upon characteristics of the device, the 
task language, the interaction medium and the model's knowledge representation. 
For example, the device language might represent the commands necessary to 
manipulate editor functions. If one has to navigate a complex structure in order to 
insert or to comprehend information, as necessitated by the parsing-gnisrap 
model, then the ease or difficultly of doing this is likely to affect strategy. 
The use of a particular interaction medium e.g. pen and paper, VDU, will also 
affect strategy. Green et al illustrate this by comparing the ease of using pen and 
paper to generate a program as opposed to dictating a program. With pen and 
paper it is a simple matter to insert new material, for instance, to balance 
parentheses or declare new variables. According to Green et al, pen and paper has 
a large 'access window', which allows the programmer to access any part of the 
expression being built. Conversely, in dictation, the access window is restricted to 
a single point. Between these two limiting cases lie word processors and text 
editors where the user must do some work to access any point other than the 
current cursor location. 
113 
The size of the access window is a property of the interaction medium, not of the 
task language. Hence, one can dictate or write Pascal or algebra and here the 
interaction medium differs while the task language remains the same. However, 
Green et al claim that the importance of the window size depends upon the task 
language. When using languages with many left-to-right constraints such as 
algebra or Pascal, it is important to have a wide access window, whereas other 
notations such as reverse Polish, which have fewer constraints of this sort, may 
not demand a large access window. 
Characteristics of the task language will also affect strategy. For instance, some 
languages are highly resistant to local change. Such languages might be described 
as viscous (Green, 1990a and b; 1991). For example, it is harder to insert a new 
section into a Pascal program than into an equivalent Basic program. This 
phenomenon is evident in the results of an experiment carried out by Green et al to 
test certain predictions stemming from the parsing-gnisrap model. This experiment 
is described in more detail in chapter 5, however its main finding was that the 
extent of non-linear generation in coding was related to the language being used. 
Hence, Pascal programmers adopted a highly non-linear style of code generation 
whereas both Basic and Prolog programmers departed infrequently from a linear 
generation strategy. 
Green et al claim that there may are several possible reasons for these difference in 
strategy. Firstly, Pascal procedures may offer better facilities for a non-linear 
approach than Basi~. subroutines. Secondly, the Pascal teaching tradition, and its 
emphasis upon stepwise refinement, has always emphasised a top-down, and 
consequently non-linear method of program development. Thirdly, Pascal appears 
to be inherently viscous, and an approach which minimises interleaving will be 
preferred. Finally, Basic is less role-expressive than Pascal (see chapter 5). 
Hence, Basic programmers will experience more difficulty comprehending code 
once it is generated and will therefore adopt a strategy which minimises the 
amount ofre-comprehension that is necessary, i.e, a linear generation strategy. 
The factors affecting coding strategy which are outlined above are, with the 
possible exception of Pascal teaching tradition, related explicitly to the formal 
structure of the task language. However, it is clear that strategy will also be 
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determined to some extent by the structure of the user's knowledge of how to 
perform programming tasks. In plan-based theories of programming expertise, 
plan structures are uniform and all their parts are equally accessible. However, it is 
clear that, in most cases, these plans will be composed of a major part and other 
necessary, yet minor elements. For example, a summation plan will require a 
minor initialisation component and more salient summation element. 
Green et al suggest that "These minor and possibly less salient parts of plans are 
sometimes left out by programmers during the first pass, either intentionally or by 
mistake, and are inserted later. On the other hand, it is extremely rare to see the 
minor part included in the first pass and the major part omitted. This asymmetry 
suggests to us that the effect is caused by asymmetry in the knowledge structure: 
the major part is focal to the plan, but the minor part is invoked only as a 
precondition required by the major part" (p 138). 
The importance of the parsing-gnisrap model is that it describes the process by 
which a plan is instantiated in a programming notation and the effect that various 
notational features will have on plan implementation and general coding strategy. 
In this sense, the parsing-gnisrap model complements and extends Rist's work on 
focal expansion by detailing the mechanisms that control plan use to give rise to 
various forms of strategy. For instance, the Green et al work showed that Pascal 
programmers frequently made backward jumps during coding to insert base 
preconditions, whereas in Basic, this retrospective inclusion of preconditions was 
infrequently observed. Similarly, PROLOG programmers almost always inserted 
a base case before developing other parts of the associated procedure. Green 
(1990b) suggests that this may arise because, in PROLOG, base cases are 
spatially contiguous with their associated focal line in the main case, whereas in 
Pascal, plan structures are diffuse. 
While the parsing-gnisrap model displays some overall similarity to the model of 
focal expansion proposed by Rist, it clearly makes different predictions about the 
order of plan generation. In particular, Rist's model would predict that experts 
would generate code in schema order, while novices would develop code by focal 
expansion. The parsing-gnisrap model makes no predictions about the relationship 
between expertise and generation strategy. However, the main factor that gives 
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rise to nonlinearities in this model relates to its limited working memory capacity. 
Since there is no reason to expect that experts would have a greater working 
memory capacity than novices, then, according to the parsing-gnisrap model, they 
should display broadly similar generation strategies, and hence exhibit similar 
patterns of nonlinearities. 
Moreover, the data used to support the parsing-gnisrap model was collected from 
expert programmers. As we have seen, this data appears to show that in many 
cases code is not generated in plan order, as would be predicted by Rist's model. 
For instance, in Pascal, preconditions are often inserted after other parts of a plan 
have been developed. Since Green et al did not analyse the plan structures evident 
in the programs generated by their subjects, it is not clear that one can make a 
direct comparison between this data and that reported by Rist. However, in 
general terms, the nonlinearities observed in the Green et al study do not appear to 
support a model of expert coding behaviour such as Rist's which would predict 
that plans will be retrieved and implemented in the order in which they appear in 
the final program. 
4.3.3 Knowledge restructuring: Extensions to the parsing-gnisrap model and the 
role of focal expansion 
In chapter 8 an experiment is reported that attempts to extend the paradigm 
suggested by Green et al by examining the nonlinearities in program generation 
made by programmers of varying skill level using different languages. This 
experiment suggests that the level of skill of the programmer is a more important 
discriminator than the programming language used. However, there were clear 
interactions in this experiment between skill level and language. This result is 
interpreted within the broad framework suggested by this thesis which advances a 
model of knowledge restructuring to account for skill development in 
programming. 
In particular, it is suggested that certain languages may facilitate the 
implementation and comprehension of focal code structures. This would explain 
the interaction between expertise and language. Hence, we might assume that as 
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knowledge representation is in the process of development, any additional means 
of facilitating a preferred programming strategy, such as might be provided by 
features of the notation of a particular language, would be of importance. At 
higher levels of skill, factors relating to the organisation of knowledge appear to 
play a greater role in the determination and support of particular forms of strategy. 
This experiment might be seen as providing a bridge between Rist's work on 
knowledge representation and the emphasis of the parsing-gnisrap model on 
language features, by suggesting possible ways in which these factors might 
interact to determine the nature of programming strategy. 
Additional support for this model of knowledge restructuring is provided by two 
further experiments which are reported in chapters nine and ten. In chapter nine, 
an experiment is described which examines the temporal generation of code for 
novice and expert programmers. Here, following Rist, each statement of the 
completed program was classified according to whether it constituted a focal or a 
non-focal line. The model of knowledge restructuring presented in this thesis 
would suggest that a programmer's representation of programming knowledge is 
not uniform, as is suggested by plan-based accounts. Rather, certain important 
code structures, i.e., focal lines, will be represented with greater saliency than 
other subsidiary plan elements. Moreover, in common with the parsing-gnisrap 
model, it is suggested that focal lines will commonly be generated first during 
coding (i.e., before non-focal lines). This reduces the load on working memory 
and provides a framework around which the rest of the program can be built. 
Since this knowledge restructuring process is assumed to underpin the 
development of expertise in programming, one would expect to see differences in 
the temporal generation of focal vs non-focal structures corresponding to the level 
of expertise of the programmer. This prediction is supported by the results of the 
experiment reported in chapter nine. In particular, expert programmers were seen 
to generate significantly more focal lines during the early stages of the 
development of a program, whereas novice programmers generated significantly 
more non-focal lines. This disparity was maintained until quite late in the 
development of a program, but focal and non-focal line generation tended to 
converge towards the final stages of program generation. This provides some 
support for the idea that expertise is related to the restructuring of programming 
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knowledge, since one would expect the saliency of various plan components to 
affect the generation patterns evident during coding. 
In addition, it is suggested that the early generation of focal lines during coding 
reflects the adoption of a top-down hierarchically levelled approach to program 
development. In chapter 6, an experiment is reported which suggests a 
relationship between design experience and subjects' ability to use cues to extract 
plan structure from a program text. It may also be the case that design experience 
can facilitate particular generation strategies. In particular, focal lines may 
represent a discrete level of design abstraction. 
This would certainly accord with Rist's characterisation of focal lines. According 
to Rist (1989) "the (plan) focus ... marks the start of detailed design in the domain 
of the program" (p. 403). Most design methodologies embody an approach which 
suggests that programs should be developed in a top-down fashion, beginning 
with the highest level of design abstraction and progressing to lower levels only 
when the preceding levels are fully articulated. Hence, programmers with design 
experience may be inclined adopt a strategy which causes them to articulate focal 
lines during the early stages of program development. 
Further evidence for the knowledge restructuring argument voiced by this thesis is 
reported in chapter ten. Here, an experiment is reviewed which employs a 
program memorisation and probe recognition task to explore the form of 
knowledge representation for programmers of various skill levels. In this 
experiment, subjects were presented with a number of small Pascal programs 
which they were asked to memorise. Subsequently, subjects were presented with 
a probe item and were asked to state whether it was contained in the original 
program. Half of these probe items were derived from the original programs and 
the other half from similar programs. Additionally, half of the probe items derived 
from the original programs were classified as focal lines and the other half as 
non-focal lines. The results of this study showed that intermediates and experts 
exhibited approximately the same recognition accuracy, suggesting that they were 
able to access similar knowledge structures. However, the expert group correctly 
recognised focal lines much faster than the intermediate group. This is taken as 
evidence for the idea that experts represent focal lines with greater saliency than 
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their less experienced counterparts and, consequently, as evidence for the model 
of knowledge restructuring presented in this thesis. 
These experiments suggest a possible means of linking the process of focal 
expansion described by Rist with the idea that code is generated and evaluated in 
cyclical phases as suggested by the parsing-gnisrap model. However, the 
knowledge restructuring model presented here differs from previous work in a 
number of respects. Firstly, in contrast to Rist's model, focal expansion is seen as 
a strategy which arises due to knowledge restructuring, and hence will be 
exhibited predominantly be experts rather than by novices. Secondly, the work 
reported in this thesis predicts that differences in generation strategy will be related 
to differences in expertise. In contrast, while the parsing-gnisrap model makes no 
specific predictions about the effects of expertise, this model implies that there will 
be no relationship between these two factors. Generation strategy, according to 
the parsing-gnisrap model, depends primarily upon working memory constraints 
and upon the nature of the task language being used, and there is no reason to 
believe that these would, in tum, be related specifically to expertise. 
4.3.4 Change-Episodes 
The cyclical nature of code generation and comprehension suggested by the 
parsing-gnisrap model is also reflected in other studies of programming 
behaviour. For instance, Gray and Anderson (1987) have carried out an analysis 
of so called 'change episodes'. Change episodes are described as key junctures in 
the coding process where programmers alter their code. Gray and Anderson 
suggest that an analysis of these episodes can help to illuminate the cognitive 
process involved in programming, since they provide a wealth of information 
about the programmer's goals, about their planning activities, about their 
evaluation of existing code and about the error detection and correction 
mechanisms which are typically invoked during programming tasks. 
Gray and Anderson suggest that coding should be viewed as a problem solving 
process where the problem statement represents the initial state of the problem and 
the completed program its goal state. The knowledge and skills of the programmer 
119 
determine which parts of the problem involve problem solving and which parts 
simply entail the retrieval of information from long term memory. 
Following All wood (1984), Gray and Anderson distinguish two types of problem 
solving activities: progressive and evaluative. Progressive activities work directly 
toward the goal state of the problem, whereas evaluative activities involve 
checking some already executed part of the problem solution. In programming 
terms, coding (and planning what to code) are progressive activities and checking 
and changing code are evaluative activities- in Gray and Anderson's terminology, 
change-episodes. 
Previous accounts of problem solving behaviour have, according to Gray and 
Anderson, tended to ignore these evaluative activities and studies of programming 
appear to have followed this trend. For example, most accounts of debugging 
(Vessey, 1985; 1986; 1989; Waddington and Henry, 1989) involve progressive 
activities. The issue of how programmers actually evaluate their progress during 
debugging and coding is not normally addressed. The work of Green et al does 
suggest an important role for evaluative activities during coding, however the 
parsing-gnisrap model does not make any strong predictions about when and 
where these activities will take place. By relating change-episodes to predicted 
planning or problem solving difficulties during coding, Gray and Anderson have 
been able to specify the circumstances in which change-episodes are most likely to 
occur, and this provides a systematic basis for understanding the evaluative 
activities that normally take place during coding. 
The Gray and Anderson study involved analysing the change-episodes contained 
in protocols produced by 'advanced novice' subjects writing a single LISP 
function. A change-episode is said to occur when the programmer alters some 
code that they have already written or when they subsequently modify a plan that 
has already been articulated (derived from a verbal protocol). Gray and Anderson 
suggest a tripartite analysis of change-episodes involving the change goal, the 
noticing event and the fix. The change goal is an articulated goal that the 
programmer later decides to change. The noticing event describes the first 
indication that the programmer wishes to change the goal structure of their 
solution. The fix is the goal structure after it has been changed. 
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Gray and Anderson derive a number hypotheses which relate to each of the three 
elements in their change-episode analysis. As far as change goals are concerned, 
Gray and Anderson suggest that the probability of a goal being the target of a 
change-episode will be correlated with the amount of planning involved in its 
execution. This hypothesis is based upon the assertion that goals which involve a 
significant amount of planning arise because the goal is not yet well learned and 
has not been subject to knowledge compilation or that there are so many variations 
as to how the goal can be used that a specific rule for the required variation has not 
yet been compiled. They suggest that in the first case, poorly learned goals can 
easily be coded incorrectly and hence they can become the target of evaluative 
activities. In the second case, choosing the correct instantiation of a goal will 
depend upon having a clear idea about how the rest of the function will be coded, 
and this in turn can depend upon a number of highly variable goals. 
The second element of Gray and Anderson's change-episode analysis, noticing 
events, are indicated either by keystroke analysis or from verbal protocols. In the 
first case, the programmer might interrupt their current activity in order to 
backtrack to an earlier part of the program. In the second case, verbal utterances 
might be indicative of a noticing event (for instance, an "oops" followed by a 
revision) or it might consist of a full articulation of the change-goal. 
Gray and Anderson suggest three issues relating to the nature of these noticing 
events which form the basis of their hypotheses. Firstly, do change-episodes form 
an abrupt interruption to the progressive activity of coding or do they arise as a 
more natural outcome of an activity such as symbolic execution that was begun for 
some other reason? Secondly, do the nature of change episodes differ if they are 
initiated by different types of noticing events? Finally, is there a relationship 
between the activity that immediately precedes the noticing event and the change 
goal? 
The final part of Gray and Anderson's analysis is related to how a goal is altered 
during a change-episode. Essentially, the fix is the goal-structure after it has been 
changed, and this is established by comparing the goal structure before the 
change-episode with the goal-structure after the change-episode. They suggests 
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two issues that relate to fixes. Firstly, are their as many types of changes or fixes 
as there are change-episodes, or can most fixes be categorised? Secondly, what 
does the nature of these fixes suggest about the role of planning in coding? 
The results of the Gray and Anderson study support the specific hypotheses that 
are outlined above and, in addition, provide a basis for a discussion of the more 
general questions raised by their analysis. For example, they found that the 
probability of a goal being the target of a change-episode was indeed correlated 
with the amount of planning involved in its execution. Their results also suggest 
that only a small number of fix categories exist. In particular, their results indicate 
that a large proportion of fixed change-episodes could be grouped into just two fix 
categories; one which involved relatively minor editing of a goal's subgoals and 
one which entailed major transformations in the goal's structure. Their results also 
suggest that a change-episcx,le can be initiated in three distinct circumstances; as an 
interrupt to coding, as tag-along to other change-episodes or as a product of 
symbolic execution. 
The first of these describes the situation where programmers simply stop coding to 
make changes. Gray and Anderson suggest that these interrupts appear to be part 
of the planning process. They argue that programmers begin to work on a goal 
before it is fully planned and that this may help programmers to remember the goal 
structure of the plan without committing them to its detailed elaboration. It appears 
that as programmers begin to elaborate a plan, this may suggest that higher order 
goals require revision. 
This process clearly has similarities with the kinds of activities described by the 
parsing-gnisrap model, since it relates planning and working memory limitations 
to the fragmentary nature of code generation and accounts for the evaluative 
activities that need to be undertaken to recover or to recreate higher-level goals. 
Change-episodes can also be initiated as a result of tag-alongs to other 
change-episodes. In general, these episodes involve fairly straightforward fixes 
such as correcting spelling mistakes or balancing parentheses. However, some 
episodes appeared to arise due to confusion over which of several methods to 
apply in a particular situation. Here, Gray and Anderson argue that such methods 
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may at an intermediate stage of compilation, where the programmer may know 
several methods, but not know which to apply. Finally, change-episodes can 
occur as a result of symbolic execution where the programmer had been 
symbolically executing their code immediately prior to noticing the need to change 
a previously coded or stated goal. 
The evidence for these three categories of change-episode was mainly derived 
from verbal protocols. However, Gray and Anderson also present collateral 
information (i.e., time between last keystroke and noticing event) which provides 
additional independent support for their categorisations. In the three categories 
they found that the mean time in seconds between the last keystroke and the 
noticing event was 52.5 (symbolic execution), 2.2 (interrupts), and 4.0 
(tag-alongs). These differences are statistically significant, and provide additional 
support for the validity of their change-episode categorisation. 
Gray and Anderson's change-episode analysis has proved important since it 
makes firm theoretical predictions about where change-episodes will occur during 
coding. In addition, it provides a detailed account of the cognitive mechanisms 
which underpin such change processes and other more general evaluation 
activities. Moreover, the change-episode analysis presented by Gray and 
Anderson clearly ties in with other work on change processes, and in particular 
with the parsing-gnisrap model. Both of these models suggest that because of 
certain cognitive limitations, code is generated in fragments and that these 
fragmentary structures need to be evaluated in some way in order to recreate the 
original plan or goal structures that initially gave rise to the generation of these 
code fragments. 
However, despite the close parallels between these models, both display a very 
different emphasis. The parsing-gnisrap model is primarily concerned with the 
effects of features of the task language on coding behaviour, and has little to say 
about knowledge representation. Conversely, the change-episode analysis 
attempts to relate the evaluative activities that occur during coding to a specific 
model of the planning and problem solving processes that underpin programming. 
Viewed together, these models clearly advance our understanding of problem 
solving in programming by illustrating the various factors that give rise to the 
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adoption of particular forms of strategy. This analysis leads to a characterisation of 
programming behaviour which highlights its true complexity and distinguishes it 
from other domains. 
Research on change processes such as that used to support the parsing-gnisrap 
model and Anderson and Gray's analysis of change-episodes is currently lagging 
some way behind advances in language design. For instance, the object oriented 
programming paradigm has spawned a number of languages which have been 
designed specifically to support an information structure which facilitates code 
change and modification. The emphasis of these languages is upon code re-use, 
and to make re-use possible these languages need to exhibit sufficient flexibility to 
allow the programmer to easily modify and tailor the code. However, there is little 
empirical evidence which demonstrates the extent to which particular object 
oriented languages might support change and re-use (See, Green, Gilmore, 
Winder and Davies, 1992). 
Lange and Moher (1989) report a single subject study of a professional software 
developer working in an object oriented environment which showed that code was 
frequently re-used. However, their subject achieved this by simply copying text 
rather than using the method-inheriteance mechanisms provided by the system. 
Lange and Moher suggest that this "reflects an overall approach of comprehension 
avoidance, in spite of the fact that the subject was modifying code that she herself 
had written earlier" (p. 69). Similar findings have arisen in other studies of 
software reuse (Maiden and Sutcliffe, 1991; Sutcliffe and Maiden, 1990). If these 
findings are generalisable, then they may suggest that language designers will 
need to think again about supporting change processes in object oriented 
environments. Moreover, this finding provides additional support for the idea that 
change processes are cognitively significant and that such processes require some 
cognitive effort to effect. 
4.3.5 Characterising coding activities and program design as opportunistic 
The studies of change processes that are reviewed above appear to suggest that 
coding may be considered to be an opportunistic process (Hayes-Roth and 
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Hayes-Roth, 1979; Hayes-Roth, Hayes-Roth, Rosenschein and Cammarata, 
1979) consisting of bouts of activity each of which involve the creation of code 
fragments. These fragments are, in turn, continually reevaluated and modified in 
respect to the particular goal or subgoal currently under consideration (Green et al, 
1987). In addition, the development of code may be postponed at any time in 
order that the programmer might direct her attention to other goals or subgoals, 
possibly in response to the recognition of previously unforeseen interactions 
between code structures (Gray and Anderson, 1987). 
Such opportunistic strategies can be contrasted with top-down models of problem 
solving which suggest that problem solving is a focused process that starts from 
high level goals which are successively refined into achievable actions. In 
addition, it is claimed that this process is hierarchically levelled. That is, plans or 
sub-goals are always fully expanded or refined at the same level of abstraction 
before the problem solver or planner moves on to a lower level in the plan/goal 
hierarchy. Such a view of problem solving is well established in the psychological 
literature (Kant and Newell, 1984; Newell and Simon, 1972) and hierarchical 
planning models in artificial intelligence are founded upon these principles (Ernst 
and Newell, 1969; Sacerdoti, 197 4; 1977). 
More recently an alternative view of the planning/problem solving process has 
emerged. This view characterises planning and problem solving as 
opportunistically mediated, heterarchical processes (Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 
1979; Hayes-Roth et al, 1979). Here, in contrast to top-down models, planning is 
seen as a process where interim decisions in the planning space can lead to 
subsequent decisions at either higher or lower levels of abstraction in the plan 
hierarchy. At each point during the planning process the planner's current 
decisions and observations may suggest various opportunities for plan 
development. For instance, a decision about how to conduct an initially planned 
activity may highlight constraints on later activities, causing the planner to refocus 
attention on that part of the plan. In a similar way, low-level refinements to an 
abstract plan may suggest the need to replace or modify that plan. Hayes-Roth and 
Hayes-Roth (1979) have provided support for their view of the planning process 
by observing subjects planning a series of errands through a town. Here subjects 
tended to mix high and low-level decision making. Often subjects planned 
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low-level sequences of errands in the absence or in direct violation of a high-level 
plan. 
The dichotomy between top-down and opportunistic processing is also evident in 
empirical studies of the programming activity. For instance, Jeffries et al (1981) 
found that both novice and expert programmers decomposed their designs in a 
top-down fashion- moving between progressive levels of detail until a particular 
part of the solution could be directly implemented in code. One major difference 
between novice and expert programmers was that novices tended to employ a 
depth-first search of the solution space- expanding only one part of the solution at 
progressive levels of detail- while experts adopted a breadth first approach-
synchronously developing many sub-goals at the same level of abstraction before 
moving to a lower level. 
Adelson and Soloway (1985) provide additional support for the use of top-down 
design by experts working in both familiar and unfamiliar domains and Anderson 
and others (Anderson, Farrell and Sauers, 1984; Pirolli, 1986; Pirolli and 
Anderson, 1985) have shown that novices characteristically develop designs in a 
top-down and depth-first manner. Such a view of the design process is also 
clearly implicated in prescriptive accounts of the software design activity. For 
instance, the emphasis on top-down problem decomposition and stepwise 
refinement that is advocated by the structured programming school (Dahl, Dykstra 
and Hoare, 1972; Wirth, 1971). 
In contrast, a number of more recent, studies have highlighted the opportunistic 
nature of program design tasks. For example, Guindon ( 1988; 1989) found that 
software designers often deviate from a top-down, stepwise refinement strategy 
and tend to mingle high and low-level decisions during a design session. Hence, 
designers may move from a high level of abstraction - for instance, making 
decisions about control structure (e.g., central vs distributed) - to lower levels of 
abstraction, perhaps dealing with implementation issues. Guindon notes that the 
jumps between these different abstraction levels do not occur in a systematic 
fashion, as one might expect from hierarchically levelled models, but instead can 
occur at any point during the evolution of a design. 
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Other studies (Ratcliff and Siddiqi, 1985; Siddiqi, 1985, Siddiqi and Ratcliff, 
1989) suggest similar deviations from a simple top-down model within program 
design. In addition, these studies have questioned the basic adequacy of 
prescriptions stemming from the structured programming school, in particular the 
notion of functional decomposition/stepwise refinement. For example, Siddiqi and 
Ratcliff, (1989) looked at the problem decomposition strategies employed by 
programmers during program design tasks. They found that subjects trained in 
structured programming do not carry out problem decomposition in a manner 
which reflects a search for appropriate levels of abstraction in a specification, as 
would be expected if these subjects were rigorously applying structured 
programming techniques. Rather, their problem decomposition is guided largely 
by various availability effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) derived from the 
problem representation. 
They found that problem decomposition can be affected by stimulus availability or 
by knowledge availability. These describe cues derived from two sources; 
Stimulus activated; i.e., where decomposition is motivated by content and surface 
characteristics of the problem specification, or knowledge activated; i.e., where 
decomposition is triggered by design experience. The last of these availability 
effects would suggest a hierarchical problem decomposition strategy, if the subject 
had received prior training in program design. However, the stimulus activated 
availability effect may suggest other decomposition strategies, and Siddiqi and 
Ratcliff have observed that on many occasions problem decomposition is triggered 
in this way, and can often lead to simplistic problem decompositions. Moreover, 
they found that this bias towards simplistic decompositions can be reduced by 
instituting small changes to the problem specification. 
The Siddiqi and Ratcliff studies suggest significant problems with hierarchically 
levelled, top-down characterisations of coding behaviour and software design 
such as those prescribed by the structured programming school. In addition, if one 
considers this work in the light of other studies which have attempted to 
characterise design and programming behaviour as opportunistic, then this clearly 
also poses problems in terms of applying classical models of problem solving to 
programming activities. Such models clearly advance a top-down description of 
problem solving and embody hierarchically levelled goal decomposition methods. 
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However, many programming activities appear to display few of the 
characteristics that have being posited by these models. For instance, programs are 
often constructed in a piecemeal fashion with frequent redesign and evaluation 
episodes and programmers are frequently observed to move between different 
hierarchical levels at various arbitrary points during the coding process. 
4.4 Studies of Novices 
The emphasis of the work that has been reviewed so far in this chapter has been 
concerned with the nature of the strategies employed by experts - often 
professional programmers - in program comprehension and generation. These 
studies suggest that there is an important strategic element in programming skill. 
We can contrast this view of expertise with knowledge-based theories which 
suggest that the development of skill in programming simply involves acquiring 
and building a body of programming knowledge. One of the main implications of 
knowledge-based theories is that one way of teaching programming involves 
passing on the knowledge used by experts to beginning programmers, and it 
follows from this that novice difficulties in programming arise simply from a lack 
of programming knowledge. However, a number of recent studies suggest that 
novice programmers display strategic as opposed to knowledge-based difficulties. 
For instance, Perkins and Martin (1986) conducted a series of interviews with 
novice Basic programmers in order to explore the kinds of difficulties they 
experienced. They suggest that one way of exploring novice difficulties is to ask 
what students typically know and do not know. In this context, they draw a 
distinction between low-level programming knowledge - that is, knowledge of 
particular language structures or stereotypical plans- and higher-level strategic 
knowledge of the abstract and general tactics of problem-solving. Perkins and 
Martin suggest that these sources of knowledge form two extremes on a 
continuum, and they ask whether novice difficulties arise from a beginners 
shortfall in low-level knowledge structures or from deficiencies in their high-level 
strategic repertoire. 
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They suggest that there are two extreme cases where these deficiencies might be 
manifest. It may be the case that novice programmers have the general cognitive 
skills for the tasks they face, but that their mastery of the primitives of the 
language may be poor. Hence, such skills cannot be applied effectively to solve 
programming problems. Conversely, novice programmers may posses knowledge 
of the language but be unable to muster this knowledge since they lack the 
necessary tactical skills. This, of course, is an over-simplification of the problems 
that novices might face. The novice may know some things about the language 
and not know other things. Perkins and Martin suggest that common experience 
testifies that often a person does not simply "know" or "not know" something. 
Rather, people can often only recruit fragmentary or fragile knowledge. 
The term fragile knowledge is introduced by Perkins and Martin to describe 
knowledge which a student has, but fails to use when it is needed or when it is 
appropriate. From their analysis of interviews with novice programmers, Perkins 
and Martin suggest that fragile knowledge may take a number of forms. For 
instance, missing knowledge is knowledge that the student has either not retained 
or has never learnt. Inert knowledge is knowledge that the student has but fails to 
retrieve when it is required. Misplaced knowledge denotes circumstances in which 
a student uses knowledge inappropriately and conglomerated knowledge signifies 
situations where a student combines disparate elements of knowledge in 
syntactically or semantically anomalous ways. 
Fragile knowledge does not simply arise because a student has not been taught 
about a particular programming construct, and evidence for the existence of 
fragile knowledge is based upon the fact that on nearly 50% of occasions where 
hints were given to students while they writing programs, the student went on to 
successfully solve the problem, even though the hint did not make reference to the 
appropriate knowledge. Their interview data also suggests that these categories of 
fragile knowledge are "exacerbated by a shortfall in elementary problem-solving 
strategies" (p 225). 
For instance, one example of a 'neglected strategy' is a 'close-tracking' or 
'parsing' strategy which involves reading the code in order to discover what the 
program actually does. One might expect even novices to employ such a 
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rudimentary problem-solving strategy. However, it appears from the interviews 
conducted by Perkins and Martin, that novices rarely engage in close-tracking -
that is, they infrequently read what exists of a program in order to check their 
progress in relation to stated or implicit objectives. Perkins and Martin go on to 
suggest that the use of such elementary problem-solving strategies should be 
encouraged. They claim that students would gain much by the self-prompting of a 
close-tracking strategy. They suggest that students should be encouraged, through 
their programming education, to ask questions like "what will the code I have just 
written really do?" or "how did my program get that wrong answer?" 
The strategic difficulties encountered by novices in the Perkins and Martin study 
suggests that the acquisition of strategic skills may play a significant role in the 
development of expertise. It may indeed be the case that novices know appropriate 
plans but not how to use them. The proponents of knowledge-based theories of 
programming expertise have generally ignored the strategic aspects of 
programming skill. However, it is clear from the studies reported in this chapter 
that strategic elements of programming skill may, in some cases, by of greater 
significance than its knowledge-based components. 
For example, Gilmore (1990) reports an unpublished study which also suggests 
that novices may know plans but not be able to use them successfully. Gilmore 
gave novice POPll programmers a programming problem in which they could 
choose between an iterative or a recursive solution. The novices in this study had 
been taught about both recursion and iteration. In a number of cases, Gilmore 
observed that the student's response to an error message was simply to switch 
from a recursive plan to an iterative plan or vice versa. 
He reports one particular protocol where a subject developed an iterative solution, 
but omitted the necessary initialisation. This turned out to be the only error in this 
subjects solution, but rather than try to edit the program, the subject simply 
switched to a recursive solution. In developing this recursive solution, the subject 
made an analogous error, by failing to implement a function that returned a value 
from the stopping condition. The subject then reverted back to an iterative plan. In 
total, this subject switched between these two possible solutions five times before 
detecting the mistake. Thus, while this subject obviously displayed some 
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knowledge of recursion and iteration, it seems that he was unsure about how to 
use this knowledge in an appropriate fashion. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The work reviewed in this chapter illustrates the wide range of perspectives that 
have been adopted by studies which have addressed the strategic aspects of 
programming skill. Unfortunately, no clear picture emerges from this work. While 
many studies have clearly demonstrated the importance of strategic knowledge, 
they have not presented a unified characterisation of the nature of programming 
strategy. For instance, a number of studies of program comprehension suggest 
that programmers search through the text of a program in a selective fashion, 
attempting to pick out salient structures or beacons which can be used to futher 
guide search or to provide evidence for specific hypotheses about program 
function which are generated during the comprehension process. While many 
resarchers would adhere to this general position, there is some evidence that 
search strategies vary considerably between individuals and that particular forms 
of strategy do not appear to be realted to either comprehension success or to 
differences in expertise. 
Similarly, models of generation strategy have described programming behaviour 
in different ways. In addition, one can derive different, and often conflicting, 
predictions from these models about the strategy that will be adopted by 
programmers. For example, Rist's model of program generation makes very 
specific and detailed predictions about the relationship between the order of 
program generation and expertise. Conversely, the models proposed by Green et 
al. and by Gray and Anderson, while not explicitly concerned with factors relating 
to programming skill, suggest that there will not, in general, be a relationship 
between generation strategy and expertise. 
The work reported in this thesis attempts to provide a conceptual bridge between a 
number of the studies reviewed in this chapter. In particular, the model of 
knowledge restructuring that is proposed in the final cahpter of this thesis adopts 
the general framework suggested by the parsing-gnisrap model in order to account 
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for the cyclical nature of code generation and evaluation that has been observed in 
a number of the experimental studies that are reported later in this thesis. In 
addition, this restructuring model relies centrally upon Rist's elaboration of the 
process of focal expansion in order to explain how representations of 
programming knowledge can be transformed and eventually implemented as 
programs. The intention of this work is twofold. Firstly, to provide a model that 
can account parsimoniously for a wide range of experimental findings, and 
secondly to provide a theoretical basis which might allow some integration of 
previously disparate areas of research. Hence, this model, and the experiments 
reported in this thesis, attempt to account for particular forms of programming 
strategy by demonstrating how strategy might be determined by the programmer's 
knowledge representation, by features of the task language and via their 
interactions. 
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Notes 
1. Software metrics (or more accurately program complexity metrics, since other 
metrics measure different things) are intended to provide a measure of the 
complexity of program code. Such metrics are normally derived from a simple 
count of a number of program surface features, i.e, number of operators or 
operands, etc. 
2. One can again draw parallels here with work in text comprehension, particularly 
Rumelhart's (1977) work on story summarisation. 
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Chapter 5. The role of task language/notational features in 
programming strategy and program comprehension 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2 we suggested that to fully understand problem solving in complex 
interactive domains such as programming we need to consider the effects of task 
and device language features on problem solving behaviour. In this context, Payne 
(1987) suggests that problem solvers need to maintain two problem spaces, a goal 
space and a device space, and that they need to construct a mapping between the 
two. This approach to understanding problem solving in complex environments 
differs from more traditional accounts of problem solving behaviour in two ways. 
On the one hand, operators are not applied directly to objects, rather they are 
effected via a task language which maps operators into action sequences. 
Secondly, the problem space is more complex and must accommodate some 
representation of the device which the problem solver is using. Hence, when 
writing a computer program using a text editor; the programming language 
constitutes the task language, and the commands used to manipulate the editor 
comprise the device language. 
In previous chapters we have alluded to the fact that features of both the task and 
the device language can affect programming behaviour, and it would seem clear 
that any complete account of problem solving in programming must take these 
factors into consideration. The intention of the present chapter is to provide a 
review of studies which have examined the effects of task language features on 
programming behaviour and strategy. Unfortunately, there have been few studies 
which explicitly address the role of device languages in the determination of 
programming strategy, however a small number of studies have at least recognised 
their importance and have attempted to state clearly the contribution that features of 
the device language make to the performance of the programmers observed in 
these studies. Hence, the emphasis of this chapter is concerned with outlining 
features of task languages, and particularly their notational aspects, which have 
been shown to affect programming strategy and program comprehension. 
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Green (1990a) suggests that programming languages embody implicit theories of 
programming, and that language designs broadly reflect the concerns of these 
implicit theories. He suggests that three main stages can be identified in the 
development of implicit theories of programming. These stages reflect the 
historical evolution of programming languages and hence provide a useful 
framework within which to review empirical work which has attempted to 
explicate these implicit theories and to question their validity as accounts of 
programming behaviour. 
5.2 Programming as errorless transcription 
Green (1990a) characterises the first phase in the development of programming 
languages as embodying a theory which views programming tasks as involving an 
errorless transcription between some mental representation of a program and its 
code-based representation. He claims that the Fortran-BASIC tradition epitomises 
this view, and that these languages display a number of basic design features 
which reflect the errorless transcription approach: 
"The Fortran programming system (punched cards) and the Basic line numbering 
system encouraged programmers to create their programs in the order of the text 
-i.e., line 1 of the final text was also the first line to be punched in. Thus, the 
program was fully developed at the start of coding, needing only to be transcribed. 
Fortran and Basic have very few guards against typing errors, which can readily 
create a new text that is syntactically acceptable but not, of course, the intended 
program. By implication, programmers do not make typing errors. 
Neither fortran nor Basic originally supported any use of perceptual cues to help 
indicate structure. Possible cues would have included indented FOR-loops, 
demarcated subroutines, bold face or capitals to indicate particular lexical classes, 
etc. The implication is that programmers can comprehend the program text without 
assistance. 
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The use of GOTOs as the sole method to determine control flow encourages small 
changes but makes large changes extremely tedious. The implication here is 
programmers do not modify their first version except trivially" (p. 123). 
Hence, the errorless transcription view implies that a mental representation of a 
program should be regarded as a series of discrete steps and that programming 
involves translating each of these steps into its coded representation in the target 
programming language. Empirical research, mostly conducted in the 1970's, 
tended to focus upon a number of specific questions which arose from this view. 
For instance, a range of studies attempted to compare the use of GOTOs with 
nested conditionals (see the next section of this chapter for a review of these 
studies). 
Other studies focused upon the individual syntactic constructions of various 
programming languages. For instance, Youngs (1974) analysed the errors made 
by novice and professional programmers according to the statement type where the 
error occurred (e.g., assignment, iteration, GOTO, conditional etc.). One of the 
more interesting results to emerge from Youngs' study was the large proportion of 
errors that were related to control statements (35% for novices and 51% for 
professional programmers). Youngs' collected data from a whole range of 
programming languages and so it is difficult to derive any specific conclusions 
which might inform language design. However, it is interesting to speculate about 
the extent to which the inflexibility of GOTO type control structures might have 
contributed to the errors found by Youngs. 
5.3 The demonstrable correctness view of programming 
The second phase of language development that is outlined in Green's review of 
implicit theories of programming is the so called 'demonstrable correctness' view 
of programming. This view is well represented by the structured programming 
school (Dahl, Dijkstra and Hoare, 1972; Yourdon, 1975) and by those languages 
which embody the principles advocated by this school, particularly Pascal. The 
main principle of the structured programming school is that programmers should 
work according to certain rules and within various constraints, and that this 
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disciplined approach will make it easier to prove that a program so constructed will 
be correct. This, of course, is a mathematical claim. However, in parallel, the 
structured programming school has made additional, and empirically testable 
claims, to the effect that the correct structuring of programs will not only lead to 
reduced errors but will also maximise the likelihood of program comprehension. 
Hence, structured programs will be easier to understand, to write and to debug. 
Here, comprehensibility is equated with structural simplicity and the idea that 
programs can be hierarchically constructed from various simple components. The 
structured programming school advocates two main principles. 
The first principle is that programmers should use well-defined control structures. 
This principle led to the rejection of arbitrary GOTOs. It has been argued that if 
such structures were allowed, more information would be needed in order to 
characterise the progress of control flow in a program. For example, Dijkstra 
(1968) claims that "Our intellectual powers are rather geared to master static 
relations ... and our powers to visualize processes evolving in time are relatively 
poorly developed. For that reason we should do (as wise programmers aware of 
our limitations) our upmost to shorten the conceptual gap between the static 
program and the dynamic process, to make the correspondence between the 
program (spread out in text space) and the process (spread out in time) as trivial as 
possible." Dijkstra then goes on to ask "Suppose that a process, considered as a 
time succession of actions, is stopped after an arbitrary action, what data do we 
have to fix in order that we can redo the process until the very same point?". This 
is taken to suggest that the use of GOTOs to characterise control flow would mean 
that more information would be needed in order to understand the control flow of 
the program, and as a consequence, that programs constructed in such a way 
would be difficult to comprehend. 
The second major principle of the structured programming school is that 
programmers should define and compose data structures and types in a 
hierarchical fashion. According to this view, the programmer is able implement the 
higher levels of a design and represent the lower levels by stubs which simulate 
their function in a simplified way. As the implementation of one level is 
completed, the programmer can then move on to a lower level in the hierarchy and 
implement that in terms of its sub-levels. Ultimately ,the lowest level in the 
hierarchy is implemented using basic programming language facilities. Note that 
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this principle, often called stepwise refinement, is also embodied in many models 
of human problem solving. Moreover, in the area of complexity theory, Simon 
(1962) has argued that systems which survive have three outstanding 
characteristics: they are organised in terms of a hierarchy of sub-systems, these 
sub-systems are often loosely coupled and the sub-systems themselves are highly 
internally cohesive. These three characteristics mirror precisely the main concerns 
of the structured programming school. 
In language design, Pascal reflected these concerns by rejecting GOTOs and by 
instituting, instead, a small repertoire of nestable loops and conditional structures 
to describe control flow. In addition, Pascal enabled programmers to hierarchically 
define and compose data structures and types. Programs built using these 
principles should, if the claims of the structured programming school are correct, 
be easier to comprehend than unstructured programs. However, a second phase of 
empirical research, which attempted to address some of the claims of the 
structured programming school, indicted that structured programming does not 
necessarily constitute a panacea which can eliminate the problems that are typically 
faced by programmers. 
5.3.1 Research on structured programming claims 
For example, Sime, Arblaster and Green (1977) compared the performance of 
novices constructing small programs in three micro-languages (see also Sime, 
Green and Guest, 1973). Each of these micro-languages embodied a different 
control structure; a jump-if structure Gump ), a nested begin else structure 
(nest-BE) and a nested if not end (nest-INE) structure (see figure 5.1). These three 
structures were used since they not only exhibit differences in nesting and jumping 
styles, but also differ in terms of the method used to indicate the scope of 
conditionals within each nesting style. Of these three notations, one (the Nest-BE 
notation) was structured, in that is used begin-end statements to mark conditional 
blocks in the normal way, one was unstructured (the jump notation- a GOTO like 
construct) and one was structured, as in the first case, but also contained 
additional information (the Nest-INE notation). This additional information was 
logically redundant since it could be derived from information already present in 
the program. Hence, in the example illustrated in Figure 5.1, the predicates 
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('juicy', etc.) are restated for the negative arm of the conditional ('end juicy'). The 
main hypothesis of this study, based initially upon the author's intuitions, was that 
this conditional restatement would improve performance. 
Jump 
if hard goto Ll 
if juicy goto L2 
chop roast stop 
L2 fry stop 
L3 boil stop 
Nest-BE 
ifhard then 
begin boil end 
else 
begin 
if juicy then 
begin fry end 
else 
begin chop roast end 
end 
Statement of problem: 
Nest-INE 
if hard: boil 
not hard: 
if juicy: fry 
not juicy: chop roast 
end juicy 
end hard 
Fry: everything which is juicy but not hard 
Boil: everything which is hard 
Chop and roast: everything which is neither hard not juicy 
Figure 5 .1. The three forms of control structure and problem statement used in Sime et al 
(1977). 
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Sime et al showed that both of the nested conditionals led to improved 
performance (in terms of the number of errors in the resulting program) over the 
unstructured notation, however performance was best in the nest-INE condition 
where additional control information was provided. These results may provide 
some general support for the structured programming school, however it is not 
possible to delineate, in this experiment, the effects of structure from the effects of 
providing extra information. Sime et al go on to claim that enhanced performance 
in the nest-INE condition arises because the redundant repetition of predicates 
helps the programmer to 'deprogram', that is to translate the program back into the 
original problem statement. 
Arblaster, Sime and Green (1979), took these ideas further by comparing the 
effects of structured vs unstructured notations on performance. In this study 
Arblaster et al, were interested in exploring the necessity of employing 
hierarchically structured notations, as implied by the structured programming 
school, as opposed to using notations which are structured in other ways. Their 
results demonstrated that several kinds of notational structuring (described as 
hierarchical, decision-table-like, and compromise) can improve program 
comprehension compared to a condition which used an unstructured notation. 
However, the hierarchically structured notation did not give rise to a significant 
improvement in performance compared to the other structured notations. 
The results of the studies ~eported above raise some doubts about the central 
claims made by the structured programming school. In particular, it is not clear 
that structured conditionals improve performance in the way that would be 
predicted. Secondly, it also appears that other forms of structuring, in addition to 
hierarchical structuring, can lead to improved performance. However, these 
results must be interpreted with some caution. Firstly, a study conducted by 
Vessey and Weber (1984a) extended the three languages used by Sime et alto 
include indented and unindented forms of all three conditional structures. In their 
original experiment, Sime et al indented only the nested languages, since they 
claimed that the jump condition could not be indented without considerably 
restricting the syntax of the micro-language. 
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However, Vessey and Weber showed that the jump language could be indented 
with only a slight relaxation of the syntax (see figure 5.2). Their results 
demonstrated that the nested conditionals led to improved performance over the 
JUMP conditional, but only in their unindented forms. In the case of their 
indented forms, Vessey and Weber found little evidence in favour of nested 
languages over unstructured conditionals. Hence, it appears that subjects' 
performance in the tasks studied by Vessey and Weber was determined to a greater 
extent by indentation than was supposed by Sime et al, and this clearly raises 
some doubts about the relative advantages of nested conditionals over other 
conditional structures. 
Indented modified JUMP 
IF hard GOTO L1 
GOTOL4 
L 1 IF green GOTO L2 
GOTOL3 
L2 peel roast stop 
L3 peel grill stop 
L4 IF tall GOTO L5 
GOTOL6 
L5 chop fry stop 
L6 IF juicy GOTO L 7 
GOTOL8 
L7 boil stop 
L8 roast stop 
Figure 5.2. Vessey and Weber showed that the jump language used in the 
Sime et al ( 1977) study could be indented with only a slight relaxation of the 
syntax. 
Another problem with many of these early studies of programming is that the 
questions they addressed were often inappropriate to the kinds of answers that 
such studies could provide. For instance, the primary concern of Sime et al was to 
evaluate the claim that nested conditionals are better than GOTOs. However, 
programming is clearly a complex skill, and it is quite probable that an advantage 
for nested conditionals might be evident in the context of certain programming 
tasks, but be absent in others, and that unstructured control forms might be more 
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useful in different task contexts (see also, Gilmore, 1990). This problem is also 
apparent in other studies, for instance, in Shneiderman's (1976) comparison of 
logical vs arithmetic IF statements in Fortran. The problem here is that research on 
micro-languages simply may not be generalisable to tasks other than the 
constrained problems employed in these studies. In addition, it is not clear 
whether the results of these studies will generalise to professional programmers, 
since they were concerned only with novices. However, Green (1977), has 
demonstrated that presenting professional programmers with hierarchically 
structured programs, together with extra information about the truth-values of 
particular variables could give rise to a significant speed advantage in terms of 
answering certain kinds of comprehension question. 
Vessey and Weber (1984b) have produced a comprehensive review of empirical 
studies which have addressed structured programming claims, including those 
outlined above. They suggests that, in general, the evidence supporting structured 
programming is weak. However, according to Vessey and Weber, this not 
necessarily because the claims made by the structured programming school are 
wrong. Rather, they suggest that these problematic results are "a manifestation of 
poor theory, poor hypotheses and poor methodology". (pg 398). They go on to 
suggest that there are several specific reasons why previous results have turned 
out to be equivocal "First... the theory enunciating the effects of structured 
programming on software practice is rudimentary and inadequate; second .. this 
lack of a theory has inhibited the formation of hypotheses that contribute to both 
understanding and predictive powers; third .. until the theory has been developed, 
it is not possible to identify the strategic hypotheses and, as a consequence carry 
out empirical research; and finally .. the existing empirical work reflects the shoddy 
state of the theory in that it does not effect a coordinated whole, nor has it aspired 
to understanding as opposed to prediction". (pg 406). 
While the research reported above has not made a clear case either for or against 
structured programming, it has demonstrated that for certain tasks, and for certain 
groups of subjects, language features can and do affect programming behaviour. 
In general, we might suggest that the structured programming school has made 
claims which are either too extensive or too vague for proper systematic empirical 
study, and that empirical work has simply mirrored these claims by over 
generalising the significance of its results. 
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5.3.2 Extending work on language features to non-procedural paradigms 
The work we have reviewed so far has been concerned with the effects of 
language features in the procedural language paradigm. However, in principle, 
this work should also apply to other paradigms, since most researchers who have 
studied notational design have been careful to phrase their explanations in terms of 
the general information processing requirements of particular tasks, and the extent 
to which specific notational features might support these requirements. 
In this vein, Gilmore and Green (1984), attempted to test Green's (1977) 
assertion that the mental operations demanded by certain tasks are harder in some 
notations than in others by studying the effects of different notations on 
comprehension tasks. In particular, they were interested in testing the hypothesis 
that it would be easier to answer procedural-type questions than declarative 
questions, given a program with a procedural notation, and conversely, that it 
would be easier to answer declarative-type questions in comparison to procedural 
questions, given a declarative notation. 
Gilmore and Green used four notations in their experiment. Two of these 
notations were procedural and two were declarative, and one of each pair 
contained cues to procedural or declarative information, respectively. One 
procedural notation resembled Pascal and contained cues to circumstantial 
information through the indentation of conditional statement, while the other 
resembled Basic, and used labels and GOTOs, instead of indentation (see Figure 
5.3). Both of the declarative notations are described by Gilmore and Green as 
resembling production systems. In the declarative-uncued condition, the rules 
formed an ordered set, whose antecedent conditions were tested in order. In the 
cued-declarative condition, the rules again fired in order, but unlike the uncued 
condition, rules were displayed even if they contributed no action. Hence, in the 
uncued condition, control information is distributed piecemeal among the rules, 
whereas in the cued condition, all control information is immediately apparent. 
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if both of ANN and JANE goto A 
if not SARH goto C 
SAIL (4) 
C: BIKE (1) 
E: if distance >= gangsize*4 goto D 
BUS (2) 
gotoE 
D: if ANN goto B 
DRIVE (2) 
gotoB 
A: WALK(4) 
if distance >= gangsize*4 goto B 
BUS (2) 
gotoA 
B: BURYLOOT 
a). Proc-No-Cues 
P1: SARAH and at most SAIL (4) 
one of ANN and JANE Turn P1 off 
P2: both ANN and JANE WALK (4) 
Turn P2 off 
P3: at most one of ANN BIKE (1) 
and JANE Turn P3 off 
P4: distance < gangsize*4 BUS (2) 
Turn P2 on 
P5: not ANN DRIVE (2) 
Turn P5 off 
P6: BURY LOOT 
stop 
c). Decl-No-Cues 
begin 
if ANN and JANE then 
begin 
WALK(4); 
while distance<gangsize*4 do 
begin 
BUS (2) 
WALK(4) 
end 
end 
else 
begin 
if SARAH then SAIL (4); 
while distance < gangsize*4 do BUS (2); 
end 
BURY LOOT 
end 
b). Proc-Cues 
(A)SAIL (4) SARAH and at most one of 
nothing ANN and JANE otherwise 
(B)WALK (4) Both of ANN and JANE 
nothing otherwsie 
(C)BIKE (1) at most one of ANN and JANE 
nothing otherwise 
(D)BUS(2), B, D distance<gangsize*4 
nothing otherwsie 
(E)DRIVE (2) not ANN 
nothing otherwise 
(F)BURY LOOT. 
d). Decl-Cues 
Figure 5.3. Examples of the programs used in Gilmore and Green ( 1984 ). The top pair of 
programs illustrate the procedural notations, with cues or without. The bottom pair of programs 
illustrate the two declarative languages. 
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Gilmore and Green asked their subjects to study the programs and then answer a 
series of questions which were intended to tap either sequential or circumstantial 
information. The sequential questions asked what either the next or the previous 
action in the program would be, given the occurrence of some event, while the 
circumstantial questions asked what condition would be true if a particular action 
either had or had not occurred. Subjects were tested in two situations, one in 
which they were able to consult the printed text of the program, and the other 
where they answered questions from memory. 
Their findings provide general support for the idea that specific notations might be 
more suited to particular tasks. Hence, in general, their subjects were able to 
answer the declarative questions more accurately given a declarative notation, 
while the procedural notation facilitated correct responses to the procedural 
questions. However, these effects were weak, except in the condition where 
subjects were working from memory. Hence, the notational structure of the 
program appears to affect the ease with which information can be extracted from 
the printed page and also seems to facilitate recall. The first of these findings is 
perhaps not surprising, however second is rather more interesting, since it 
suggests that the mental representation of a program maintains some features of 
the original notation, and as a corollary that programs are not stored in a uniform 
mental language. 
The idea that all programming languages are represented in some uniform mental 
language which preserves the semantics of the program but not its surface 
features, is implicit in many theories of programming (Soloway and Ehrlich, 
1984; Shneiderman and Mayer, 1977). For instance, the frequent use of memory 
tests to assess program comprehension implicitly assumes that the same problem, 
represented in different notations, will give rise to the same memory 
representation. In support of this, Shneiderman (1977), cites Bransford and 
Franks (1971) who have demonstrated that in prose memory, syntax is rapidly 
forgotten, and that semantics are recalled. 
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5.3.3 Implications for plan-based accounts of programming behaviour 
Moreover, the schema or plan-based account of program comprehension, 
similarly, relies upon the assumption that programs are represented in a generic 
semantic form, and that programming plans will be equally applicable regardless 
of the language being used. In chapter 3, we questioned the validity of this 
assumption, and there is now a significant amount of evidence which suggests that 
such plans are not language independent. For instance, Gilmore and Green (1988) 
have carried out a study which demonstrated that while plans may be useful to 
Pascal programmers, Basic programmers appear to rely to a much greater extent 
upon the control flow information which they are able to derive from the program. 
Hence, it appears that the plan theory may be able to account for program 
comprehension in the context of certain languages but not in others, and this may 
suggest that the plan theory is of significantly less utility that has previously been 
supposed. 
Gilmore and Green (1988), examined the debugging behaviour of experienced 
programmers using two different languages - Basic and Pascal. Their subjects 
were presented with programs which had various structural elements highlighted. 
For instance, some programs had control structure highlighted. Here programs 
were indented in the normal way to provide a perceptual cue to control-flow. 
There have been many studies which have demonstrated the utility of indentation 
as a perceptual cue in the context of tasks that require an understanding of the 
control-flow structure of the program (Miara, Musselman, Navarro and 
Shneiderman, 1983; Kesler, Uram, Magarah-Abed, Fritsche, Amport and 
Dunsmore, 1984), and as such it can provide a useful perceptual cue without 
affecting the perception of other structures. Other programs used in the Gilmore 
and Green study were highlighted in a different way to provide cues to the 
program's plan structure. To achieve this, Gilmore and Green highlighted each 
separate plan in a different colour. The validity of using colour cues to indicate 
structure has been demonstrated independently by VanLaar (1989), who showed 
that colour can supplement indentation in showing control-flow in Pascal 
programs , with some net gain in performance for learners answering a variety of 
comprehension questions. Also, in addition to the two program formats outlined 
above, other programs were presented with no perceptual cues and others with 
both control-flow and plan structure cues. 
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The main intention of the Gilmore and Green study was to determine the way in 
which perceptual cues to different structures in a program can affect the 
performance of programmers in certain tasks. More specifically, they were 
interested in addressing three specific issues that arise from the plan-based view of 
programming. Firstly, they suggest that the existence of plans has mainly been 
inferred from protocol and error analysis, rather than from direct experimental 
evidence. They claim that direct experimental support for the plan-based view 
could be obtained by showing that perceptual cues to plan structure, such as the 
colour cues described above, improve the comprehensibility of programs. 
Secondly, they suggest that the plan theory would claim that plans constitute the 
primary mode of representation for the programming knowledge of experts and 
that plans represent the deep structure of the problem being solved. Gilmore and 
Green suggest that, as a corollary to this, providing a situation in which plans can 
be readily perceived should improve performance on all programming tasks. 
Finally, Gilmore and Green argue that all the existing evidence for plans had been 
obtained from studies of Pascal programmers, with the assumption that plan 
effects will generalise to other languages. By comparing the performance of 
programmers using different languages, Gilmore and Green were able to test this 
plan generalisability assumption. 
In the Gilmore and Green study, these issues were addressed by comparing the 
detection rate and accuracy of their subjects in a debugging task for a variety of 
bug types, in situations where perceptual cues were provided to various program 
structures. Bug types were derived from one of four categories. Firstly, bugs 
could be described as surface level bugs, when they were independent from any 
particular structure in the program. Such bugs are likely to arise from typing errors 
and syntactic slips. For instance, surface level bugs might include missing or 
misplaced quotes or undeclared variables. Control flow bugs occur in the control 
flow of the program, but do not affect other structures, for instance, a missing 
begin statement. Plan structure bugs are, as the name implies, bugs which arise 
from the incorrect implementation of a plan and include such things as updating 
the wrong variable. Finally, there are bugs which are caused by structures 
interacting in the wrong way. For instance, both the control-flow structure and the 
plan structure of a program may be correct, but their interaction may contain 
errors; for example, initialisations within a main loop. 
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Gilmore and Green suggested four specific predictions which correspond to the 
predictions that they.claim are implied by plan-based accounts of programming 
behaviour. Firstly, they suggested that the presence of cues will make no 
difference to the detection of surface errors. Secondly, that indentation cues to 
control flow will improve the detection of control flow errors. Thirdly, that the use 
of colour cues to indicate plan structure will improve the detection of plan errors, 
and finally, that the presence of both cue-types will improve the detection of 
interaction errors. Moreover, they argue that these effects should be evident in the 
case of both Basic and Pascal. 
The main findings of this study pose a number of disturbing implications for 
plan-based accounts of programming, since while all the above hypotheses were 
supported for the Pascal data, none were supported by the data from the Basic 
programmers. The results of this study clearly demonstrate that plan structures are 
psychologically meaningful to Pascal programmers, since perceptual cues to 
plan-based structures give rise to an improvement in performance in plan-related 
tasks. However, plan structure cues did not improve performance in 
non-plan-related tasks, and Gilmore and Green suggest that because of this, plans 
do not represent the deep semantic structure of the problem. Finally, they claim 
that since plan structure cues do not enhance the performance of Basic 
programmers, it appears that such programmers do not view programs in the same 
way as Pascal programmers. While Pascal programmers may be influenced by 
plan structures, it appears that the behaviour of Basic programmers is influenced 
more by other structures, and in particular by control-flow. 
Gilmore and Green interpret their findings as suggesting that certain notations may 
facilitate plan use, while different notations may more readily support the 
extraction and use of other sources of information. In particular, they advance the 
idea that some notations, and in particular Pascal, may be more role-expressive 
than others, and that role-expressiveness may facilitate plan use. Gilmore (1986) 
introduced the idea of role-expressiveness to describe a property of languages 
which facilitates the automisation of a mapping between the problem being solved 
and the programming knowledge that is brought to bear during problem solving. 
He suggests that there are three components to role-expressiveness; 
discriminability, statement-structure mapping and statement-task mapping. 
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Discriminability refers to the ease with which a notation provides access to chunks 
of code, where a chunk may be a single statement or a group of related statements. 
The initial step in perceiving the role of some statement is to differentiate it from 
other structures that surround it, and if this process can be aided then this will 
improve comprehension for certain kinds of task. Gilmore and Green claim that 
this process is facilitated in languages such as Pascal which display a rich set of 
lexical cues. Statement -structure mapping refers to the process of establishing the 
structural role of a statement, independently of the particular problem being 
solved. Gilmore and Green claim that establishing this mapping will be more 
difficult in unstructured languages such as Basic where the same piece of code 
may be used for more than one purpose (for example, as an initialisation or as an 
update. Statement-task mapping is a process which maps the structural role of 
statements to their task role. An example of the difficulties that can arise at this 
level is evidenced in Soloway, Boner and Ehrlich's (1983) observation that novice 
programmers who try to force a problem into a 'read-process' loop make errors 
when they are required to test the terminating condition twice. 
The Gilmore and Green study clearly throws some doubt upon plan-based 
explanations of programming behaviour, and in particular upon the idea that plans 
are generalisable structures which are used during problem solving regardless of 
the programming language being used. In addition, this study points to some 
important notational features of programming languages which appear to underpin 
the ease with which certain structures, including plan structures, can be extracted 
from the program text. However, it appears that there are other explanations for 
the findings of this study which suggest other factors, in addition to notational 
features, which may have given rise to the results obtained. 
For instance, in chapter 6 an experiment is reported which suggests that the 
learning experiences of Pascal and Basic programmers are often very different, 
and that this may have may have been a confounding factor and led to the 
differences in plan comprehension observed in the Gilmore and Green study. This 
experiment demonstrated that Basic programmers who had been taught structured 
programming techniques performed in a very similar manner to the Pascal 
programmers in the Gilmore and Green study, in terms of their ability to use cues 
to plan structure in plan related tasks. Conversely, other Basic programmers, who 
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were not taught structured programming, did not show an improvement in plan 
related tasks in the situation where plan structures were cued. In fact, as in the 
Gilmore and Green study, the performance of this second group was affected to a 
much greater extent by control-flow cues. 
This suggests that the learning experience of programmers may contribute in 
certain ways to their comprehension and information seeking strategies, and that 
structured programming experience may in some way encourage programmers to 
focus upon a program's plan structure even though the notation of the 
programming language used may not facilitate plan use, as in the case of Basic. 
The results of this experiment are interpreted in terms of the broad theory 
presented in this thesis, whereby expertise is seen to be related, in part, to the 
restructuring of programming knowledge. This restructuring process may be 
facilitated by certain forms of programming experience, and especially by 
techniques such as structured programming which emphasise the functional role of 
certain programming constructs and encourage programmers to adopt 
decompositional strategies which suggest a hierarchical structuring of 
programming knowledge. Interpreted in this way, certain forms of programming 
behaviour are seen as dependent upon interactions between knowledge structures 
and notational features, and this suggests that the current polarisation between 
notational and plan-based accounts of programming behaviour may be 
inappropriate. 
5.4 Programming as exploration 
The third phase in Green's taxonomy of language paradigms and implicit 
programming theories reflects the present view of programming. According to 
Green, this view characterises programming as an evolutionary process in which 
various alternatives are explored and their consequences considered. In this way, 
programs are built from preexisting structures which are modified in certain ways 
according to the demands of the particular problem being solved. Recent language 
developments such as Smalltalk embody this evolutionary view of program 
development by encouraging code re-use and by emphasising the process of 
gradual incremental change in software development. 
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In chapter 4 we reviewed a number of studies which have attempted to characterise 
programming in this way. For instance, the parsing-gnisrap model of code 
generation proposed by Green et al (1987 a and b) and Gray and Anderson's 
analysis of change episodes have both emphasised the cyclical nature of 
programming activities. These models have promoted the idea that code is not 
generated in a linear fashion, but is instead generated in fragments - a facet of 
behaviour reflecting certain cognitive limitations - and that these fragments need to 
be continually reinterpreted and evaluated as coding progresses. In chapter 4 a 
detailed description of these models was presented, and this need not be repeated 
here. However, these models make certain predictions about the effects of 
notational features upon the nature of these cyclical coding activities, and it is to 
these that we now turn. 
For instance, the behaviour of the parsing-gnisrap model is determined by a 
number of features, including the effects of certain notational properties of the 
language being used. In particular, Green et al suggest that the behaviour of this 
model is determined in large part by the ease with which already generated code 
fragments can be reinterpreted; that is, remapped back into an internal cognitive 
representation. They claim that this process will be facilitated if the language is 
role-expressive (see above), and in consequence that it supports the programmer's 
perception of the role of each program statement or group of related statements. 
Role-expressiveness, therefore will affect the parsing side of the parsing-gnisrap 
model. However, other language features will affect the generative aspect of 
coding behaviour. 
In particular, languages which are resistant to local change (to use Green's 
terminology- viscous languages (See Green, 1989; 1990b)) will provide little 
support for non-linear generation. For instance, to insert a new line in Basic may 
involve renumbering existing lines and will possibly necessitate readdressing 
control structure assignments. In Pascal, adding a single statement or procedure 
may not be as difficult, however if this necessitates reconstructing the identifier 
hierarchy so that a given procedure can be brought into a lower block, then this 
may have many undesirable repercussions. 
Viscosity is not only a property of task languages, but may also be manifest at the 
device level. For instance, some editors require much more effort to achieve a 
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given action, and a significant proportion of a programmer's behaviour may be 
taken up simply operating an editor. This is especially true when code is not 
generated in a linear fashion and where programmers have to navigate through the 
code. Such device viscosity is reflected in a study of CAD users conducted by 
Whitefield (1985), who found that users would often spend a significant 
proportion of their time simply operating the device and making no progress with 
the task in hand. 
One principle question addressed in the Green et al study was the extent to which 
different languages might affect the distribution of non-linearities during code 
generation. Green et al analysed the behaviour of programmers using three 
languages -BASIC, Pascal and Prolog. These languages were chosen to exemplify 
some important differences in language design. Their results showed that although 
Pascal programmers produced programs with a very similar structure to the Basic 
programmers, the latter group generated code almost linearly, whereas the Pascal 
group engaged in many backward jumps to insert new material into already 
generated structures. Finally, the Prolog group fell somewhere between these two 
extremes in terms of the extent of non-linearities. 
Green et al claim that their results provide evidence for predictions stemming from 
the parsing-gnisrap model, in particular that coding is fitful and sporadic and that 
the extent of this nonlinearity is dependent upon features of the language. They 
explain these results by suggesting that Basic is more viscous than Pascal, causing 
programmers to adopt a strategy which minimises interleaving, and secondly that 
Basic is less role-expressive than Pascal. Hence, Basic programmers will generate 
code in a linear fashion, since they would otherwise experience difficulty 
comprehending it. In the case of Prolog, Green et al are more conjectural about its 
notational properties, however they do suggest that it may rank low on the 
role-expressiveness dimension. In particular, they have observed that there are 
very few cues in Prolog which can be used to indicate the purpose of a specific 
piece of code. For instance, they suggest that it is impossible to know if a Prolog 
variable is to be used for input or output at any one time during the execution of a 
program. 
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5.4.1 Modelling the parsing of notations 
More recently, Green and Borning (1990) have attempted to produce a 
computational model of notation parsing, based upon an extension of Kempen and 
Vosse's (1989) unification based natural language parser. Green and Borning 
refer to their model as a generalised unification parser, since it preserves Kempen 
and Vosse's general approach, but has increased power. In particular, it is capable 
of using typographical features to aid the parsing process. 
Their parsing model is programmed with an elementary grammar of procedural 
language cliches or plans (see figure 5.4). For instance, text patterns representing 
counter plans start with an initialisation statement, in which some identifier is set 
to an exceptional value, commonly zero. Secondly, there will be a statement 
corresponding to a start of loop, followed by an add-1 statement, where an 
identifier is set to itself plus one. Finally there will be an end of loop which 
completes the counter pattern. Other statements may of course intervene between 
these various plan components, however these are ignored during parsing1. 
Green and Borning have extended the Kempen and Vosse parser in various ways 
and in the present context, two of these extensions are of particular relevance. 
Firstly, their model can use display-based features to aid the parsing process. 
Hence, the salience of a particular statement and its corresponding level of 
activation in the parse space can be affected by its indentation level, by its colour 
coding (i.e., as in the Gilmore and Green (1988) study) or by other typographical 
features. 
Secondly, in the Green and Borning model, beacon constructions (Wiedenbeck, 
1986 a and b, and see chapter 4) are assigned permanently raised activation values 
in the lexicon. Green and Borning do not discuss how beacons are identified, 
however they suggest that raising their activation level will have the effect of 
making the model search for beacons. They suggest that an experienced 
programmer will know which constructions are likely to be the most efficient ones 
to parse first (See Brooks, 1983 and chapter 4), and hence their model captures 
this salient behavioral feature of the programming activity. 
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Initialise 
Counter 
[var = NCiients] 
[tab = 1] 
[loopvar = Order] 
[type = while] 
Add-1 
[var = NCiients] 
[tab= 1] 
[var = NCiients 
[tab = 2] 
Begin-loop 
[loopvar = Order] 
[type = while] 
[tab = 1] 
End-loop 
[tab = 1] 
[type = while} 
Figure 5.4. The elementary grammar of procedural language cliches or plans used 
in Green and Borning's parser. 
Their model makes a number of comparative predictions about the ease with which 
various notations can be parsed. In general, parsing difficulty will increase when 
elements in the parse tree, or unification space, have similar activation levels. In 
the context of this model, the probability of unifying any two elements in the parse 
tree depends primarily upon their activation value. Hence, when a programming 
language has few lexical or typographical cues, the parser's ability to differentiate 
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structure will decrease and parsing difficulty will increase correspondingly. For 
example, they suggest that their model would predict that Prolog would be a 
difficult language to parse since it has no conventions for indentation and has 
fewer distinctive typographical constructions than many other languages. 
Green and Boming report that they are attempting to extend their parser to include 
an elementary grammar of Pro log cliches. If their intuitions about the difficulty of 
parsing Prolog are correct, then this is likely to have significant implications for 
both the teaching of Prolog and for associated programming environments. Prolog 
has developed a reputation for being a difficult language to learn, and studies of 
Prolog learning have suggested that this may be because of the difficulties learners 
experience with its underlying conceptual model (Ormerod, Manktelow, Robson 
and Steward, 1986; Ormerod, Manktelow, Steward and Robson; 1990; White, 
1987). In particular, one difficulty arises in determining the execution path from 
the program text, and to ameliorate this, systems which have incorporated 
impressive animations of Pro log execution have been developed (Brayshaw and 
Eisenstadt, 1988; 1989). 
However, as Green and Boming suggest " the difficulty of parsing Prolog 
correctly may have contributed to the difficulty experienced by novices. A 
corollary of our work would be that a Prolog parser which picked out and labelled 
familiar cliches could significantly assist the learner." (pg 956). This would 
parallel work in other languages such as VanLaar's (1989) colour coded Pascal 
environment, and Green and Comah's (1984) 'Programmer's Torch' which was 
designed to highlight cliche structure in Basic. In addition, the Green and Boming 
study draws into question the importance of execution animation over other 
techniques intended to improve program comprehension, and in particular 
techniques which illuminate a program's plan or cliche structure. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The work reviewed in this chapter has demonstrated the effects that certain 
notational properties of programming languages can have on both the nature of 
program generation strategy and upon comprehension success. This work has 
primarily addressed two themes. 
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Much of the early work on notational properties was concerned with evaluating the 
claims made by the structured programming school and, in particular, the idea that 
certain conditional forms will be more comprehensible than others. While this 
exercise has clearly proved to be useful in terms of questioning the basic 
assumptions of this paradigm, it is less clear whether these findings can inform 
notational design outside the narrow class of problems and restricted 
micro-languages that have been studied. In addition, it is questionable, whether 
the results of these studies are generalisable to more complex programming tasks. 
The second phase of research into notational properties has been concerned more 
explicitly with examining the way in which notations can support the cyclical 
generation/evaluation activates that have frequently been observed in the context of 
programming studies. For instance, this work has addressed the way in which 
certain notational properties can affect generation strategy by demonstrating the 
extent to which such properties might support nonlinear generation. In addition, 
this work has suggested that comprehension success, at least in the context of 
certain tasks, is also affected by the notational properties of the language that is 
being used. In particular, it has been shown that task language features can 
influence the ease with which a program text can be decomposed or parsed into its 
constituent plan structures. This second phase of work has led to the description 
of various notational dimensions (Green, 1989) which, it is claimed "apply to 
many types of language ... and control how (or whether) the preferred cognitive 
strategy for design-like tasks can be adopted." (Green, 1989, pg 443). 
In the context of the restructuring model presented in this thesis there appear to be 
at least three primary notational properties or dimensions that are of relevance. 
This model relies upon the notion of focal expansion to explain how programs are 
generated and adopts the basic principle of the parsing-gnisrap model which 
emphasises the fragmentary nature of code generation and evaluation. Hence, the 
ease with which focal structures can be parsed back into plans will be likely to 
affect both program generation strategy and comprehension success. This will 
depend upon the extent to which a particular language can be described as 
role-expressive. In addition, since this restructuring process is proposed to 
underpin the development of expertise, then there should be an interaction between 
expertise and language used, where the languages are here distinguished by the 
extent of their role-expessiveness. 
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Secondly, the extent to which plan structures (as represented in code) are 
contiguously distributed, in a spatial sense, will also affect the success of focal 
expansion. Hence, in languages where plan structures are diffuse, the programmer 
will have to do more work at the device level in order to implement a plan. In 
addition, as we have seen, languages which enable programmers to implement a 
base case or initialisation adjacent to the main procedure may facilitate 
comprehension. In this situation it is not necessary for programmers to link 
together various spatially disparate areas of a program during comprehension in 
order to recreate the program's original plan structure. 
Finally, and related to this, the viscosity of the language will also affect the 
success of focal expansion. The model of knowledge restructuring presented in 
this thesis suggests that focal lines represent a discrete level of design abstraction. 
In addition, the model claims that focal lines will tend to be generated first during 
coding, following a hierarchically levelled approach to design decomposition. 
Hence, if features of the language make it difficult to insert subsidiary plan 
elements then the focal expansion process will be disrupted, and this disruption 
will result in the adoption of different forms of generation strategy. 
Notes 
1. Rich and Wills (1990) present an alternative program parsing method based 
upon a graph parsing technique which takes a program text as input and produces 
plan cliches as output. Rich and Wills claim that this output can be used to 
reconstruct a program's design and automatically generate documentation. 
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Chapter 6. The effects of the possession of design skills upon the 
perception and use of programming plans. 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 we introduced the notion of the programming plan. It was suggested 
there that descriptions of programming behaviour that have been couched in terms 
of plan theory have provided reasonably successful accounts of novice and expert 
programming behaviour in certain kinds of experimental task. However, more 
recently, the primary claims of the plan theory have been brought into question. In 
particular, subsequent experimental work has questioned the ability of the plan 
theory to account for the existence and the use of plan structures in languages 
other than Pascal. In addition, other work has thrown some doubt upon the 
relationship between programming plans and the development of expertise in 
programming. 
This chapter reports two experiments that address these issues in further detail. 
The first experiment explores the extent to which plan knowledge guides the 
debugging behaviour of experienced programmers. These programmers had 
equivalent levels of experience with the programming language used in this study 
(Basic), however half of this experimental group had received design training. The 
second experiment looks at the recall of programs by design experienced and 
non-design experienced subjects. The intention of these experiments was to 
examine the extent to which the use of programming plans might be generalisable 
to languages other than Pascal and to explore the role played by design skills in the 
development of such plans. This allows us to examine the two central claims of 
the plan theory. Firstly, that programming plans are universal structures used by 
experienced programmers, despite the language being used. Secondly, that plans 
are the defining characteristic of programming expertise. 
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6.1.1 Programming plans and expertise 
Soloway and Ehrlich (1984) present a fairly straightforward view of the 
relationship between plans and expertise. They suggest that experts possess and 
use appropriate plan structures while generating and comprehending programs and 
that novices typically do not. However, little is said about the processes involved 
in becoming an expert. Rist (1985) suggests that expert programmers develop 
both more plans and plans at a higher level than novices, and that the development 
of plans is characteristic of programming expertise. Another possibility is that 
novices may in fact possess an extensive range of plan structures but have 
difficulty mapping these structures onto structures in the target programming 
language. 
Gilmore and Green (1988) claim that the plan theory of programming implies that 
programming plans represent the "underlying deep structure of the programming 
problem" (p. 423). Hence, if novices understand at least some aspect of the 
problem domain, as one might reasonably expect in certain cases, then it would be 
possible to assert that plans exist, and that they represent structures in that domain, 
but that novices have to learn how to express these plans in a particular 
programming language. Knowing that an average is a sum divided by a count 
must clearly be some form of 'natural plan' which would presumably be observed 
in non-programmers. Hence, novices must possess such knowledge if they are 
familiar with the problem domain. One of the limitations of the plan theory of 
programming is that little is known about the sorts of factors that might be 
involved in the development of the ability to map these 'natural plans' onto code 
structures. 
6.1.2 The generalisability of programming plans 
The second major problem with the plan theory of programming is concerned with 
the generalisability of plans to languages other than Pascal. Soloway and Ehrlich 
claim that programming plans are one of the major components of programming 
expertise. 
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However, Gilmore and Green (1988), have recently drawn into question the 
generality of the programming plan as a description of the main type of 
representation employed by the expert programmer (see chapters 3 and 5). 
Gilmore and Green suggest that the notation of certain programming languages 
may make those languages amenable or otherwise to the identification and use of 
plans. This suggestion is based upon the finding that Basic programmers are 
unable to benefit from cues to plan structure, while de-bugging programs, in the 
way that Pascal programmers are. 
They conclude that Basic programmers do not appear to employ an abstract 
plan-based representation of a particular program while attempting to understand 
that program, but rely more extensively upon the control flow information 
embedded in the notation. Gilmore and Green suggest that Basic is less "role 
expressive" than other languages. That is that Basic programs are less 
discriminable from each other than are, say Pascal programs. In the case of 
Pascal, they argue that features of the notation of the language, and in particular its 
role expressiveness, make it easier for the programmer to infer the role of a 
particular statement and to discover the relationship between groups of statements 
(see chapter 5). 
This work has a number of implications. Firstly, it suggests that the programming 
plan may not be a universal construct that is common to all programming 
languages (most previous studies on programming plans have been concerned 
only with Pascal or very similar languages). Secondly, that where plan structures 
do exist, they may not constitute the exclusive nor even the primary source of 
information relevant to program comprehension. Problems of this nature challenge 
the fundamental theoretical suppositions which underlie the notion of the 
programming plan and thus create something of an impasse. 
To sum up, previous research appears to suggest two potentially divergent views; 
a) that programming plans are universal natural strategies that characterise the 
cognitive representation of a program and the programming activity of the expert 
programmer and that the existence of plans can be taken to be a reflection of this 
expertise. Such plans are thought to represent the 'deep structure' of the 
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programming problem. This approach might be termed the 'Plans as Natural 
Artifacts view'. 
b) that programming plans might be best regarded, in some circumstances at least, 
as artifacts both of a particular language and the structure that this language 
imposes on the programmer via the constraints of its specific notation. This 
approach might be called the 'Plans as Notational Artifacts view'. 
The two experiments reported in this chapter present a third view on the nature of 
programming plans. Experimental evidence is cited that provides the basis for an 
alternative interpretation to present views, and suggests, in addition, what might 
be regarded as a more parsimonious and consistent analysis of existing 
experimental data. 
6.1.3 The relationship between design experience and programming plans 
The experimental work reported here suggests that both the above interpretations 
of the nature of plans maybe incomplete and that programming plans might be 
more suitably characterised in terms of their specific relationship to the way in 
which programming is taught. It appears that such plans cannot be regarded 
exclusively as natural structures that have evolved independently of learning about 
a language nor can they be considered solely as static properties of a program i.e. 
as mere artifacts of the structure that a particular language might impose. 
The rationale underlying this alternative view on the nature of programming plans 
relates to two factors. Firstly, the way in which the differential learning experience 
of programmers may be reflected in the type of programming language used by a 
specific population of programmers and secondly, the effect that this may have on 
the development and use of programming plans. 
Many experienced programmers will have learnt to program within the context of a 
formal course in which programming itself formed only a part. Programming is 
often taught in conjunction with the development of program design skills. For 
example, major methodologies such as Jackson Structured programming 
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(Jackson, 1975) or one of the more important design notations such as structure 
charts (Constantine and Yourdon, 1979) and design description languages (Chu, 
1978). Such skills are intended by their nature to be independent of the particular 
programming language employed. 
Despite the increasing emphasis placed upon the teaching of program design skills 
it is clear that many programmers are taught to program without the benefit of any 
formal training in program design. Programming is often taught in isolation as an 
adjunct to other subjects (engineering, business etc.). Moreover, it can be seen 
that the type of programming language taught to those groups who also learn 
about design skills, is often radically different than that taught to those who learn a 
language in isolation. Hence one might expect the so called structured languages, 
Pascal, Algol, C and the like to be the mainstays of courses associated with the 
teaching of formal design methods. 
Conversely, Basic often predominates as a general purpose language in groups 
where programming is used to support other activities. Interestingly, this 
dichotomy is also reflected in the differences found in more objective 
classifications of programming languages by usage where Pascal, C and Algol fall 
into a clearly differentiated group of languages, while Basic and Cobol fall into 
another (Doyle and Stretch, 1987). 
Previous experimental studies investigating the nature of programming plans 
across languages have ignored the fact that groups of programmers experienced in 
using different languages, despite exhibiting similar levels of programming 
competence, may have been exposed to widely differing kinds of backgrounds. 
Similarly, studies examining the nature of programming plans within a single 
language, have ignored the possible effects of the teaching of design skills on the 
development and use of such plans. 
It would perhaps be unreasonable to suggest that the proponents of the natural 
artifact view of programming plans would rule out the possible effect of teaching 
on the development of plans. However, the plan theory suggests that plans 
constitute the expert programmer's mental representation of a program and 
consequently that they (plans) represent the deep structure of the problem. 
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However, if the development of plan structures is one of the major defining 
characteristics of expertise, then differences in teaching strategy per se, should 
not affect the nature of that expertise. 
Most design methodologies place an emphasis upon problem decomposition and 
this may facilitate the ability to perceive common methods of solution within and 
between problems. Hence, it might be claimed that 'natural plans' exist, and exist 
within the problem one is trying to solve, but that novices have some difficulty 
expressing these in the target programming language. In addition, these plans or 
features of these plans need not correspond, except perhaps coincidentally, with 
the sorts of structures that arise as a product of the design activity. However, 
'design skills' might facilitate the ability to perceive features of commonality 
between those structures which are the products of design, and are not expressible 
directly in a programming language, and 'natural plans' which in tum form useful 
structures that can be expressed in a programming language. 
An investigation into the role of the effects of the teaching of program design on 
the existence and use of programming plans has a number of important 
implications for our understanding of such plans. If programming plans are to be 
regarded as natural artifacts that represent universal cognitive strategies which in 
some way facilitate the activity of programming by providing the basis for a 
cognitive representation of a program, then one would expect experienced 
programmers, whatever their background, to possess and employ such plans 
while generating or attempting to understand a program. If this is not the case then 
we must clearly rethink our theoretical position on the nature of programming 
plans, because of their assumed universality. 
Denying this universality would mean that proponents of the Natural Artifacts 
view would have to make what might constitute possibly unacceptable 
concessions to their theory in order that it remain consistent. Indeed, if the plan 
theory is not generalisable to languages other than Pascal then clearly it of 
significantly less utility and therefore interest. If one is to view programming plans 
as Notational Artifacts then one might expect certain programming languages to 
facilitate (eg Pascal) or to discourage (eg Basic) the perception of plan-structures 
in that language regardless of the programmer's particular background in design. 
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Of course, if such design courses teach plans or how to find and use them, then it 
would not be surprising in the least to discover that those who have taken such a 
course use plans with more success than those who have not. However, the 
design courses discussed in this chapter were concerned exclusively with the 
teaching of structured design methods (in particular, Jackson structured design) 
and functional decomposition, and not with the explicit teaching of the sorts of 
plan structures identified by the Soloway group. Indeed, the exercises associated 
with these courses required students only to produce program designs and not 
implementations of these designs in any target programming language. 
The experiments reported in this chapter address the hypothesis that programming 
plans can be at least partially characterised as artifacts of design or, as artifacts of 
the teaching of particular program design strategies. Taken as a whole these 
experiments do not assume homogeneity of experience between subject groups, 
rather groups have been chosen precisely because their backgrounds differ in 
terms of the level of design experience possessed by the groups. It must be noted 
however that as far as their ability to generate correct programs and to de-bug 
programs is concerned all groups exhibited equivalent overall levels of 
programming competence. It is interesting to note that most previous studies 
which have examined the role of programming plans in expert programming 
performance have attempted to measure performance factors that relate to either the 
recall or the generation of plan-like structures in programs. Hence programming 
plans are used to both explain the difference between novice and expert 
performance whilst at the same time providing the only measure of that 
performance. This lack of any independent means of evaluating programming 
performance seems to have clouded the theoretical interpretation of such research. 
Two experiments are reported each looking at a separate aspect of the development 
and the nature and role of programming plans. The first experiment is concerned 
with the effects of the cueing of salient information structures in Basic programs 
and the effect that this has on de-bugging for design/ non-design experienced 
programmers. The second experiment examines the recall of plan structures by 
design and non-design experienced programmers. 
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The first experiment follows quite closely a design presented by Gilmore and 
Green (1988), in which Basic and Pascal programmers were asked to find bugs in 
programs in which various information structures were highlighted (see chapter 
5). Gilmore and Green found that the highlighting of plan structures was 
advantageous to experienced Pascal programmers, but of little benefit to Basic 
programmers who appear to rely more extensively on control based information in 
programs. They conclude that the notation of Basic is less 'role expressive', 
making the identification and use of plans more difficult. 
However, another interpretation of these results might be to suggest that Pascal 
programmers are more likely to have access to design based skills than Basic 
programmers, and that these skills facilitate the identification and use of 
plan-based information in programs. Indeed, Gilmore and Green point out that the 
Basic programmers used their experiment were engineering students while the 
Pascal programmers were computer science students. It would not be 
unreasonable to assume that the latter group had some experience of program 
design as most computer science courses now have a program design component. 
In the case of the former group this assumption is less valid since Basic is often 
taught in isolation to the teaching of design skills. Hence, evidence that is put 
forward for the effects of notation on the comprehension of plan structures in 
programs might equally well be interpreted as arising from non-trivial differences 
between the subject groups. 
In fact, Gilmore and Green acknowledge that notational factors and in particular 
'role expressiveness' might not be the only factors that influence the use of 
plan-structures in different programming languages. Indeed, they argue that 
different teaching strategies may provide a different emphases to the way in which 
such structures are perceived in programs. However they say little more about this 
issue except to say that more research is required into the influence of educational 
factors in determining the development of expertise in programming. 
If one considers the "natural artifacts" view of programming plans, as we have 
characterised it, then one would expect no significant or systematic differences to 
exist between groups of design/non-design skilled programmers in terms of the 
benefit of the provision of cues to plan structure as compared to other types of 
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cue. Indeed in the experiment reported by Gilmore and Green, both groups 
exhibited similar overall levels of programming competence (as measured in terms 
of their general ability to debug programs). Hence, if programming plans are the 
major defining characteristic of programming expertise, then cues to plan 
structures in Basic programs should help the expert Basic programmer to detect 
plan-related bugs in the same way that cues to plan structures in Pascal programs 
should aid the expert Pascal programmer in the detection of plan-related bugs. 
However this hypothesis is not supported by the results of the Gilmore and Green 
study. 
The first experiment reported in this chapter has been carried out in order to 
investigate the effects of the possession of design skills on the perception of cues 
to plan-structures in Basic programs. If the notational features of a language, and 
in particular its role expressiveness, are the primary factors that determine whether 
plan-structures can be usefully employed in the comprehension of programs 
written in that language, then cues to plan structure in Basic programs (which 
offer low role expressiveness) should be less useful than cues to other information 
structures, and in particular cues to control-based information. However, if the 
hypothesis that the possession of design skills facilitates and enables the 
programmer to both perceive and use plan structures in programs is correct, then 
cues to plan-structure in Basic should aid the design skilled programmer more than 
the non-design skilled programmer. In addition, if we assume that both of these 
groups are equally competent with the language, then the overall detection and 
correction of bugs by both groups should be broadly comparable. If this is the 
case and design skilled programmers benefit more than non-design skilled 
programmers from the provision of cues to plan structure, then the notion of the 
programming plan cannot provide the basis for a mechanism that can 
straightforwardly explain the nature of expertise in programming. 
The second experiment reported in this chapter is a longitudinal study which is 
concerned with the effects that the teaching of design has on the recall of 
plan-based structures in Basic programs. Looking at the accuracy, speed and the 
order of the recall of programs provides us with the opportunity to examine the 
possible relationships between design experience and the perception and 
comprehension of programs. 
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Soloway and Ehrlich (1984) have analysed the recall of plan and non-plan-based 
Algol programs in order to test their hypothesis that if plan-based structures in 
programs facilitate the comprehension of those programs, then the recall of the 
salient features of plan-based programs is likely to be achieved more quickly and 
with greater accuracy than that of non-plan-based programs (see chapter 3 for a 
more detailed discussion of these experiments). 
According to Soloway and Ehrlich, if programming plans help programmers to 
encode a program more efficiently, then expert programmers should recall first 
those lines (the critical lines) that make programs plan-like before they recall other 
elements of the program. 
Gilmore and Green (1984), again using a program recall paradigm, have examined 
the notion that all programming languages are translated into a single type of 
cognitive representation when they are encoded by the programmer. Positing a 
single, universal, representation of programming knowledge has a strong affinity 
with the ideas which underlie the approach that we have characterised as the 
Natural Artifact view of programming plans. In this study Gilmore and Green 
explored the way in which individuals reproduce aspects of a specific language 
notation when they are asked to recall a program. The results of this study are 
used by the authors to illustrate their contention that the mental or cognitive 
representation of a program maintains certain salient features of the original 
notation of that program and as a corollary that the representation of the 
comprehended version of the program is not stored in a uniform "mental 
language" that is in some way independent of its external form. 
Again we appear to have encountered something of a potential dichotomy between 
the natural and notational views of programming plans. On the one hand, plans are 
proposed as mechanisms through which one can explain the internal cognitive 
structures which underlie the mental representation of programs. On the other 
hand, features of the mental representations of programs (Gilmore and Green do 
not mention plans explicitly) are regarded as notational artifacts that are derived 
from the external structure of the program. 
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If we are to claim that design experience (rather than mere programming 
experience alone) facilitates the ability of programmers to use plan-structures in the 
comprehension of programs then we would expect the following hypotheses to be 
supported by the findings of the second experiment reported in this chapter. 
1). During the first trial there should not be a significant interaction between 
Program type (plan-like or unplan-like) and Group (design skilled/non-design 
skilled). 
2). During the second trial this interaction should be significant. 
If these hypotheses are supported we will be in a position to claim firstly, that after 
learning about design, programmers are able to recall plan-structures more 
effectively than before. Secondly, this effect will have been demonstrated to be 
independent of mere programming experience, since both groups attended the 
same Basic programming course and had presumably attained the same level of 
competence in Basic. The conventional interpretation of the programming plan 
would not be able to account straightforwardly for this finding. If programming 
plans are the major characteristic of programming expertise then programmers of 
equal competence -with the same level of exposure to the language- should 
demonstrate a similar level of plan recall. This perhaps highlights again one of the 
fundamental problems of research into programming plans. That is that the notion 
of the programming plan is used to both explain the nature of expertise and 
provide the only measure of that expertise. 
6.2 Experiment 1, the effects of cues to program structures 
6.2.1 METHOD 
Subjects 
A total of 72 students participated in the experiment. One group of 36 subjects 
was drawn from a population of computer science undergraduates all of whom 
had attended a course on program design (Group A). A second group of equal size 
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was recruited from courses in finance, accountancy and engineering. This group 
(Group B) had no experience of program design. Both groups had an equivalent 
level of Basic programming experience amounting to at least 18 months. The 
design courses discussed in this chapter took place over a period of two academic 
terms. During the first term students were instructed in the underlying philosophy 
of structured design and functional decomposition. The second term was given 
over to the application of these techniques, and students participated in design 
exercises for which feedback was provided but no assessment made. Students 
were not expected to produce implementations of their designs in a target 
programming language. 
Materials 
The experimental materials used in this study consisted of three versions of 
programs written in Basic. These programs were based upon a program intended 
to calculate average rainfall (Johnson and Soloway, 1985). Five versions of a 
first (practice) program were created and 10 versions of the remaining two. All 
programs contained two bugs drawn from the Yale Bug Catalogue 1 (Johnson, 
Soloway, Cutler and Draper, 1983). 
These bugs were of three types and were evenly distributed between the programs 
with a maximum of two in each. Ten bugs were unrelated to any particular code 
structure (for example, incorrect operator in arithmetic calculation, typographical 
error etc.), ten were related to control structure (for example, incorrect 
line-number assignment in GOTO statements) and a third class of ten bugs were 
related to the plan structure of the program (for example, no guard for invalid 
input, updating of wrong variable etc.). 
Three representations of each of these programs were established. One 
representation provided no cues, a second used indentation in the normal way to 
reflect the underlying control structures of the program and the third used colour to 
indicate plan structure. In the case of the latter representation, lines of code which 
belonged to the same plan were indicated by presenting them on the screen 
grouped in terms of a particular colour. This representation did not make use of 
indentation. 
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The plan structures used were Input plan with guard, Running total loop plan, 
Counter variable plan and Guarded counter variable plan (Johnson and Soloway, 
1985). 
Figure 6.1 shows an example of one of the programs used in the experiment. 
Figure 6.1 a shows the correct version of the program with plan-structures 
highlighted. Figure 6.1 b illustrates a program which contains a number of errors. 
10 REM avrprob 
20 LET count= 0 
30 LET Sum= 0 
40 REPEAT 
50 HNPUT New 
60 HlF New = 99999 l'lHIEN G01'0 90 
70 ILE1' Sum = Sum + New 
80 LET Count= Count + 1 
90 UNTIL New= 99999 
100 IF Count= 0 THEN PRINT "No legal inputs" ELSE PRINT 
"Average is ..... "; Sum/Count 
110 END 
Figure 6.1a). correct version. 
1 0 REM avrprob 
20 LET count = 0 
30 LET Sum= 0 
40 REPEAT 
50 HNPU1' New 
60 HlF New= 99999 l'lHIEN G01'0 100 
70 ILE1' Sum = Sum + Count 
80 LET Count= Count + 1 
90 UNTIL New= 99999 
100 IF Count= 0 THEN PRINT "No legal inputs" ELSE PRINT 
"Average is ..... "; Sun/Count 
110 END 
Figure 6.1 b). Program with control flow error line 60, plan error line 70, and 
surface error line 100. 
Figure 6.1. An example of a Program used in the first experiment. Different 
fonts represent the colour highlighting of different plans. Lines 20 and 80-
Counter variable plan. Lines 50 and 70 - Running total loop plan. 
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Design 
The experiment was a three factor design. The independent variables were: 
1). The type of structural cue provided- No Cue, Control Cue or Plan Cue. 
2). The level of design experience of the group - Group A, design experience and 
Group B, no design experience. 
3). Bug-type- Surface, control or plan. 
Two factors (I) and (2) were between subjects factors; factor (3) was a 
within-subjects factor. 
The dependent variable was the number of errors detected and corrected in a 
limited, fixed amount of time. 
Procedure 
After a short practice session, in which subjects were given feedback relating to 
their performance, the experimental programs were presented to subjects at 
random on the screen of a microcomputer. Subjects were instructed to attempt to 
find errors in the programs and to highlight these on the screen using a light pen. 
Transcripts of this activity were obtained. Subjects were given a natural language 
specification of the problem (from Johnson and Soloway, 1985) and allowed 1.4 
minutes to locate the bugs in the programs. Subjects were explicitly told that each 
program contained only two bugs. They were then asked to correct these errors 
using a familiar screen editor and were allowed 5 minutes to complete this activity. 
Again, transcripts of this editing activity were obtained for later analysis. 
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6.2.2 Results 
The results of this experiment, represented graphically in figures 6.2 and 6.3, 
were analysed using a three-way analysis of variance. 
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This analysis revealed no main effect of design experience, bug-type or cue-type. 
Hence design experience does not appear to improve the programmer's overall 
ability to detect bugs or to use cues. In addition, there was no three-way 
interaction between design skill, cue-type and bug-type. Such an interaction might 
be expected if the possession of design experience impacted upon the 
programmer's general ability to use cues to structure or to detect bugs. Interactions 
between design skill and bug type and design skill and cue type were evident. The 
design skill x bug type interaction was significant (F2,30 = 14.5, p <0.01) as was 
the design skill x cue type interaction CF2,30 = 18.6, p < 0.01). 
This suggests that design experience does have a significant impact upon a 
programmer's ability to detect plan-related bugs and use cues to plan structure. A 
cursory examination of Figures 6.3 and 6.4 suggests that while design skilled 
subjects are able to use plan related cues and to detect plan related bugs, these 
abilities appear to prevail at the expense of an ability to use other types of cue or to 
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detect other types of bugs. Indeed, a significant interaction (F 1 15 = 6.86, p < 
' 0.05) is evident between design skill, bug category and cue category (omitting 
plan bugs and plan cues). 
6.2.3 Discussion 
These results clearly demonstrate the effect of the possession of design related 
skills on the comprehension of plan-based structures in programs. In general, 
subjects in both groups demonstrated a similar level of programming competence. 
Hence, no main effect on the detection and correction of errors by design/non 
design experienced subjects was found. In fact, the overall percentage rate of error 
detection and repair only differed by two percent between groups for both cue and 
bug category (Bug category: Group A, 56%, Group B, 54%. Cue category: 
Group A, 57%, Group B, 55%). However, the detection and correction of errors 
by the design experienced group increased significantly when plan-structures were 
highlighted or when the errors in question were related to one of these 
plan-structures (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). This is reflected in the interactional 
effects that were found to exist between the possession of design experience 
(Group) and bug category and design experience (Group) and cue category. 
Contrary to the results of Gilmore and Green (1988), Basic programmers do 
appear to benefit from the provision of cues to plan structure when attempting to 
locate and repair errors in programs. However, it must be noted that this effect is 
only significant for the group that possessed design experience. From their study, 
Gilmore and Green suggest that the failure of Basic programmers to comprehend 
plan structures in programs is a reflection of the strictures of the notation of Basic; 
in particular, that it is less role expressive than Pascal. However, the failure of 
Basic programmers to benefit from cues to plan structure in comparison to Pascal 
programmers might simply be a reflection of the differential design experience 
possessed by each group. 
Advocating the concept of programming plans to explain the difference between 
novice and expert performance in program generation and comprehension would 
therefore appear to be too simple a view. On the basis of the experiment reported 
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above, there does not appear to be a significant degree of uniformity between the 
use of plans by groups of programmers who would be regarded, on the basis of 
their ability to detect and repair errors, to possess very similar levels of 
programming competence. The results of the above experiment challenge both the 
natural and the notational artifact views on programming plans. Such plans appear 
not to be universal natural strategies or constructs that characterise or reflect the 
expertise of the programmer nor can they be regarded merely as notational artifacts 
that are imposed by the constraints of the particular structure of the language in 
question. Plan-structures appear only to provide the basis for the comprehension 
of programs for those programmers trained in design. In addition, plan structures 
are employed in the comprehension of Basic programs despite previous 
suggestions that Basic, because of features of its notation, does not facilitate the 
development and use of plan-like structures. 
Another interesting result is that the ability possessed by design experienced 
programmers to detect plan-related bugs and use cues to plan structures appears to 
hamper their ability to detect control and surface bugs and to make use of control 
and surface cues. In other words design experience might be seen to focus 
attention on plan-like bugs/cues at the expense of other possible sources of 
bugs/cues. Without more research we are not in a position to comment on the 
possibility that in actual programming practice more surface and control bugs may 
infest programs than plan bugs. If this were the case we might be forced to adopt 
the rather disturbing conclusion that the possession of design experience might 
have an overall detrimental effect upon a programmers' ability to detect certain 
types of bugs! 
6.3 Experiment 2, program recall 
6.3.1 Method 
Subjects 
Two groups of first year undergraduate students were employed in this study. 
Participants in both groups had initially at least 6 months experience of Basic 
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programming. One group of subjects (Group B) attended the same course on 
program design that was attended by subjects participating in the first experiment. 
There were 24 subjects in each group. Note that these subjects did not participate 
in experiment 1. 
Materials 
The programs used in this study were again based upon a program intended to 
calculate average rainfall (Johnson and Soloway, 1985) and consisted of 30 lines 
of Basic code. Following the procedure adopted by Soloway and Ehrlich (1984), 
two versions of the program were constructed. One version contained five critical 
lines conveying information relating to three salient plan structures: Calculating a 
running total, calculating a maximum, and establishing a counter variable plan. 
Figure 6.4a shows a fragment of this program with two of its constituent plan 
structures illustrated. A second - unplan-like - version of this program was 
constructed (see figure 6.4b). In this case, following Soloway and Ehrlich (1984), 
the initialisation assignments of the count and sum variables violated the normal 
and correct form of initialisation for the counter variable plan and the running total 
loop plan. Otherwise the programs were intended to be identical: both version had 
the same number of lines and a similar number of operands and operators. 
Design 
The experiment was a three factor design. These factors were:-
1). The type of treatment for each group; exposure to design experience or no 
exposure (Group A and Group B respectively). 
2). The nature of the programs (plan-like or unplan-like). 
3). Performance (number of critical lines correctly recalled in a limited time) on 
first vs second trial. 
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10 REM avrprob 
20 LET count = 0 
30LETSum=O 
40REPEAT 
50 INPUT New 
60 IF New = 99999 THEN GOTO 90 
70 LET Sum = Sum + New 
80 LET Count = Count + 1 
90 UNTIL New = 99999 
100 IF Count= 0 THEN PRINT "No legal inputs" ELSE PRINT 
"Average is ..... "; Sum/Count 
PROGRAM (a) - Plan-like 
10 REM avrprob 
20 LET count = -1 
30 LET Sum = -99999 
40REPEAT 
50 INPUT New 
60 LET Sum = Sum + New 
70 LET Count = Count + 1 
80 UNTIL New = 99999 
90 IF Count= 0 THEN PRINT "No legal inputs" ELSE PRINT 
"Average is ..... "; Sum/Count 
PROGRAM (b)- Unplan-like 
Figure 6.4. Fragments ofprograms used in the second experiment. Two of the 
five critical lines in the program are represented by lines 20 and 30. The plan 
structures represented (in the case of Program a.) are a Running Total Loop Plan 
(lines 30 and 70) and Counter Loop Plan (lines 20 and 80). 
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Procedure 
In the first trial subjects were presented with a program on the screen of a 
microcomputer. Each presentation lasted for 120s. Half of the subjects in each 
group were presented with the plan-like version of the program and the other half 
with the unplan-like version. The assignment of programs to subjects was done at 
random. Immediately after the presentation of the programs subjects were asked to 
attempt to recall the program verbatim and to retype it onto a familiar full-screen 
editor. Subjects were given 300s to complete this task. The screen editor was 
modified so that each depression of the return key (to open a new line) was 
recorded and time-stamped. This enabled a record to be obtained of the temporal 
order of recall. 
Five months after this first trial a second trial was conducted. This trial followed 
the same procedure as the first. During the elapsed time between the first and 
second trials, one group of subjects (Group A) had attended an optional course on 
program design (the content of this course has been outlined in the introduction to 
experiment 1). Subjects in both groups attended the same course on Basic 
programming between the first and second trial. Measures were obtained during 
each trial of the number of correctly recalled critical and non-criticallines and the 
order in which these lines were recalled by both groups. 
6.3.2 Results 
The results of this experiment are shown graphically in figures 6.5 and 6.6. The 
number of critical lines correctly recalled during the first lOOs of the recall session 
in both trials were entered into a three factor analysis of variance with the factors; 
Program type (plan-based or unplan-based), Group (A and B) and Trial (first and 
second). This revealed the following effects; 
a). No main effect of Program type, Group or Trial (all F's < 1.5, NS) 
b). A three way interactionm between Group, Program type and Trial (F1,5 = 
14.5, p < 0.01). 
178 
No other main or interactional effects were apparent. 
This three-way interaction can be split up into two separate two-way interactions -
one for trial 1, where there should be no significant interaction between 
Program-type and Group, and one for trial 2 when there should be an interaction. 
This is indeed the case. For trial1 the Program type x Group interaction is not 
significant. For trial2 this interaction is highly significant (F 1,5 = 19.43, p < 
0.01). 
In order to ensure that both groups exhibited similar levels of programming 
competence in Basic the results of a simple end of course test were analysed. This 
test involved presenting students with mini programs that they were expected to 
debug. The results of this test, which were marked by someone other than the 
experimenter, were compared for each group and at-test indicated that no 
significant differences did in fact exist between the groups. 
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6.3.3 Discussion 
The only significant effect revealed by the three-way analysis of variance 
discussed in the results section of this experiment was that existing between 
Group, Program-type and Trial. This interaction appears to reflect the increased 
number of plan structures recalled by group A during the second trial. Clearer 
evidence for this effect is to be found in the results of the individual two-way 
analyses. These results show that before design training the groups did not differ. 
However after training, subjects in Group A, the trained group, recalled 
significantly more plan structures than Group B. The conventional interpretation 
of the relationship between programming plans and expertise cannot account for 
this effect. Indeed one might expect plan recall to increase between trials since at 
the second trial, both groups had attended the same programming course and had 
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presumably added to their knowledge of the programming language. Indeed, a 
comparison of the results of the end of course test in Basic for both groups 
suggests that their expertise (at least in debugging) was broadly equivalent. 
However contrary to this expectation, if one compares performance by the groups, 
the increase in the level of recall of plan structures between trails was not 
consistent. 
The results of this experiment suggest that not all experienced programmers use 
plan-like representations to encode programs. This clearly has implications for 
those who advocate the programming plan as a key element in their theoretical 
analysis of expert programming performance. Again the universality of the 
programming plan appears to be drawn into question.In addition to this, 
conventional work into programming plans appears to tacitly adhere to the 
assumption that the recall or the generation of more programming plans is a good 
way to characterise expertise. However, when proper external measures of 
performance and expertise are employed, i.e., in terms of debugging abilities, this 
assumption loses strength. 
6.4 Overall discussion 
Programming plans appear to form useful constructs only for those programmers 
who possess design related skills. Indeed, on the basis of the experiment reported 
above, it would appear that the recall of plan-like structures cannot be used to 
indicate differences between novice and expert programming performance. This is 
because one would not expect significant and systematic differences in 
performance to arise between the two groups of programmers studied. The results 
of the first experiment reported in this paper confirm that where independent 
measures are used to assess performance (i.e., in terms of debugging skills) then 
the difference in overall levels of performance found to exist between those with 
design experience and those without is not significant. This provides additional 
support for the conclusions drawn above and, viewed in tandem with these later 
findings, questions both the universality of programming plans and their use in the 
characterisation of expert programming performance. 
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6.5 General conclusions 
Taken together the results of the experiments reported in this chapter highlight the 
effects of design experience upon the nature and development of programming 
plans. These experiments have shown that the plan theory cannot account 
straightforwardly for the differences between novice and expert programming 
performance. In particular, they clearly show the important role played by the 
acquisition of design-based knowledge in the comprehension of programs. The 
conflict between the natural and the notational approach to programming plans 
may, when viewed in the context of these experiments, turn out to be more 
apparent than real. However, the main conclusion remains valid. That is that 
current views concerning the nature and development of programming plans are 
flawed in two ways. On the one hand, the notational view is too narrow in its 
perspective because of the emphasis it places on notation at the expense of other 
demonstrably important factors. On the other hand, the views expounded by the 
Soloway group reflect a fundamental confusion between the measurement of plans 
and their use in theoretical explanations of expert performance. Hence, neither 
provides a sound theoretical basis for a full psychological theory of programming. 
Clearly the naturalistic and notational views of programming plans are by no 
means mutually exclusive. One might wish to suggest that 'natural' plans exist, 
but that novices have difficulty expressing them in a programming language. 
However, some programming languages may reveal plan components more 
clearly than others (the notational view). A tripartite analysis is proposed here in 
which both of the views described above can be considered valid only when the 
role of design experience is recognised as an important factor in the development 
of plan-related knowledge. By adopting this view, it is possible to provide a 
consistent analysis of existing experimental data. 
Using this framework, it can be argued that while novices have some difficulty 
learning to express plans, they can benefit from training in design. This is because 
although training in design is not concerned with the explicit teaching of 
programming plans, we can see that the design process provides a means of 
applying the salient features of plans, and discovering the links between them. 
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Thus such training is likely to aid the programmer in constructing and/or 
employing the vital mapping between structures in the problem domain and 
structures in the language domain. 
It appears from the experiments reported in this chapter that design training may 
encourage programmers to focus upon plan structures during comprehension and 
debugging activities. A similar finding has been reported by Stone, Jordan and 
Wright (1990), who demonstrated that training in structured programming 
techniques, such as those reported in this chapter, can improve debugging 
performance by "increasing the comprehension of program goals and plans" (pg 
81). They go on to claim that their results "suggest that the value of structured 
programming techniques may be realized more in the programmer's way of 
thinking about a program than in the creation of a structured program per se." (p. 
81). 
Subsequent experiments reported in this thesis suggest that the development of 
expertise in programming does not simply involve the accumulation of plans. 
Rather, programming expertise appears to depend upon the structuring of 
programming knowledge such that certain salient plan elements can be retrieved 
and accessed more quickly. It may be the case that design training facilitates this 
structuring process by encouraging programmers to focus upon the salient 
elements of plans. In addition, this might be expected to enhance the mapping 
between the language and problem domain that is discussed above, by providing a 
means of applying the salient features of plans and establishing the links between 
them. 
The model of programming expertise presented in this thesis will be considered in 
greater depth in chapter 12, where the results of this and subsequent experiments 
are interpreted in a rather more integrated and global context. The experiments 
reported in this chapter contribute to this model, but must be viewed in tandem 
with the other experiments reported in this thesis. Nevertheless, the experiments 
reported in this chapter raise a number of specific issues for the plan theory of 
programming. Firstly, despite a suggestion to the contrary in earlier work, 
programming plans do appear to be generalisable to languages other than Pascal. 
However, only the design experienced programmers involved in this experiment 
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demonstrated significant plan use. Secondly, there does not appear to be a clear 
relationship between the possession of plans and the development of expertise in 
programming. Hence, programmers who might be regarded to possess equivalent 
levels of skill, in terms of their general debugging ability, do not necessarily use 
plans to the same extent. These two findings appear to challenge the central tenets 
of the plan theory as it is currently expressed and clearly raise fundamental doubts 
about its ability to account for the nature and the development of programming 
expertise. 
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Chapter 7. Plan Violation and Programming Expertise: Evidence for 
knowledge restructuring 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the main conclusions of the previous experiment was that programming 
plans do not appear to provide a straightforward account of programming 
expertise. Hence, programmers may exhibit the same general level of 
programming competence in the context of certain tasks, but use plans rather 
differently. One area that has yet to be subjected to experimental analysis is 
concerned with the dynamic aspects of plan use and the relationship between plan 
use and the development of expertise. 
One major criticism of the plan/goal analysis of programming is that it presents a 
fairly limited view of the programming activity. This is particularly true given 
what we know about the role of plans and goals in other problem solving 
domains. Programming plans are proposed as constructs that form the basis for 
distinctions between novice and expert performance, yet little concern has been 
directed toward an analysis of the development and use of plan structures and the 
refinement of goals as programming expertise and knowledge increases. 
Studies of the development of plan structures and goals in other domains suggest 
that the plans that underpin expertise develop through a number of identifiable 
stages. Kay and Black (1984, 1986), for example, have traced the plan acquisition 
process in a text editing domain. They suggest that a complex relationship exists 
between the development of plan structures and increase in expertise. They 
highlight the importance of the refinement of plan structures and the use of 
selection rules as expertise develops. 
In light of this work, the notion that the primary distinction between the novice 
and expert programmer is solely based upon the latter's possession of plan related 
structures would appear to be an oversimplification. Indeed, experts need to not 
only possess plan structures but also know how to use them appropriately. Kay 
and Black (op cit) suggest that during intermediate stages of skill acquisition plan 
structures are already well developed but that genuine expertise tends to be 
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exhibited only when appropriate selection rules are developed to guide the 
implementation ofplans. 
Kay and Black suggest that skill learning in the text editing domain progresses 
through four identifiable stages. The first stage in this description represents the 
naive user who has no text editing experience. They suggest that users bring to 
the task a range of preconceptions about text editing terminology which may or 
may not accord with their interpretations of that terminology as expertise develops. 
The next stage in Kay and Black's description is concerned with the goal of 
overcoming this prior knowledge bias. They suggest that during this phase (which 
they call the initial learning phase) users develop conceptual knowledge structures 
that link specific goals with commands. At this stage, users tend to cluster together 
functionally related commands. For example, INSERT, PUT, REPLACE might 
be grouped together because these commands are used to accomplish the goal of 
adding information. Users tend to modify their initial clustering strategy, based 
upon prior knowledge associations, to one which emphasises the functional links 
between commands. 
The third phase of expertise development is concerned primarily with the 
formation of plans. Once users have acquired a range of basic editing commands 
and goals, they learn that a number of commands can be grouped together in terms 
of the frequency of the use of such commands in accomplishing a particular goal. 
That is, they combine the actions that were organised separately during the phase 
of initial learning. Both Kay and Black and Sebrechts et. al. (1985) provide 
evidence about the nature of the development of knowledge structures during this 
third phase. During early stages users group commands in terms of their 
functional relationships. As expertise develops this grouping tends to occur with 
respect to commands that are used in conjunction to accomplish a particular goal. 
For example, the commands PUT and PICK might be grouped since they are used 
together when the user wants to move an item of text. 
During the final stage in Kay and Black's model, users produce compound plans 
to accomplish major goals and refine the selection rules that are used to choose 
among alternative plans in given situations. At this level goals are linked to plans 
using the conditions in which these compound plans are invoked, whereas, in 
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phase three goals are linked to simple plans, and during phase two merely to 
actions. 
The Kay and Black model suggests that a complex relationship exists between 
expertise and the development of goals and plans in a routine cognitive activity 
such as text editing. This model also has a number of implications for our 
understanding of the role of goals and plans in the programming domain. Previous 
studies of the programming activity suggest that expertise can be characterised 
primarily by the possession of plans or plan related structures and additionally that 
the existence of such plans can be used to make the distinction between the novice 
and expert. In the programming domain little or no concern has been directed 
toward an analysis of the development and refinement of plan structures as 
expertise increases. The Kay and Black description of skill development suggests 
a number of key areas of concern for the analysis of problem solving in 
programming. These can be summarised as follows; 
i). Can the mere existence of plans be taken as an indicator of expertise? 
ii). Are plan structures exhibited at intermediate skill levels? 
iii). Do programmers develop plan selection rules as their expertise develops? 
iv). How are plan structures refined as expertise develops? 
These issues are here addressed via an experimental study of the programming 
activity as programming skill increases. Programmers of varying skill levels 
(Novice, Intermediate and Expert) were presented with a number of Pascal 
programs, each of which contained several blank lines. In addition, a number of 
program fragments were presented with each program. The programmer's task 
was to attempt to state which of the fragments could be used to best complete the 
program; which might be their second choice, and so on. In the first series of 
programs the associated program fragments represented plan structures and 
contraventions of plan structures. 
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For example, Figure 7.1 represents a program intended to calculate the square root 
of a number. The important plan structure in this program might be referred to as a 
Data Guard Plan (Soloway and Ehrlich, 1984). The first program fragment (1) 
illustrates the correct use of the Data Guard Plan. This plan protects the "Sqrt" 
function from trying to take the square root of a negative number. The 'IF' part of 
the statement carries out this check and makes the number positive if necessary. 
The second program fragment (2) represents a contravention of the Data Guard 
Plan. Here the first statement suggests an assignment type initialisation (Num = 
0). This gives rise to the expectation of an assignment update (i.e., Num := Num 
+ 1). However, the Data Guard Plan predicts a read update since using an 
assignment statement would never result in a negative number - making the Data 
Guard Plan in this case superfluous. The third program fragment (3) contravenes 
the plan structure in a more straightforward manner and simply introduces an 
incorrect test for a negative value (Num > 0) in the last statement. 
One might expect, in light of the studies into the development of expertise that 
have been reviewed in this chapter, that the level of expertise possessed by the 
programmer would have some effect upon both their choice of the ordering of 
program fragment and the time taken to make this choice. If the existence of plan 
structures can provide an indication of the programmers expertise or, similarly, if 
such structures facilitate the comprehension of programs, then expert 
programmers might be expected to choose a fragment that best completes the 
program which represents or conforms to a plan structure. 
Indeed, from the results of the Kay and Black studies reviewed in this chapter, it 
might also be expected that programmers of intermediate skill level would make a 
similar choice. This would confirm the finding that plans exist and are used at both 
intermediate and expert skill levels. If plan structures are well represented as 
cognitive schemata, which would be expected in the case of the expert, then the 
time needed by the programmer to make a choice of appropriate program fragment 
(conforming to a plan structure) would presumably be less than that needed when 
such structures are poorly formed (as one might expect in the case of the novice) 
or when plan structures remain unconsolidated (corresponding to the intermediate 
level). 
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The second series of program fragments used in this study represented the correct 
and violated use of program discourse rules. Program discourse rules, according 
to Soloway and Ehrlich, specify the conventions in programming. For example, 
such rules might take the form (following Soloway and Ehrlich, 1984); 
"If there is a test for a condition then the condition must have the potential of being 
true." 
"An IF should be used when a statement body is guaranteed to be executed only 
once and a WHILE used when a statement body may need to be executed 
repeatedly" 
To a large extent rules of programming discourse correspond to the types of 
selection rules used by experts that have been identified in other studies of skilled 
performance. Soloway and Ehrlich (1984), for example, claim that discourse rules 
govern the use of plan structures in programming. That is, they provide an 
indication of the type of plan that is appropriate at a given point in the program 
and, in addition, provide some constraints on the formation of plan structures. 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the representation of a discourse rule and two violations of 
the rule in three program fragments. The discourse rule represented in the program 
is that variable names should reflect their functions. In this example the program is 
intended to calculate either a maximum or a minimum value. 
The first program fragment (1) represents a procedure that conforms to the 
program discourse rule. That is, the variable name Max is used in a procedure 
intended to calculate a maximum value. The second fragment of code (2) 
represents a violation of this discourse rule. This procedure uses the Max variable 
in conjunction with the calculation of a minimum value. The last procedure (3) 
represents a similar violation of this discourse rule but in this case the program 
would produce a run-time error if executed. 
Again, we might expect experts to exhibit a preference for the program fragment 
that represents the correct use of a discourse rule, since at this level of skill the 
selection rules corresponding to the rules of programming discourse will be well 
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developed. Kay and Black suggest that expertise is characterised not only by the 
possession of plans but also by the use of appropriate selection rules. This also 
conforms to predictions that stem from the GOMS model (Card, Moran and 
Newell, 1980) of skilled behaviour which places an emphasis on the presence of 
selection rules as a characteristic of expertise. 
At intermediate skill levels it might be expected that programmers, while 
displaying a preference for plan structures, may not exhibit well developed 
selection rules. Hence one might expect that the choice of program fragment used 
in the completion of a program may not accord with a strategy based upon the use 
of such rules. Correspondingly, no particular preference for the program 
fragments that represent discourse rules should be exhibited. This effect should 
also be apparent in the case of the novice programmer. The time taken to produce 
an appropriate ordering of program fragments should also provide some evidence 
about the development and role of program discourse rules at different skill levels. 
In the case of the expert programmer one might expect discourse rules to be well 
developed. Hence, the time taken to decide upon an appropriate ordering of rules 
in a particular circumstance would be less than that required by both the novice 
and the intermediate programmer. In such cases we would hypothesise that rules 
of programming discourse remain undeveloped. 
7.2. Method 
Subjects 
A total of 45 subjects participated in the experiment. These subjects were 
categorised according to experience into Novice, Intermediate and Expert 
programmers. Each of these groups were of equal number. The Novice 
programmers were undergraduates with approximately two months experience of 
Pascal. The Intermediate group were also undergraduates but this group had 
completed a nine month course in Pascal. The Expert group were either teachers of 
Pascal or were employed in industry as programmers. All in the latter group had 
used the language on a regular basis for more than two years. 
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Procedure 
Subjects were given the programs and program fragments (See Figure 7.1 and 
Figure 7.2) in booklet form. These booklets also contained instructions for the 
completion of the task. Subjects were asked to attempt to complete all the 
programs (i.e., to choose the most appropriate ordering of program fragments) as 
quickly as possible. No time limit was imposed on this task and all subjects 
responded to all the programs. Both the ordering of program fragments and the 
time taken for each subject to decide upon this ordering for each program was 
recorded. 
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(1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
PROGRAM One (input, output), 
VAR Num REAL, 
I INTEGER, 
BEGIN 
Writeln (Num, Sqrt (Num)), 
END, 
END 
FOR I = 1 TO 1 0 DO 
BEGIN 
READ (Num), 
IF Num < 0 THEN Num = -Num, 
Num = 0, 
FOR I = 1 TO 1 0 DO 
BEGIN 
READ (Num), 
IF Num < 0 THEN Num = -Num, 
FOR I = 1 TO 1 0 DO 
BEGIN 
READ (Num), 
IF Num > 0 Then Num = -Num, 
D 
D 
D 
Figure 7.1. A program intended to calculate a Square root illustrating program 
fragments corresponding to ( 1) the correct use of the Data Guard Pian and 
violations of its use (2) and (3). 
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(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
PROGRAM Three (input, output), 
VAR Max, I, Num, INTEGER, 
BEGIN 
END, 
Writeln (Max), 
END 
Max =0 
FOR I = 1 TO 1 0 DO 
BEGIN 
READLN (Num), 
IF Num > Max THEN Max= Num 
Max= 999999 
FOR I = 1 TO 1 0 DO 
BEGIN 
READLN (Num), 
IF Num < Max THEN Max = Num 
Max= 0 
FOR I = 1 TO 1 0 DO 
BEGIN 
READLN (Num), 
IF Num = Max THEN Max = Num 
D 
D 
D 
Figure 7.2. A program illustrating program fragments representing the correct 
use of a program discourse rule ( 1) and violations of that rule (2) and ( 3 ). 
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Materials 
Two sets of programs and program fragments were used in this study. The first 
set of three programs were associated with program fragments that represented 
plan structures and contraventions of plan structures. The three program types 
were as follows: 
Program Type1- A program intended to calculate a square root (See Figure 7.1). 
Program Type 2 - A program intended to calculate an average. 
Program Type 3 - A program intended to calculate a maximum or a minimum 
value. (See Figure 7 .2). 
The plan structures employed (derived from Soloway and Ehrlich, 1984) were as 
follows: 
Plan 1- A Guard Plan (see Figure 7.2). 
Plan 2 - A Running Total Loop Plan. 
Plan 3 - A Search Plan. 
Plan 1 was associated with Program 1, Plan 2 with Program 2 and Plan 3 with 
Program 3. Each program was presented with three program fragments (as in 
Figures 7.1 and 7 .2). One program fragment represented the correct use of the 
plan and the second and third fragments a contravention of plan structures. The 
ordering of program fragments presented with each program was randomised, as 
was the order in which program types occurred. 
The second series of programs consisted of the same program types (Program 
Type 1-3) and a number of associated program fragments. These fragments 
represented program discourse rules and violations of these rules (See Figure 
7.2). The three discourse rules used (Derived from Soloway and Ehrlich, 1984) 
were as follows: 
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Discourse Rule 1 - "If testing for a condition then the condition must have the 
potential of being true." 
Discourse Rule 2- "Do not include statements in the program which will not be 
used." 
Discourse Rule 3 - "Variable names should reflect function." 
Each of the three program types was presented with three associated program 
fragments. One of these program fragments represented the correct use of the 
program discourse rule, a second represented a violation of the rule, but resulted 
in an executable program, and the third violated the discourse rule but resulted in a 
error-prone program (See Figure 7.2). In the same manner as above, discourse 
rule 1 was associated with program 1, discourse rule 2 with program 2 and 
discourse rule 3 with program 3. 
7.3. Results 
Figures 7.3 to 7.6 illustrate the results of this study. Figure 7.3 shows the 
programmer's first choice of program fragment when completing a program. 
These fragments correspond to either a plan structure or to plan structure 
violations. As can be seen, both intermediate and expert programmers choose, in 
the main, to complete the program with the fragment that corresponds to the 
correct use of a plan structure. Conversely, novices do not exhibit a preference for 
plan structures over program fragments representing violations of plan structure. 
These effects were statistically significant. 
There was an overall efect of skill level (F2,28 = 13.64, P < 0.001) and of 
fragment type (plan/plan violation) (F2,28 = 10.62, p < 0.001). In addition, the 
interaction between skill level and fragment type (plan/plan violation) was also 
significant (F456 = 5.92, p < 0.001). Multiple post-hoc comparisons were 
conducted with the Newman-Keuls test, and a significance level of p < 0.01 was 
adopted for all such tests. 
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This procedure indicated that both expert and intermediate programmers choose 
the program fragments representing plan structures more frequently than novices. 
Correspondingly, novices tended to choose fragments representing plan structure 
violations more frequently than both intermediate and expert programmers. None 
of the other contrasts between means was significant. Hence, novices choose 
fragments representing plan structures with approximately the same frequency as 
they choose fragments representing plan structure violations and intermediates 
choose to use the correct plan fragment with about the same frequency as experts. 
14 
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Conforming to 
Plan Structure 
Plan Structure 
Violation 
Type -1 
Novice Programmers 
~ Intermediate Programmers 
D Expert Programmers 
Plan Structure 
Violation 
Type- 2 
Program Fragment Type 
Figure 7.3. The frequency with which a program fragment (corresponding to a 
plan structure and violations of plan structure) was choosen as best completing a 
program by novice, intermediate and expert programmers. 
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Figure 7.4 shows the total time taken by novice, intermediate and expert groups to 
make a choice of program fragments and to order them appropriately. Novices 
take the greatest time to order the program fragments, follwed by the intermediate 
group and then by experts. These differences are statistically significant. Novices 
take significantly longer than those in the intermediate group to order program 
fragments (t-test, p < 0.05, two-tailed), and the latter group also take somewhat 
longer than experts (t-test, p < 0.05, two-tailed). 
120 
90 
30 
Novice Intennediate Expert 
Group 
Figure 7.4. Mean time taken to order programfragments (corresponding to a plan 
structure and to violations of plan structure) by novice, intermediate and expert 
programmers. 
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Figure 7.5 shows the mean number of occasions in which program fragments, 
corresponding to the correct and violated use of a program discourse rule, are 
chosen first in the ordering of program fragments by novice, intermediate and 
expert programmers. Here, when asked to complete a program, the expert group 
tend to choose first the program fragment that represents the correct use of a 
program discourse rule. Those in the intermediate group tend to make this choice 
less frequently. Novices exhibit no particular preference for the correct use of a 
discourse rule over program fragments representing contraventions of the rule. 
These effects were statistically significant. 
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Figure 7.5. The frequency with which a program fragment (corresponding to a 
discourse rule and to violations of a discourse rule) was choosen as best 
completing a program by novice, intermediate and expert programmers. 
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There was an overall effect of skill level (F2,28 = 8.63, p < 0.001) and of 
fragment type (discourse rule/discourse rule violation)(F2,28 = 19.54, p < 0.001). 
The interaction between skill level and fragment type (discourse rule/discourse rule 
violation) was also significant (F4,56 = 11.46, p < 0.001). Once again, multiple 
post-hoc comparisons were conducted using the Newman-Keuls test, and a 
significance level of p < 0.01 was adopted. This procedure indicated that experts 
choose the program fragment representing the correct use of a program discourse 
rule more frequently than both the novice group and the intermediate group. 
Comparing the choice of program fragments representing the correct and violated 
use of a program discourse rule suggests that experts tend to choose the program 
fragment that represents the correct use of such a rule more frequently than a 
fragment representing a contravention of the rule. The same is true of the 
intermediate group. Conversely, novices show no preference for fragments 
representing the correct use of a discourse rule compared with those representing 
the controvention of such a rule. 
Figure 7.6 shows the total time taken by novice, intermediate and expert groups in 
completing the ordering of program fragments representing discourse rules and 
discourse rule violations. Here, experts tend to complete the task faster than both 
intermediate and novice groups. This is confirmed by further statistical analysis. 
Experts order program fragments faster than both those in the intermediate group 
(t-test, p < 0.05, two-tailed), and those in the novice group (t-test, p < 0.05, 
two-tailed). The intermediate group, in tum, appear to complete this ordering task 
slightly more quickly than those in the novice group, but this difference was not 
significant. 
7 .4. Discussion 
The results of this study suggest that the relationship between programming skills 
and the formation and utilisation of plans and selection rules in programming is by 
no means straightforward. Previous work in this area suggests that expertise is 
characterised primarily by the possession of programming plans and rules of 
programming discourse (Soloway and Ehrlich, 1984). 
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Figure 7.6. Mean time taken to order program fragments (corresponding to a 
discourse rule and to violations of a discourse rule) by novice, intermediate and 
expert programmers. 
This work, however fails to examine the way in which such plans might be 
formed and the nature of their use as skill in programming develops. The results 
of the experiment reported above suggest that programming plans exist at both 
expert and intermediate skill levels in programming. At both levels such plans 
provide a basis for the comprehension of programs. Both expert and intermediate 
groups are equally likely to choose a program fragment corresponding to a plan 
structure when completing a program. Novices, in contrast appear to exhibit no 
200 
particular preference for those program fragments representing plan structures 
over those representing plan structure violations. 
One interesting difference in performance that emerged between the expert and 
intermediate groups was that reflected in the time taken to complete the ordering of 
program fragments corresponding to plan structures and to plan structure 
violations. The intermediate group took much longer than the expert group to 
produce such an ordering. This may suggest either a). that while both intermediate 
and expert groups utilise plan based structures, in the case of the former these 
plans remain unconsolidated or b). that the intermediate group are, for some 
reason, unable to easily access or activate these plans. 
These findings would accord with results obtained from studies of the 
development of skilled performance in other problem solving domains. For 
example, Kay and Black (1984) suggest that the existence of plan structures in text 
editing is characteristic of both intermediate and expert performance, but that the 
rules of selection governing the use of appropriate plan structures only develop at 
higher levels of expertise. Such expertise would appear, in addition, to be 
characterised by the development of so called compound plans. Indirect evidence 
for this is adduced by Kay and Black from studies which suggest that as expertise 
develops the time taken to formulate and implement plans decreases. Another 
possible interpretation of this result might be to suggest that experts automate 
some simple generic sub-components of the programming task (these may 
correspond to plan structures). Empirical studies of this knowledge compilation 
process have been reported for general problem solving tasks (Anderson, 1982) 
and within the more specific context of programming (Anderson, 1987; 
Wiedenbeck, 1985). 
The results of the experiment reported in this chapter provide some support for the 
contention that expertise in programming cannot be explained merely by alluding 
to the notion of the so called programming plan. Such plans are used by both 
intermediate and expert programmers. The important distinction between these 
groups would appear to be based more strongly upon the use and deployment of 
appropriate selection rules as expertise develops. 
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This distinction appears to be reflected in the results stemming from an 
examination of the role of program discourse rules in skill development in 
programming. Expert programmers tend to make the most use of program 
discourse rules. Their use of such rules differs significantly from that of 
intermediate programmers who, when completing a program, tend to exhibit no 
particular preference for the program fragment representing the correct use of a 
discourse rule over those violating such rules. This would suggest that an 
important characteristic of expertise is related to both the possession and use of 
program discourse rules. Examining the time taken to order program fragments 
which correspond to discourse rules and to violations of these rules indicates that 
intermediate performance differs little from that of novices. Experts, on the other 
hand, perform the task a great deal faster than both novice and intermediate 
groups. This again supports the view that such discourse rules are an important 
feature of expert performance. 
Existing plan/goal analyses of programmer behaviour provide only a limited 
insight into some of the underlying features of this important problem solving 
activity. Studies in other domains, most notably that of text editing, suggest the 
need to examine in more detail not only the role of plans but also the nature of the 
development and refinement of such plans as expertise increases and, in addition, 
the central role played by selection rules in expert performance. This chapter has 
attempted to highlight the correspondences that exist between plan/goal analyses of 
text editing and those which appertain in programming. Strong similarities have 
emerged between these domains. 
For example, models of problem solving such as that proposed by Kay and Black 
for text editing provide a valuable basis for an analysis of programming. 
Extending the scope of such models to account for performance differences in 
programming has highlighted a number of difficencies in the current plan/goal 
analysis of problem solving within this domain. The present study has attempted 
to address some of these difficencies and by doing so to suggest ways in which 
the plan/goal analysis of programming might be extended. The central theme of the 
chapter - that programming plans alone do not provide an adequate basis for a full 
account of expert problem solving in programming - is supported and the 
plan/goal analysis of programming is extended to reflect the central role played by 
selection rules in expert performance. 
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7.5 General Conclusions 
The results of the experiment reported in this chapter provide general support for 
the idea that the possession of plans per se does not necessarily guarantee the same 
level of programming performance for different groups of subjects. It has been 
suggested that performance differences may be associated with the development 
and refinement of appropriate selection rules and/or with a process of knowledge 
restructuring that may result in the development of compound plans. 
In addition, this process may give rise to the restructuring of knowledge within 
plans and lead to certain structures becoming prominent within the context of 
individual plan structures. The model of programming knowledge presented later 
in this thesis suggests that via this restructuring process, focal plan elements will 
tend become more accessible as expertise develops. Hence, in the context of the 
present experiment, while intermediates appear to be able access the same plan 
knowledge as experts, they are able to achieve this more effectively, as evidenced 
by their greater speed. It may be suggested that this increase in speed results from 
the greater ease with which plans can be retrieved and implemented when focal 
structures are accessible. 
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level attained by the programmer. This chapter endeavours to extend current 
models of programming by emphasising the need to consider in detail not only the 
development of programming strategy, but also the way in which knowledge 
representation and features of the task language interact to give rise to particular 
forms of programming behaviour. 
The studies described previously in this thesis suggest a particular dichotomy 
between theories of programming that emphasise knowledge representation and 
those which stress the effects of language notation. However, these two elements 
are by no means mutually exclusive. The problem facing such theories is one of 
providing explanations for the way in which these factors interact to produce 
observed phenomena. 
8.1.2 Strategy vs Knowledge 
Also, besides questioning the assumed universality of the programming plan, the 
work cited above suggests other problems with the plan theory of programming. 
Bellamy and Gilmore (1990), have compared the coding behaviour of experienced 
programmers using a number of different languages. The intention of this work 
was to examine whether the order of program generation suggested the existence 
of plan-like structures. Their evidence for the use of plan structures in program 
generation was equivocal (see chapter 3). 
Hence, the question that arises is why plans should prevail in the comprehension 
process (as in Soloway's recall experiments) but not during generation? It may be 
that the appearance of plan-based behaviour is determined by comprehension 
strategy rather than knowledge (see chapter 4). Hence, studies which have 
examined recall as opposed to generation may, as Bellamy and Gilmore suggest, 
have tapped post-hoc rationalisations of the programmer's behaviour. Therefore, it 
would seem reasonable that studies investigating such behaviour should aim to 
clarify or make explicit the particular role of strategy versus knowledge. In 
addition, it is clear that studies examining program recall should not be assumed 
necessarily to be tapping the same knowledge structures or programming 
strategies as those found to exist in code generation. 
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8.1.3 Addressing Strategy 
Other problems with the plan notion are that little attention has been paid to a 
consideration of the mechanisms that control plan selection or implementation, to 
the nature of the development of plans with expertise or to the dynamic aspects of 
plan use (see chapter 3). Rist's (1986, 1989) model of the programming activity 
suggests that novices and experts employ very different strategies when 
developing a program to solve a particular problem. Rist claims that expertise is 
characterised by the ability of the programmer to focus upon the most salient parts 
of the plans which comprise a program. These Rist terms the 'focal lines' of the 
plans. Rist suggests that as expertise develops, some plans are automated (such as 
input and output) and initially ignored during design. This enables the programmer 
to direct her attention to the more difficult or novel segments of code. In terms of 
Rist's framework, as expertise increases plans are selected rather than constructed, 
and knowledge of the plan focus reflects this increase in expertise. 
In contrast to Rist's model, Green, Bellamy and Parker (1987) suggest that when 
code is not generated in a strict linear fashion (which they claim is the 'natural' 
development path for the construction of programs; cf Hoc, 1981 ), this is 
primarily because of problems with notational features of the programming 
language (partly because of it's limited 'role-expressiveness') or because of 
constraints imposed by the device language. Besides these two determinants of 
strategy, Green et al (1987), also suggest the importance of the programmer's 
knowledge representation, but in contrast to previous studies that have emphasised 
the role of knowledge representation, their empirical work has focused upon an 
investigation of those features of both the task (programming) language and the 
device language which are thought to determine strategy. 
8.1.4 Towards an integrated developmental framework for understanding 
programming behaviour. 
It is likely that features of the device language, the task language and the 
programmer's knowledge representation interact to determine the nature of 
programming strategy. The work reported in this chapter provides empirical 
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support for a model that has been constructed in order to explain the development 
of programming strategy and to clarify the nature of the interactions between 
programming language and the development of those structures which are 
hypothesised to represent programming knowledge. The aim of this work is 
twofold. Firstly, to provide additional support for the models of coding presented 
by Green et a1 and by Rist and secondly, to extend and elaborate these models by 
exploring the way in which their separate aspects (i.e., Green, Bellamy and 
Parker's emphasis on task language features and the programming environment 
and Rist's on knowledge representation) might be combined to form a single and 
unified developmental framework. This framework aims to show how 
programming strategies change with changes in knowledge representation arising 
via restructuring and to highlight the effects of the notational features of the task 
language on the development of these strategies. 
In order to investigate the strategic aspects of the programming activity the work 
reported here used a method similar to one originally devised by Green et alto 
examine non linearities in the coding process. Green et al, used discontinuities or 
'jumps' in the generation of program text to indicate departures from linearity. For 
this purpose a jump was defined as an editing action which was followed by 
moving the cursor to another location and performing another editing action. An 
extension to this method, which taps more directly the role of knowledge 
representation in the determination of programming strategy, involves examining 
departures from linearity within and between the program's plan structures. This 
method has been used successfully to investigate the more general effects of 
programming language notation and skill differences on strategy (Bellamy and 
Gilmore, 1990). 
Essentially, the method involves identifying the plan structures in code that have 
been generated or reconstructed from memory and then analysing, from transcripts 
of the coding activity, the number of jumps made between lines within the same 
plan structure (intra-plan jumps) and the number of jumps made between lines 
which form part of different plan structures (inter-plan jumps). 
Such jumps can be characterised as the points at which programmers make some 
change in their code. Gray and Anderson (1987) introduce the notion of 
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'change-episodes' to describe these key junctures in the coding process. They 
suggest that change-episodes can be implemented in two distinct ways; either as 
minor local amendments to a program or as major transformations in the 
programs' goal structure. 
Inter and Intra-plan jumps loosely correspond to the categorisation of 
change-episodes proposed by Gray and Anderson. For instance, Intra-plan jumps 
involve small local changes to code while inter-plan jumps may (though will not 
always) imply some change to the program's plan or goal structure. The intention 
of the work reported in this chapter is to extend out current understanding of the 
development of programmers' knowledge representations with increasing 
expertise and to investigate the more general effects of the notation of particular 
languages within this broadly developmental framework. Using the technique 
outlined above a number of issues might be addressed. 
Firstly, if plan structures constitute the underlying cognitive representation of a 
program and are not language dependent, but are instead related to the 
programmer's level of expertise, then clearly this will be reflected in differences in 
the strategic use of plan structures by programmers of different skill levels. 
Secondly, this technique provides a means of assessing the way in which the 
effects of language notation might facilitate or discourage plan use. In contrast to 
the method employed by Green et al, which simply analysed the number of 
distinct non-linearities in coding, here these non-linearities can be examined within 
the context of discrete plan-based knowledge structures. This provides a means of 
examining the interactions that might exist between features of the notation of the 
programming language and the programmer's knowledge representation. It may 
also be the case that features of the notation of programming languages tend to 
assume a greater or lesser role in the determination of strategy as programming 
skill develops. Hence, this technique enables us to examine the more complex 
interactions that might exist between expertise, knowledge representation and 
notation. 
A second measure that provides information about the factors that affect or 
contribute to programming strategy is pause data. Such data has been used to 
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indicate the independence of discrete plan structures in memory. For instance, 
Haberlandt (1980) has found reading time evidence for story episodes as 
independent memory units. Specifically, Haberlandt found that readers paused for 
a greater length of time at the beginnings and ends of episodes in stories. In a 
similar way, Robertson and Black (1983) have shown that pause time increases 
between hypothesised plan boundaries in a text editing task. Reitman and Rueter 
(1980) have invesigated the organisation of programmer's knowledge 
represenations using a free recall technique backed up with collateral converging 
evedence obtained from structures induced from the pattern of recall pauses (see 
chapter 3). 
Within the present context we are interested in the time spent pausing between the 
execution of inter- and intra-plan jumps. This information will have a twofold use. 
Firstly, it will provide evidence for plan boundaries; hence the pause time between 
intra (within) -plan jumps should be less than that occurring between inter 
(between) -plan jumps. Secondly, such data will allow us to investigate issues 
such as whether the ability to locate plan boundaries may differ as a function of 
expertise or is dependent upon salient features of the programming language 
notation. Indeed, the interaction between these elements may turn out to be more 
revealing. For example, it may be the case that the discriminability of language 
structures, which in turn is dependent upon notational features such as 
'role-expressivness', may have a significant role to play as programming skill 
develops, but becomes less important at higher levels of expertise. In this case, the 
ease or difficulty of discriminating between plan structures will be reflected in the 
time spent pausing between inter-plan jumps. 
8.2 Method 
Subjects 
Thirty Six subjects were recruited for this experiment. These subjects were 
classified into 3 groups of equal size according to their programming expertise. 
The novice group consisted of first year undergraduate computer science students 
all of whom had attended a preliminary short course in Pascal. All subjects in this 
209 
group had some knowledge of Basic, although this was limited to experience 
acquired during ad hoc courses prior to their matriculation. None of these subjects 
expressed the feeling that they could claim any particular expertise in Basic. 
Indeed this prior screening of potential subjects excluded a number of subjects 
from this group because of their wide ranging experience of Basic and 
concomitant knowledge of the language. 
A second group of subjects was classified as intermediate. This group consisted of 
second and final year computer science undergraduates. Subjects in this group had 
completed two single term courses in Pascal, and all had employed the language 
extensively in project work. All subjects in this group professed to being 
reasonably conversant with Basic. Indeed, most of the subjects classified as 
intermediate had used Basic quite extensively during the early stages of their 
course. A final group of expert programmers consisted of subjects drawn from a 
population of teachers of programming and professional programmers employed 
in industry. None of the subjects in this group had less than 3 years post-degree 
programming experience, while a number of members possessed over 10 years 
post -degree experience. 
Materials/Experimental Programs 
Subjects were asked to produce programs from natural language specifications of 
three problems. One of these problems was the 'rainfall problem' (see figures 8.1 
and 8.2) used by Johnson and Soloway (1985). The second problem involved 
determining whether an integer supplied as data was a prime number or not. The 
third problem specification was concerned with the calculation of a maximum and 
a minimum value from a series of numeric keyboard inputs. 
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PROGRAM Rain (INPUT, OUTPUT); 
CONST STOP = 99999; 
VAR Sum, Rain, Max, Ave: REAL; 
Valid, Rainy, Dry: INTEGER; 
BEGIN 
.... 
.... 
' 
... 
Sum:= 0; 
Dry:= 0; 
Rainy:= 0 
Max :=0; 
Writeln ('E 
Readln; 
Read (Rain 
WHILER 
nter rainfall'): 
); 
ain < 0 DO 
teln (Rain : 0: 2, 'is not a possible rainfall, 
BEGIN 
Wn 
pleas 
Rea 
END; 
WHILER 
BEGIN 
Su 
IFR 
e try again'); 
d (Rain); 
ain <> STOP DO 
m := Sum + Rain; 
ain = 0 THEN .... 
Dry:= Dry+ 1 .... .... 
EL SE ...,. 
Rain :=Rain + 1; .... ... y y 
t--
GUARDED COUNTER 
VARIABLE PLAN 
- Counts zero inputs -
GUARDED COUNTER 
VARIABLE PLAN 
- Counts positive inputs -
IF Rain> Max THEN Max:= Rain; ADD PARTIAL RESULTS 
Valid:= Rainy+ Dry; •---------- PLAN 
Writeln ('Enter Rainfall'); 
Readln; 
Read (Rain); 
WHILE Rain < 0 DO 
BEGIN 
-Combine counters -
Writeln (Rain: 0 :2, 'is not a possible rainfall, please try again'); 
Read (Rain); 
END; 
END; 
END. 
Figure 8.2. A standard Pascal solution to the rainfall problem with a number of plan structures 
illustrated (from Johnson and Soloway, 1985). 
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Design 
The experiment employed a program generation task. There were two independent 
variables:-
1. Language - Pascal/Basic 
2. Skill level - Novice/Intermediate/Expert 
and two dependent variables:-
1. Number of jumps performed by jump-type classification (Inter/Intra-plan 
jumps) 
2. Length of pause between jumps by jump-type classification (Inter/Intra-plan 
jumps) 
8.4 Procedure 
Subjects were presented with a short description of one of the three experimental 
problems and were asked to generate a solution using a familiar full-screen editor. 
They were allowed 5 minutes to complete this task. Subjects were not allowed to 
use pencil and paper but could make on screen notes if they wished. Subjects were 
asked to produce solutions in both Pascal and Basic, but the order in which they 
were requested to code their solutions in either language was randomised. All 
subjects attempted to generate solutions to all three of the experimental problems. 
The order of presentation of these problems was randomised. Transcripts of all 
on-screen activity were obtained for future analysis using the UMIST MMI 
monitor (Morris, Theaker, Phillips and Love, 1988). This device enables 
non-invasive recording of all user keystrokes and machine responses and provides 
controllable real-time (and half-real time) playback of user activities via the host 
machine. These transcripts were subsequently analysed for the presence of plan 
structures in code, the occurrence and nature of plan jumps and the pause duration 
between jumps. 
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A number of protocols were established in order to ensure a level of consistency 
within these different measures. The presence of plan structures was analysed by a 
group of three experienced programmers, all of whom were briefed about the 
nature of programming plans and were informed which plans might be expected to 
occur in each of the programs. These plans were derived from Johnson and 
Soloway (1985). Each member of the group analysed all the resulting program 
generation transcripts in terms of the expected plan structure of the program. They 
were asked to associate each line of the program with a specific plan. The raters 
were requested to carry out their analysis in terms of the plans identified by the 
experimenter. However, they were encouraged to suggest other plans within the 
program that were not made explicit in the initial plan analysis. It should be noted 
that no new plans were identified during this process. Figure 8.3 shows two 
program fragments illustrating comparable plan structures in Basic and Pascal. 
Plan jumps were defined as follows: Intra-plan jumps were classified as 
movements between a current cursor position to positions within the same plan 
structure. Inter-plan jumps were classified as movements between a current cursor 
position to positions within different plan structures. These protocols applied to 
situations where new text was being inserted or existing text modified. Pause time 
between jumps was recorded in milliseconds, but this level of recording sensitivity 
was not thought necessary for the analysis. Hence, pause time is represented to 
the nearest second. 
Edits to line numbers in Basic and to indentation structure in Pascal were excluded 
from the analysis since neither editing operation has a counterpart in the other 
language. It was thought that inclusion of these data in the analyses could give rise 
to difficulties in the comparison of plan editing between the two languages. 
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BEGIN 
Sum:=O; 
Rain:=O; 
Read (Rain); 
WHILE Rain <> 99999 DO 
BEGIN 
IF Rain<O THEN 
ELSE 
BEGIN 
IF Rain=O THEN 
Vaild := Vaild + 1 
ELSE 
BEGIN 
Vaild := Vaild + 1 
Rainfall := Rainfall + 1 
END; 
Sum :=Sum+ Rain 
IF Rain> Max THEN 
Max :=Rain 
END 
Read (Rain); 
END; 
Average:= SumNalid; 
Figure 8.3a A Pascal program fragment indicating a running total loop plan and an 
average plan 
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50 REM avrprob 
80 LET Count = 0 
90LET Sum =0 
IOOREPEAT 
140 INPUT New 
145 IF New= 99999 THEN GOTO 170 
150 LET Sum= Sum+New 
160 LET Count= Count+ 1 
170 UNTIL New = 99999 
190 IF Count= 0 THEN PRINT "No legal inputs" ELSE PRINT 
"Average is ... "; Sum/Count 
Figure 8.3b). A Basic program fragment indicating a running total loop plan and an 
average plan 
Figure 8.3. Two program fragments representing similar plan structures in Pascal and 
Basic. Note that these programs do not compute exactly the same function. This reflects 
the variation typically found in the subject's answers. 
8.5 Results 
Plan jumps 
Figure 8.4 shows the mean number of inter and intra-plan jumps performed by 
subjects during generation by novice, intermediate and expert programmers using 
either Pascal or Basic. These data were entered into a three-way analyses of 
variance with the following factors in each case: 
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1). Skill level (novice/intermediate/expert) 
2). Jump type (inter/intra-plan jump) 
3). Language (Pascal/Basic) 
No main effect of skill level or language was apparent. There was a significant 
interaction between jump type and skill level (F2,132 = 6.34, p<O.Ol). This 
appears to reflect the orthogonal relationship between inter and intra plan jumps 
with increasing levels of expertise. In addition, a complex three-way interaction 
between language, jump type and skill level was evident.(F2,66 = 3.72, p<0.05). 
Separate ANOV As for the results from each jump-type classification were 
employed in attempt to clarify the nature of this more complex interaction. These 
ANOV As revealed that the skill level x language interaction was significant in the 
case of the inter-plan classification (F2,66 = 8.43, p<O.Ol) but not for the 
intra-plan classification. This interaction appears to be a consequence of the greater 
number of inter-plan jumps performed by intermediate and expert Pascal 
programmers in comparison to their Basic counterparts. There were no other 
significant main or interactional effects. 
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Pauses 
Pause data (figure 8.5) was analysed in a similar fashion using a three-way 
ANOV A. The three factor levels were the same as above. This analysis indicated 
the following effects: 
There was no main effect of either language or skill level. The effect of jump type 
was highly significant (F2,132 = 18.2, p<0.01). There was a significant 
interaction between skill level and jump type (F2,66 = 5.89, p<0.01) and a 
three-way interaction between language, skill level and jump type (F2,66 = 10.74, 
p<0.01). Again, separate ANOVAs for each jump type classification were carried 
out. This procedure indicated that the language x skill level interaction was 
significant in the case of the Inter-plan classification (F2,66 = 7.55, p<0.01) but 
non significant for the intra-plan classification. 
Additional language comparisons 
A comparison of the average number of plans generated for different programming 
languages (Basic or Pascal) revealed no significant difference between languages 
(t-test). The average length (lines of code) of each plan did not differ significantly 
between languages (t-test). In addition, the average length (lines of code) of Pascal 
and Basic solutions did not differ significantly (t-test). However, novices 
generated significantly fewer plans than both intermediates and experts, while a 
comparison of intermediate and expert performance indicated no significant 
difference in plan generation (t-test). 
A measure of inter-judge scoring reliability was obtained in order to ensure a level 
of concordance between the three judges assessing programs for the presence of 
plans. A high coefficient of concordance was found to exist between judges 
(Kendall's coefficient of concordance W = 0.77, p<O.Ol). 
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for different languages during program generation 
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In addition, a plan analysis of all the resulting program transcripts was carried out 
by the experimenter in order to attempt to corroborate the results produced by the 
analysts. Both analyses were carried out independently and there was a high level 
of concordance between experimenter and judges analyses in terms of both the 
plans that were identified (W = 0.57, p<0.01) and their identification with 
particular lines of code in the program (W = 0.64, p<0.01). 
The program transcripts were also analysed in terms of the comparative 
distribution of plans in Pascal and Basic. This analysis was undertaken because it 
is possible that the plans generated in one language might be implemented in a 
localised group of statements, and in another language be more widely distributed 
in the program, thus giving rise to problems interpreting the plan editing process. 
Here, all lines in a program that corresponded to the same plan construct were 
identified. Each set of program statements (corresponding to a particular plan) 
were given the same label. Next the distance from the first line of a particular plan 
to other lines comprising that plan were assessed. Hence, if the next line of the 
plan was immediately adjacent to the initial line this was scored as zero, if it 
occurred on the next line it was scored as one, and so on until reaching the last 
statement of a particular plan. This procedure provides a broad measure of the 
distribution of the elements of a particular plan . An average indication of plan 
distribution in the two languages can be computed by summing these distribution 
measures for each plan and dividing this by the total number of lines comprising 
each plan. The average distribution measure for Pascal plans (0.11) did not differ 
significantly from the average distribution measure for Basic plans (0.09), [t-test]. 
The fact that this distribution measure is greater than zero for both languages does 
suggest some plan distribution, however this distribution is minimal and, by and 
large, plans appear to be generated in spatially contiguous blocks of code in both 
Pascal and Basic. 
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8.6 Discussion 
Taken together these data suggest a rather complex relationship between skill 
level, language and programming strategy. While they provide support for 
particular elements within existing theories of programming, they also reveal some 
of the more complex interactions between these elements which are not predicted 
by such theories. For instance, as predicted by Rist (1986), the results of the 
present study indicate changes in the strategic use of plans as skill levels increase. 
Hence, the linear generation mode adopted by novices is replaced by a strategy 
that appears to reflect a development in plan focus as expertise increases. This is 
evidenced by the significant increase in inter-plan jumps with increasing expertise 
and a concomitant decrease in intra-plan jumps during the program generation 
task. These data also support a view of program generation that is similar to 
Jeffries' (1982) analysis of the strategies involved in reading programs. Jeffries 
found that experts read programs in the order in which they would be executed. In 
contrast, novices tend to read programs from beginning to end, in linear order like 
a piece of text. 
In addition, the pause data suggests that as expertise increases the time spent 
pausing between both inter and intra-plan jumps decreases. This may reflect the 
type of speed-up function typically found in other studies of skilled performance 
within both a general problem solving context (Anderson, 1982) and also within 
the programming domain (Anderson, 1987; Wiedenbeck, 1985). Also, evidence 
for plan boundaries is suggested by the interaction between jump type and skill 
level for pause data. Hence, the pause time between inter-plan jumps is greater 
than that between intra-plan jumps for all skill levels. As in other studies 
(Haberlandt, 1980; Reitman and Rueter, 1980; Robertson and Black, 1986) this 
suggests the existence of discrete plan boundaries in the programmer's knowledge 
representation. 
The effects of language on generation strategy are however rather less 
straightforward. The model of coding presented by Green et a1 (1987) predicts a 
clear relationship between the notational features of particular languages and the 
development of programming strategies. Hence, if this model were correct, a 
language such as Basic should inhibit plan use because of certain features of its 
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notation while Pascal, which is thought to offer greater plan discriminability, 
should facilitate plan use. The results of the present study, however, suggest that 
language has little overall effect upon programming strategy. This concurs with 
results obtained by Bellamy and Gilmore ( 1990) which also failed to provide 
evidence for a straightforward relationship between language and programming 
strategy. 
While the results of the present study do not reveal a main effect of language, they 
do indicate a potentially interesting three-way interaction between plan-type, 
language and skill-level. Further analysis suggests that this interaction results from 
the fact that a greater number of inter-plan jumps are performed by intermediate 
and expert Pascal programmers in comparison to their Basic counterparts. One 
reason for this seems to be that the effect of notation in the determination of 
programming strategy plays a greater role as programming skills develop, and 
particularly at intermediate skill levels. 
Additional evidence for this interaction effect is to be found in the analysis of 
pause data during program generation. Once again no main effect language was 
evident, however the language x skill-level interaction was highly significant in the 
case of the inter-plan jump classification. From figure 8.5 it is clear that, for 
intermediates, the length of pause between inter-plan jumps in Pascal is 
significantly less than that occurring between inter-plan jumps in Basic. This may 
suggest that as programming skill develops the notation of the language (and its 
related plan discriminability etc.) has a significant effect upon plan use, but is of 
little relevance as a determinant of strategy at lower and higher skill levels. 
The interpretation of this effect may be quite straightforward. For the novice, plan 
use is hypothesised to be minimal (as demonstrated in the present study), hence 
one would not expect notational factors to play a role. As expertise increases then 
the mean length of pause between inter-plan jumps for Pascal falls sharply. In 
contrast, there is only a slight reduction in the mean length of pause for the Basic 
data. Hence, for Pascal programmers, at the earlier stages of skill development, 
the notation of the language appears to support the use of plan structures. This is 
evidenced by the reduction in the mean length of pause which is taken to be an 
indicator of the ease with which plan structures can be used (selected or 
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implemented). The small decrease in the mean length of pause for Basic 
programmers at early stages of skill development is assumed to support the 
contention that the notation of this language does not support the use of plans. 
At later stages of skill development the results indicate an inversion of the above 
results. Assuming a straightforward notational view we would expect to find a 
linear relationship between the ability to use plans and increasing levels of 
expertise, regardless of language. However, figure 8.5 illustrates that for Pascal 
programmers the rate at which the mean length of pause reduces between 
intermediate and expert skill levels is minimal. For Basic programmers, however, 
there is a decrease in the mean length of pause between these particular skill levels. 
Once again, these results give credence to the idea that at early levels of skill 
development the notational aspects of Pascal support the use of plan structures, 
but once expertise has developed to a certain point the effects of notation become 
less important. For Basic, the development of the ability to use plan structures 
appears to be hindered during the beginning stages of skill development. 
However, the initial adverse effects of notation on plan use soon diminish as 
programmers reach sufficiently high levels of skill. Hence, the question that needs 
to be addressed is why plan use appears to be differentially affected by the 
notational aspects of the programming language at different skill levels. 
Green et al (1987; and see chapter 4) suggest that because of the limitations of 
working memory, programmers need to make use of an external medium (eg the 
VDU screen) as a temporary store for code fragments as they are generated. The 
aim of Parsing is to recreate the original plan structure from these code fragments. 
In addition, features of the notation of the language may aid or hinder plan use. 
The formal structure of the programming language is not the only determinant of 
strategy. According to Green et al, strategy is also affected by the user's 
knowledge of how to perform external tasks- by their knowledge representation. 
However, as we have seen in previous discussion of this work, no consideration 
is given to the way in which the notational features of the programming language 
and the programmer's knowledge representation might interact to determine 
strategy. 
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Green et al claim that their parsing/gnisrap model is a model of expert coding 
behaviour, but the results of the present study suggest that expert programming 
strategies do not appear to be affected by notational features in the way that the 
parsing/gnisrap model would predict. It appears from the data that the 
parsing/gnisrap model provides a reasonable interpretation of intermediate 
performance, where notation appears to influence programming strategy in the 
manner predicted. 
The model would, however, also predict a similar strategy to prevail during expert 
performance. If we assume, not unreasonably, that intermediates and experts have 
similarly constrained working memory, then the only other factor in the 
parsing/gnisrap model, excluding notation, that might influence strategy would be 
the programmer's knowledge representation. Hence, it appears that for experts, 
features of their knowledge representation take precedence over notation as a 
determinant of strategy. 
Different notations are likely to facilitate parsing to a greater or a lesser extent 
(Green, 1989). Hence, in terms of the above interpretation, experts appear to be 
able to make use of some feature of their knowledge representation for programs 
that enables them to parse for particular structures more readily. One way in which 
parsing might be facilitated is via the recognition of 'beacons' which serve to 
indicate the presence of particular program components. Wiedenbeck (1986a, 
1986b) has demonstrated that experts can recall these key lines or beacons much 
better than novices. In addition, the presence of beacons in programs has been 
shown to facilitate program comprehension (Wiedenbeck and Scholtz, 1989). 
These studies suggest that expert programmers possess and are able to access a 
representation of programming knowledge which in some way reflects the 
saliency of these key lines. 
The results of the present study tend to support these findings and in addition 
provide a means of examining the way in which programmers' knowledge 
representations may develop. These data also suggest some quite subtile 
interactions between developments in knowledge representation and general 
notational features of particular languages. Hence, as programming skill develops, 
225 
features of the programmer's knowledge representation appear to reflect the 
increasing role of 'beacons' and 'focal lines', etc., in the program comprehension 
and generation process. 
Hence, intermediate programmers, whom we might suggest are still involved in 
the process of developing these particular features of their programming 
knowledge, are likely to be affected, to a greater extent than experts, by the ease 
with which they can parse existing program structures back into internal semantic 
representations. The results reported above appear to support this argument and, 
while not providing a basis for the rejection of existing models, clearly indicate the 
need for a framework which can allow for the integration of a range of different 
models in order to explain the richness of this particular form of behaviour. 
8. 7 General Conclusions 
8.7.1 Changes in programming strategy with expertise 
The experiment reported in this chapter has demonstrated that a range of factors 
may contribute to the determination of programming strategy. These factors 
include the development of particular features of the programmer's knowledge 
representation and the way in which the notation of a language might facilitate the 
parsing of code structures into cognitive representations and vice versa. The 
results of the present study provide evidence for changes in strategy which are 
associated with increasing expertise. In terms of existing work, there appear to be 
a number of ways of accounting for these differences in strategy. 
Firstly, one of the outstanding features of expertise in programming, and in other 
domains appears to be the particularly opportunistic nature of preferred cognitive 
strategy for programming and other tasks. Hence, the programming activity 
cannot be characterised as purely sequential, rather it might be better construed as 
consisting of bouts of activity each of which involve the creation of code 
fragments. These fragments are, in tum, continually re-evaluated and modified in 
respect to the particular goal or subgoal currently under consideration. In addition, 
the development of code may be postponed at any time in order that the 
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programmer might direct their attention to other goals or subgoals, possibly in 
response to the recognition of previously unforeseen interactions between code 
structures. Opportunistic strategies of this nature have been highlighted in a 
number of previous studies concerned with both program design (Guindon, 1989; 
Guindon, Krasner and Curtis,1987; Ratcliff and Siddiqi, 1985; Siddiqi, 1985; 
Visser, 1988) and the coding activity (Green et al, 1987). The non-linearities 
observed in the present study, which appear to characterise both expert and 
intermediate program generation behaviour, may provide additional support for 
this opportunistic view of the coding process. 
An alternative view of the strategic changes that appear to accompany increasing 
expertise might be to suggest that programming strategy is transformed from a 
depth-first novice strategy to a breadth-first expert strategy. This position is 
advanced by Jeffries et a1 (1981) who claim that novices adopt a depth-first 
approach to problem solving in programming; that is, they tend to expand only 
one part of a solution at progressive levels of detail. In contrast, experts tend to 
synchronously develop many sub-goals at the same level of abstraction before 
moving on to a lower level. 
While the results of the present study provide evidence that programming strategy 
changes with increasing expertise, they do not provide a means of distinguishing a 
depth-first vs breadth-first view of the programming activity, such as that 
suggested by Jeffries et al ( 1981 ), from an opportunistic characterisation of expert 
programming strategy. However, this study does indicate various factors which 
appear to contribute to the adoption of such strategies or to the ease with which 
they might be supported. The framework advanced below suggests two central 
determinants of programming strategy and stresses the fundamental importance of 
their interaction in the development of strategy. 
8.7.2 The role of knowledge representation in the determination of strategy 
Firstly, it seems clear that the programmer's knowledge representation must 
support the representation of salient code structures. Such structures, which might 
be characterised as 'beacons' or 'focal lines', act as partial descriptions of 
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particular code fragments and provide reminders that a segment of a program may 
need completing at a subsequent stage. In addition, the development of these code 
structures appears to coincide with increasing expertise. This may suggest that as 
expertise develops, knowledge structures change such that the organisation of 
these structures reflects the increasing importance of 'focal lines' and 'beacons' 
etc. Similarly, in the domain of software design, Jeffries, Turner, Polson and 
Atwood (1981) found that although novices used the same general 
problem-solving methods as experts, they lacked skills in two areas: applying 
processes for solving subproblems, and effective ways of representing 
knowledge. Jeffries et al attribute this latter deficit to the inadequacy of the 
organising functions provided by the novice's immature design schema. 
While the present chapter does not seek to deny the existence of generic declaritive 
representations of programming knowledge (i.e., programming plans), it does 
suggest the need to consider the development of an asymmetry in programmers' 
knowledge structures with increasing expertise. Hence, such knowledge 
structures appear to facilitate the representation of the 'focal' aspects of plans, 
while the necessary, yet minor and subordinate parts of plans are represented with 
less saliency. Here, we might the adopt the common view of natural language text 
comprehension (Bower, Black and Turner, 1979; Kintsch, 1974; Rumelhart, 
1975) and conceive of programming knowledge as being represented in terms of 
hierarchically structured schemata, with focal plan elements achiveing prominance 
in each plan or schemata hierarchy. 
This model of knowledge representation in programming will be elaborated later in 
this thesis (chapter 12). While this model clearly does not rule out a plan-based 
approach, it does suggest certain limitations for the plan theory of programming. 
For example, one implication of the present study is that it would appear that the 
plan theory does not provide an adequate basis for a theory of programming 
expertise. Hence, the expert programmer does not simply have more plans than 
the intermediate. Rather, the development of expertise might be better 
characterised as a 'fine-tuning' activity whereby the focal elements of plans are 
identified and the kinds of knowledge asymmetry we have discussed are 
established. 
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It is the case that novice programmers seem to be able to access fewer plans than 
both intermediates and experts. This may mean that the plans novices are able to 
access are poor matches to the current goal under consideration. Hence, novices 
may feel the need to correct these badly-matching plans immediately. This may 
give rise to the finding that novices tend to work on one plan at a time and to the 
associated prevalence of intra-plan jumps that has been observed in the context of 
novice behaviour. Conversely, experts, who have a greater range of plans may be 
able to find better matches to a current goal and hence may be more prepared to 
suspend the development of a particular plan until later. This view of the 
development of programming expertise would suggest that programmers gradually 
acquire program-specific plan constructs and as a consequence one would 
presumably expect intermediates to possess a greater range of plans than novices 
and a correspondingly smaller range than experts. However, the results of the 
present study indicate that experts and intermediates generate the same number and 
range of plans while novices, in comparison, generate significantly fewer plans. 
This provides additional support for other findings reported later in this thesis. In 
particular, intermediate and expert programmers appear to perform at the same 
level when asked to detect plan violations in programs, suggesting a similar level 
of plan knowledge. Novices, by contrast, are very poor at detecting plan 
violations (See chapter 7). 
In the present context, we might suggest that while both intermediates and experts 
have access to the same number and range of plans, in the latter case the 
representation of these plans has become attenuated in order to reflect a growing 
recognition of the importance the focal aspects of these plans. In the final chapter 
of this thesis a framework for understanding programming behaviour is advanced 
which attempts to provide a richer account of the devlopment of knowledge 
representation in programming. Here it is suggested that the behaviour of expert 
programmers is governed largely by the implementation and comprehension of 
focal plan structures. 
The results of the present study contribute to our understanding of the processes 
which underpin schema or plan development, and provides a framework for 
elaborating the relationship between the development of knowledge structures and 
expertise. This is likely to have implications for schema theory as it is applied in 
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other domains, since few studies have been concerned the detailed relationship 
between schema development and expertise. Where this relationship has been 
studied, expertise differences are normally explaned in terms of either the relative 
completeness or incompleteness of schemas (Lesgold et al, 1988) or in terms of 
the presence or absence particular schemas (Soloway, Adelson and Ehrlich, 
1988). In the present context, emphasis is placed upon the way in which 
knowledge is structured rather than upon the presence of schemas or their relative 
completeness. This issue is considered in greater detail in chapter 10 where a 
study is reported that indicates the central importance of schema restructuring in 
the development of expertise. 
8.7.3 Notation as a determinant of strategy 
The second part of our framework is concerned with an analysis of the way in 
which programming language notation might support programming strategy. One 
of the more interesting findings of the present study is that notation does not 
appear to support an opportunistic or a breadth-first strategy to the same degree for 
programmers of different skill levels. That is, the effects of notation on strategy are 
less extensive for experts than for intermediates. In terms of existing theory 
(Green et al, 1987) this effect would not be predicted, since there is no reason to 
believe that features of the task language notation should provide differential 
support for programming strategy, regardless of a programmer's level of 
expertise. 
One way to explain this differential effect might be to suggest that notation and 
knowledge representation interact very strongly to determine strategy. Hence, as 
representations of programming knowledge are in the process of development, as 
we suggest in the case of intermediates, then any additional means of facilitating 
programming strategy, such as might be provided by certain features of the 
notation, are likely to be of particular importance. At higher levels of skill, factors 
relating to the organisation of knowledge appear to play a greater part in the 
determination and the support of programming strategy. 
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In addition, the work reported here suggests a slightly different model of planning 
to those models which are generally advanced as descriptions of the human 
planning activity. Most extant models of planning embody some abstract notion of 
the planning activity in which the nature of the problem representation is not 
shown to have an effect upon the kind of planning or problem solving strategy that 
is invoked. However, within the programming domain it is clear that features of 
the notation of the task language can facilitate, or indeed act to constrain, the 
preferred cognitive strategy that is adopted for this task. This is likely to have nore 
general implications for the study of planning within the range of domains that use 
formal or semi-formal notations to describe aspects of the problem space. 
Consequently, it might be suggested that there are certain dangers in attempting to 
divorce planning models from an analysis of the way in which tasks might be 
represented. 
8.8 Summary 
The framework advanced here suggests a number of implications for our 
understanding of the determinants of programming strategy. In particular, it is 
clear that the role of both notation and knowledge representation cannot be fully 
explained in isolation. This is because these factors appear to interact very strongly 
to determine programming behaviour. Hence, it is only through an analysis of 
these more complex interactions that a comprehensive elaboration of the 
determinants of programming strategy will be forthcoming. This chapter suggests 
the need to consider these interactions within a developmental framework. That is, 
within a context which views the development of programming skill as 
accompanied by subtle changes in the way in which programming knowledge is 
represented. This 'fine tuning' of programming knowledge appears to provide 
support for particular forms of preferred programming strategy. The use of such 
strategies is in tum assisted by features of the language notation, but only during 
the beginning stages of their development. As programming skill increases the role 
of notation appears to take less precedence as a determinant of strategy. 
This analysis suggests that previous studies which have examined the nature of 
programming strategy only provide an interpretive basis within a rather limited 
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context. Hence, such studies, while emphasising the need to consider both 
notation and knowledge representation, have failed to elaborate the relationships 
and interactions between these factors within the general realm of skill 
development in programming. This chapter attempts to build upon the results of 
these studies, whilst at the same time stressing the fundamental nature of the 
interactions between these central determinants of strategy. A comprehensive 
understanding of the strategies involved in a complex task such as programming is 
only likely to be facilitated if we can not only delineate the role of its individual 
components, but also understand in detail the intricate nature of their interactions. 
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Chapter 9. Delineating forms of strategy and their relationship to 
the development of expertise in programming. 
9.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to demonstrate the way in which 
strategy may change with increasing levels of programming expertise. However, 
the experiments reported there did not allow for a clear differentiation between 
general forms of program generation strategy. Specifically, the findings reported 
in the last chapter did not enable a distinction to be made between breadth-first 
strategies and depth-first/opportunistic strategy. For that reason, the present 
chapter aims to provide a more detailed analysis of the generation strategies 
exhibited by novice and expert programmers. 
The primary intention of this chapter is concerned with explicating the detailed 
relationship between the knowledge restructuring process that is proposed in this 
thesis and the emergence of particular forms of strategy. In particular, it has been 
suggested that this restructuring process improves the accessibility of particular 
elements of individual program schemata or plans. Moreover, it was suggested in 
the previous chapter that elements which are prominent in the schemata hierarchy 
are likely to be those which are salient to the programmer. 
Extending this analysis further, Rist's concept of 'focal line' was adopted in order 
to provide some means of equating this psychological saliency with specific 
program structures. In terms of this analysis, it was hypothesised that focal lines 
will tend to be generated first during coding, and that programmers, having 
mapped out the general structure of the program at a high level of abstraction, will 
return later to these focal structures in order to elaborate the code surrounding 
them. This prediction is based upon the parsing-gnisrap model, however the 
present analysis endeavours to exten<.f this model by both describing the salient 
aspects of a programmer's knowledge representation and by demonstrating the 
way in which this form of representation can affect programming strategy 
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In order to carry out such an analysis, an attempt has been made to define a 
number of explicit levels of abstraction in program structure. This is based 
partially upon Rist's model of focal expansion that was described in chapter 3. 
Additionally, emphasis has been placed upon the derivation of general behavioral 
regularities from data generated from a reasonably large number of subjects. Data 
has been collected from a retrospective analysis of code generation rather than 
from verbal protocols, as in Rist's studies, and this means that the imprecision 
normally involved in classifying salient behavioral aspects of the programming 
activity can be avoided. Collecting data in this way should reduce the inaccuracy 
stemming from the linearisation effects that are common in subjects' verbalisations 
about knowledge structures that have a significant temporal and/or spatial 
dimension (Levelt, 1981). Such effects are likely to be of particular significance 
in studies which use verbal protocols to provide evidence of particular forms of 
strategy. In the context of the present study, however, abstraction levels can be 
related explicitly to fragments of program code as they are generated. Hence, the 
study relies neither upon concurrent verbalisation nor upon potentially imprecise 
protocol classification schemes. 
9.2 The programming task: Nonlinearities and focal expansion 
Rist ( 1989) has proposed a model of program generation which traces the 
evolution of a program through a number of stages (see chapter 3). An explicit 
feature of Rist's model concerns the identification of levels of abstraction in 
program structure. It is claimed that programs are built from simple knowledge 
structures that are merged and combined to form more complex structures. Rist is 
primarily interested in the processes that underlie the plan generation activity and 
central to his theoretical explanation is the idea of focal expansion. 
Focal expansion describes the process of generating a programming plan from a 
so-called 'focal line'. In terms of Rist's account, each programming plan has an 
associated focal line that directly encodes the goal of that plan. For instance a 
'running total loop plan' will be associated with the focal line 'count:=count+ 1'. 
The complete plan will also consist of an initialisation component and some means 
of reading data values into the plan. The production of a program is seen to 
progress through various stages beginning with the implementation of a focal line, 
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its extension to form a complete plan and finally to the creation of an entire 
program through a process of plan merger. 
The emphasis of Rist's model is concerned with the process of plan creation 
through focal expansion, however little attention is paid to the process of plan 
merger. This raises some important issues in the context of the present study. For 
instance, are plans created in a linear order such that the programmer completes 
one plan before moving onto the next? Or, conversely, are the focal lines of plans 
instantiated first to provide an abstract skeletal program structure which can later 
be extended to include less salient plan elements? The model of know lege 
restructuring presented in this thesis would predict the latter, since focal lines are 
taken to represent a single level of abstraction within a program structure. 
Non-focal lines simply extend this plan focus. According to Rist (1989) "The 
(plan) focus ... marks the start of detailed design in the domain of the program" 
(p 403). The emphasis of Rist's model is, however, too constrained (considering, 
in detail, only the move from focal line to programming plan) to explain possible 
interactions between higher-level structures. 
The present study attempts to address the issues outlined above by examining the 
evolution of high and low-level program structures during a program generation 
task. Information obtained from this analysis will provide some indication of the 
form of strategy that is adopted for this task. 
Following Rist, it is assumed that focal and non-focallines represent discrete 
levels of abstraction within the program hierarchy. One implication of the model 
presented in this thesis is that focal lines will be created before non-focal lines. 
Hence, one level of the program hierarchy will be established before lower-levels 
in the hierarchy are expanded. 
Another way of investigating these issues is to explore more explicitly the nature 
of the nonlinearities found to exist in code generation. In the previous chapter an 
experiment was reported which explored these nonlinearities in the context of plan 
generation in programming, but an analysis of nonlinearities can also provide 
more specific evidence for the development of particular forms of strategy. In the 
present context, interest is directed towards the nonlinearites occurring both within 
and between hierarchical levels in program structure. Hence, a number of different 
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categories of nonlinearity are possible; jumps between a focal line and another 
focal line; jumps between a non-focal line and other non-focal lines (within the 
program's hierarchical structure). Conversely, jumps may occur between 
hierarchical structures; from focal line to non-focal line or vice versa. 
Although the present study is primarily concerned with the generation strategies 
employed by experts, it has also been possible to investigate novice behaviour 
within this context. Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1979) suggest that expertise 
may influence the kind of planning model a planner or problem solver brings to 
bear on a particular problem, however no further consideration is given to this 
conjecture. Jeffries et al (1981) have shown that novices tend to adopt a depth-first 
approach to design problem solving while experts favour a breadth-first approach. 
Larkin et al (1980) have demonstrated that experts and novices employ different 
strategies when solving physics problems. Experts tend to work forwards from 
general physical principles to problem goals while novices work backwards from 
the problem goal. With these notable exceptions, many previous studies looking at 
both program tasks and at more general problem solving activities have failed to 
elaborate the mechanisms that underlie the relationship between expertise and the 
use of particular forms of strategy. 
The model presented in this thesis makes two specific claims about the strategies 
that will be adopted for program generation tasks. In the case of experts, a 
top-down or breadth first strategy should be evident since it is suggested that 
programs will be generated in a manner which reflects the hierarchical structure of 
the programmer's knowledge representation. That is, one level of program 
abstraction should be mapped out before other levels are elaborated. Specifically, 
we have suggested that those structures representing focal lines will tend to be 
generated first and that these will later be elaborated to include less salient elements 
at other levels of abstraction. In contrast, it has been suggested that novice and 
intermediate programmers do not typically posses this differentiated form of 
programming knowledge. Hence, for these groups it might be predicted that 
generation will be in schema order, and that this will be reflected in the adoption of 
depth-first or opportunistically orientated strategies. 
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9.3 Participants, Procedure and Tasks 
Forty subjects participated in this study. Subjects were split into two groups of 
equal size. One group of subjects were classified as experts and the other as 
novices. The expert group consisted of programmers/designers with a number of 
years industrial experience (4 to 13 years. Mean, 5.6 years) and of teachers of 
programming and software design, all of whom possessed previous industrial 
software design experience. The novice group comprised a number of Second 
year undergraduate students. Members of this group were drawn from the same 
student cohort and all had been instructed in the basic principles of traditional 
software design practice and structured prograrnrning.Subjects in both groups had 
experience of the programming language employed for this study - Pascal. All 
members of the expert group either taught Pascal or used it extensively in their 
work, while all members of the novice group had attended a first year course in 
Pascal and had used the language for project work. 
Participants were asked to undertake a number of programming tasks of varying 
difficulty. The simplest problem (derived from Johnson and Soloway, 1985) 
required participants to construct a program that would calculate an average and a 
running total from a series of input values. More difficult problems were based 
upon Ratcliffe and Siddiqi's (1985) traffic counting task and a task derived from 
Rist (1989) which required participants to sort 2113 weights into ascending order. 
These problems might be considered to be fairly straightforward by professional 
standards, however it is clear that they demand a significant degree of problem 
solving behaviour- the more difficult tasks taking between 43 and 78 minutes for 
experienced programmers/designers. 
Participants were provided with short natural language specification of the 
problems and were asked to write a program to solve each problem. Participants 
were told that they could make on-screen notes if desired, but were requested not 
to use pen and paper. No time limit was imposed on the tasks. Participants were 
asked to type their programs onto a familiar full-screen editor. All on-screen 
activities were recorded using the UMIST HIMS tool (Theaker et al, 1989); a 
non-invasive recording and replay device providing a number of analysis facilities. 
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[ ]. 
[ ]. 
[ ]. 
[I) Sum:=O; 
[I) Rain:=O; 
[ ]. 
[ ]. 
[ ]. 
[R] Read (Rain); 
Plan} 
[E) WHILE Rain <> 99999 DO 
[M] BEGIN 
[E) IF Rain<O THEN 
[ ]. 
[ ]. 
[M] ELSE 
[M] BEGIN 
[E) IF Rain=O THEN 
[F) 
[M] 
[M] 
[F) 
[F) 
[M] 
[F) 
[E) 
[E) 
[M] 
[E) 
[ ]. 
[ ]. 
Vaild := Vaild + 1 
ELSE 
BEGIN 
Vaild := Vaild + 1 
Rainfall := Rainfall + 1 
END; 
Sum :=Sum+ Rain 
IF Rain> Max THEN 
Max:= Rain 
END 
Writeln ( 'Please enter next value:' ); 
[R] Read (Rain); 
[M] END; 
[F) Average:= SumNalid; 
[ ]. 
{Running Total Variable Plan} 
{Guard Plan} 
{Guard Plan/Running Total Loop 
{Running Total Loop Plan} 
{Guard Plan} 
{Guard Plan} 
{Counter Variable Plan} 
{Counter Variable plan} 
{Guard Plan} 
{Running Total Variable/Loop Plan} 
{Running Total Loop Plan} 
{Average Plan} 
Figure 9.1. Program except illustrating plan structures and statement 
categorisation. [F)= Focal Line; [R] =Read statement; [E)= Extension; 
[!}=Initialisation and [M] =Miscellaneous. 
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The resulting programs were analysed for the presence of common plans by three 
independent raters using a goal hierarchy (Bellamy and Gilmore, 1990; Gray and 
Anderson, 1987). The plans that were identified varied little between the raters. 
For each plan, the raters were asked to identify the focal line of that plan based 
upon the definition provided by Rist (1989). Once again there was high degree of 
agreement between raters regarding the identification of focal lines. Figure 9.1 
presents a program except with plan structures highlighted and illustrates an 
example of the coding scheme used to classify program statements. This coding 
scheme allows each statement to be categorised either as a focal line (a line that 
directly implement a current goal) or as a non-focal line. Non-focal lines may 
consist of statements representing a focal line extension, a plan initialisation or a 
read process (see Rist, 1989). All other statements were classified as 
miscellaneous. 
From the above analysis, and by replying on-screen activity, a retrospective 
analysis of the temporal distribution of focal and non-focal lines was undertaken. 
In addition, a number of nonlinearities could be classified. For this purpose a 
nonlinearity was defined as a jump between one line of code to another. This 
could be either to edit an existing line or to insert a new line. An analysis was 
undertaken of the number of nonlinearities occurring between focal lines; between 
non-focal lines and between focal and non-focal lines and vice versa. 
9.4 Results 
Figure 9.2 shows the mean number of focal and non-focal lines (representing 
different abstraction levels) generated by both novice and expert programmers 
during the experimental session. The number of lines generated within each block 
consists of a simple count of the lines produced (focal or non-focal - according to 
the protocol outlined above) during each 10 minute time period, and is therefore 
not a cumulative count over the entire session. 
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Figure 9.2. Mean nunber of focal and non-focal lines generated by expert and 
novice programmers during each generation block. 
The cumulative mean number of focal lines generated by experts and novices over 
all generation blocks did not differ significantly (t-test) (mean[Novices] = 10.4: 
mean[Experts] = 9.4). Similarly, no difference was evident between the 
cumulative mean number of non-focallines generated by these groups over the 
same period (t-test) (mean[Novices] = 79.1 : mean[Experts] = 72.3). 
These data were entered into a pair of two-way ANOV A's - one constructed with 
the focal line data, and the other with non-focal line data. In each case the two 
factors were: 
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- Group (Expert/Novice) 
-Generation Block (t1 through t6) 
For the focal line data no significant main effects were evident. However, a 
significant interaction between generation block and group (F5,228 = 6.73, p < 
0.001) was apparent. This interaction appears to reflect the decrement in focal line 
generation that can be observed in the case of the expert group as the session 
progressed. The novice group, in contrast, appeared to maintain a fairly constant 
rate of generation throughout the course of the session. Further support for this 
finding was provided by instituting multiple pairwise comparisons of means 
between all adjacent generation blocks using the Newman-Keuls test with a 
significance level of p < 0.01. In the case of the expert group, significant 
differences were found to exist between blocks t1 through t4, with no significant 
differences between t4 through t6. For the novice group there were no significant 
differences in an identical range of post hoc comparisons. 
Similar findings emerge from the non-focal data. Again, no main effects were 
apparent. However, there was a significant interaction between generation block 
and group (F5,228 = 10.32, p < 0.001). Multiple post hoc comparisons of means 
indicated significant differences between blocks t2 through t4 for the expert group, 
reflecting an increasing rate of non-focal line generation during this period. No 
significant differences were evident for all other post hoc comparisons. 
Figure 9.3 shows the number of nonlinearities occurring between and within 
hierarchical level. For this purpose a between hierarchy jump was classified as a 
jump between a focal line and a non-focal line or vice versa and a within hierarchy 
jump as a jump between a focal line and another focal line or between a non-focal 
line and another non-focal line. These data were analysed using a identical 
procedure to the one reported above. 
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Figure 9.3. Mean number of Between and Within-Hierarchy jumps performed by 
novice and expert subjects during each geneartion block. 
The cumulative mean number of within hierarchy jumps for experts and novices 
over all generation blocks did not differ significantly (t-test) (mean[Novices] = 
12.5: mean[Experts] = 10.2). Similarly, no difference was evident between the 
cumulative mean number of between hierarchy jumps for these groups over the 
same period (t-test) (mean[Novices] = 20.9: mean[Experts] = 21.3). 
These data were entered into a pair of two-way ANOVA's- one constructed with 
the within hierarchy data, and the other with between hierarchy data. Again, the 
two factors in both analyses were: 
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-Group (Expert/Novice) 
-Generation Block (t1 through t6) 
In the case of the between hierarchy data no main effects were apparent There 
was, however, a significant interaction between Group and Generation block 
(F5,228 = 4.23, p < 0.001), reflecting the decreasing rate of between hierarchy 
jumps over generation blocks for the expert group. Multiple post hoc comparisons 
reveal significant differences (p<O.Ol) between means for blocks t1 through t4 for 
the expert group. No other post hoc comparisons proved to be significant. 
For the within hierarchy data, there was an interaction between Group and 
Generation block (F5,228 = 5.89, p < 0.001). Here, multiple post hoc 
comparisons indicated significant differences between means for blocks t1 through 
t5 for the expert group. Again, no other sigificant differences were apparent in the 
case of the novice group in an identical range of comparisons. 
9.5 Discussion 
These results clearly have a number of implications for the way in which we might 
attempt to characterise the program generation activity. Firstly, the strategy 
adopted by experienced programmers appears to broadly correspond to the 
adoption of a top-down, hierarchically levelled approach. Hence, the abstract 
structure of the program, represented by the instantiation of focal lines, is mapped 
out at an early stage in the evolution of the program. This high level structure 
provides a framework around which the rest of the program can be built. 
However, at many points during the evolution of the program, programmers can 
be seen to engage in opportunistic behaviour - synchronously generating both 
focal and non-focal structures. Hence, at any particular point during the 
programming activity, behaviour might legitimately be described as opportunistic. 
However, this clearly does not rule out the existence of a more global top-down 
programming strategy. 
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At early stages during program generation, expert programmers make many jumps 
between structures at the same level of abstraction. As the task progresses, 
however, nonlinearities occur between hierarchical levels and strategy is seen to 
become more opportunistically oriented. This corresponds to the findings that 
emerge from the analysis of focaVnon-focalline data reported in the first study. 
Taken together, these findings clearly demonstrate that different forms of strategy 
may be adopted within the context of a single task, and further, that choice of 
strategy may not be primarily determined by task characteristics as suggested by 
existing work (Carroll et al, 1980; Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979). The 
results reported here indicate that during the early stages of the development of a 
program, opportunistic episodes are subsumed within a more general top-down 
approach. However, during later stages, program generation takes on a more 
opportunistic character as programmers begin to perform significantly more jumps 
between distinct hierarchical levels. 
A rather different picture emerges in the context of novice behaviour. Less 
experienced programmers appear to display highly opportunistic behaviour 
throughout the course of the programming activity. This finding is rather 
surprising since all the programmers participating in this study had some training 
and experience (albeit rather limited in the case of the novice programmers) in 
top-down programming methodologies. One might reasonably expect this to be 
reflected in the generation strategy that is adopted. However, in spite of this, 
novice programmers appear to maintain a fairly constant generation rate for both 
focal and non-focallines and tend to perform as many jumps between hierarchical 
level as within. Such behaviour could only be described as opportunistic as it 
reflects none of the characteristics that are implied by top-down models of 
programming. 
The mechanisms which might be thought to underlie the differences that have been 
found to be associated with different levels of expertise are not clear. Anderson 
(1983) suggests that behaviours which might be described as opportunistic 
deviations from hierarchical problem solving may often arise as a consequence of 
fairly simple cognitive failures. For instance, subjects may pursue details of a 
current plan that is inconsistent with higher level goals simply because they have 
forgotten or have misremembered these goals. Both Hoc (1988) and Guindon et al 
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(1987) have observed that even expert designers may experience difficulties 
simultaneously considering all possible solution elements at a single level of 
abstraction, thus leading to an opportunistic approach as opposed to a the adoption 
of a strict top-down strategy. 
From this we might conclude that opportunistic episodes arise largely as a 
consequence of simple cognitive failures. By and large these failures appear to be 
related to working memory capacity limitations. For instance, this is apparent 
from the difficulties experienced by programmers in simultaneously maintaining 
all possible solution elements at one level of abstraction. Opportunistic strategies 
may be a symptom of these kinds of failure or alternatively it may be adopted as a 
deliberate means of circumventing working memory limitations in order to reduce 
the frequency and scope of possible failures. In the context of the present study it 
is not possible to resolve this issue. However, the findings of a study reported in 
chapter 11 of this thesis looking at the role of working memory and expertise in 
programming shed some light upon the prevalence of opportunistic episodes in 
programming behaviour. 
Here it has been observed that expert programmers tend to rely extensively upon 
the use of external memory sources (VDU screen, notes on paper etc) when 
generating a program. Conversely, novices rely to a much greater extent upon the 
use of internal memory to develop as much of a solution as possible before 
transferring it to an external source. The reasons for this are as yet unclear. 
However, such a strategy may give rise to the opportunistically oriented behaviour 
evident in the case of novice programmers in the context of the present study. 
Relying in this way upon internal memory sources means that novices will 
experience difficulty simultaneously maintaining aspects of an emerging program 
in memory. In particular, it will prove difficult to map out a global framework at a 
single level of abstraction - that is, adopt a hierarchically levelled approach. 
Indeed, Rist (1989) has found that novice programmers tend to adopt a very 
localised coding strategy, which places a minimal load on their working memory, 
and design the same part of a solution at different levels of abstraction. In contrast, 
experts appear to employ a strategy that involves greater use of external media to 
reduce working memory load. The present study suggests that expert 
programmers develop solutions in a hierarchically levelled fashion and this may 
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only be possible if an external media is used to record partial fragments of the 
solution as it develops. However, as the program evolves, experts seem to revert 
to the more localised strategy that is evident in the case of novice behaviour, and 
tend to engage in a greater frequency of opportunistic episodes. 
One possible reason for this phenomenon may be that, in the case of expert 
performance, there is a clear temporal separation between the progressive and 
evaluative problem solving activities that are normally involved in the 
programming task. Gray and Anderson ( 1987) suggest that problem solving 
activities in programming can be described as either progressive (working directly 
toward the goal state of a problem) or as evaluative (evaluating some already 
executed part of the problem solution). One might speculate that expert 
programmers will tend to engage broadly in progressive activities during the early 
stages of a programming task and in evaluative activities toward its latter stages. 
Hence, in the context of the present study, we might characterise the early 
top-down stages of program generation as progressive and the later opportunistic 
activities as arising from an evaluative process which has led to the location of 
flaws in the emergent program. For novices, progressive and evaluative episodes 
may be more closely linked and this is likely to be manifested in temporally 
localised generation and monitoring activity. This may give rise to a more 
systematic pattern of opportunistic episodes as small localised parts of an 
emergent program are evaluated and then modified when necessary. In order to 
provide additional support for this hypothesis, an analysis of the temporal 
distribution of evaluative and progressive activities in a programming task is 
presently being undertaken. This analysis is not yet complete. However, early 
indications appear to provide support for notion that differences in expertise are 
associated with distinct temporal patterns of progressive and evaluative activities 
such as those discussed above. 
9.6 Conclusions 
The studies reported in this paper differ in a number of significant respects from 
existing work which has examined salient behavioral characteristics of the 
programming activity. In particular, the use of a comparatively large subject 
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group means that the possible confounding factors which might arise as a 
consequence of intra-subject variation are minimised. In addition, it has been 
possible to derive, from previous empirical work (Rist, 1989), a number of 
distinct levels of abstraction within the problem space upon which to base a 
behavioral analysis. 
A number of interesting findings emerge from this analysis. Firstly, it has been 
shown that opportunistic episodes may occur at any point during the evolution of a 
program. However, this does not rule out the existence of an overall top-down 
strategy. Hence, the clear dichotomy between top-down and opportunistic 
approaches that is implicated in previous work may be unfounded. It is unlikely 
that studies involving an analysis of the behaviour of a relatively small number of 
subjects would make the observation of these regularities possible. 
Secondly, it has been shown that the emergence of top-down or opportunistic 
strategies is not task dependent as suggested by a number of previous studies. 
Rather such strategies can co-exist within the context of a single task. However, 
one form of strategy make take precedence over the the other at particular points 
during the evolution of the program. 
Expertise also appears to play a major role in the determination of particular forms 
of strategy. For instance, novice programming behaviour appears to be 
systematically opportunistic, displaying none of the characteristics of a top-down 
approach. Conversely, expert programmers adopt a broadly top-down approach, 
at least during the early stages of program generation. In this context, the notion of 
the focal line appears to play a significant role in expert programming behaviour. 
The experiment reported in this chapter has shown that experts tend to generate 
focal lines first, providing a framework around which the rest of the program can 
be constructed. This may arise as a consequence of the knowledge restructuring 
process proposed in this thesis whereby the devlopment of expertise is seen to be 
accompanied by the restructuring of plan/schemata structures such that focal lines 
achieve promanance. 
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Finally, there appear to be clear differences between the temporal distribution of 
opportunistic and top down episodes when comparing novice and expert 
programming behaviour. It has been proposed that the pattern of this distribution 
may be indicative of differences existing between experts and novices in terms of 
the separation of progressive and evaluative programming episodes. It appears that 
novices adopt a very localised evaluation strategy that is likely to give rise to 
localised changes, and consequently to a systematic temporal distribution of 
opportunistic behaviour. Conversely, experts tend to engage in evaluative 
episodes toward the latter stages of the programming task, giving rise to an 
asymmetrical pattern of top-down and opportunistic behaviour. The idea that 
differences in expertise are associated with distinct temporal patterns of 
progressive and evaluative activities is again only speculative. This hypothesis will 
require further empirical support before any firm view can be established. 
In conclusion, this chapter suggests a rather different view of the programming 
activity to that proposed in previous studies. In particular, top down and 
opportunistic strategies are seen to co-exist within the context of a single task. 
Additionally, there appear to be clear differences between novice and expert 
programming strategies. The psychological mechanisms that may underlie these 
differences are as yet unclear, but further empirical studies will hopefully provide 
a foundation for a more detailed analysis and specification of these mechanisms. 
In particular, future experimental work should address the distribution of 
progressive and evaluative episodes in program generation and the relationship of 
this distribution to differences in expertise. This will provide more information on 
the behavioral aspects of the programming activity and may contribute to our 
understanding of more general problem solving tasks. 
Another issue that will need to be addressed relates to the generalisability of the 
present study. Programming is clearly taught in a top-down fashion and many 
views of the program design process prescribe a top-down, hierarchically levelled 
approach (see chapter 5). It may be the case that a rational top-down process of 
this nature is not appropriate to the software design activity (Pamas and Clements, 
1986). Such a view of the design process may stem from the tendency of previous 
work to conflate descriptive and prescriptive accounts of the design activity 
(Carroll and Rosson, 1985). However, the effects of the way in which 
programming is taught are likely to be closely related to the way in which program 
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ming actually takes place. Hence, it is difficult to disentangle 'natural' preferred 
programming strategies from those which are acquired and/or prescribed. 
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Clhlaqpteir liO. Klrnowledlge Irestnncturing in programming: Evidence foir 
saliellllt n>syclhlological stiructures derived from reaction time and 
erirors. 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores in greater detail the relationship between knowledge 
structure and organisation and the development of expertise in programming. An 
empirical study is reported which provides support for the model of knowledge 
organisation in programming that is presented later in this thesis (see chapter 12). 
This model stresses the importance of knowledge restructuring processes in the 
development of expertise. In the context of the present chapter, this is contrasted 
with existing models which have tended to place unique emphasis upon plan or 
schemata acquisition as the fundamental mode of learning associated with skill 
development in programming and other domains (see chapter 3). For example, it 
is clear from our earlier discussion of the plan theory of programming presented 
by Soloway and others, that the development of expertise in programming 
depends largely upon the acquisition of plans. This work not only neglects to 
consider the detailed structure of plan knowledge, but also provides no indication 
of the way in which plan structures are implemented as programs. 
10.2 Schema theory and expertise 
Schema theory provides the theoretical foundation for a great deal of work in 
contemporary cognitive science (Schank and Abelson, 1977; Rumelhart, 
1975).The idea that understanding and comprehension are mediated by schematic 
stereotypical knowledge structures extends a tradition begun by Bartlett (Bartlett, 
1932) and the Gestalt psychologists earlier this century. Contemporary schema 
theory now underpins accounts of text comprehension (Kintsch and van Dijk, 
1978) and complex problem solving (Larkin, 1983; 1985) and has been applied 
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more recently to a variety of HCI domains including text editing (Kay and Black, 
1984) and computer programming (Soloway and Ehrlich, 1984). 
The application of schema theory to our understanding of problem solving has 
proved important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it provides a means of 
describing fundamental aspects of a problem solver's knowledge representation 
for a complex task. From this it should be possible to derive predictions 
concerning typical problem solving behaviour in the context of a particular task 
and to provide an indication of the sorts of errors that problem solvers are likely to 
make in that task. Secondly, schema theory can provide an account of the way in 
which knowledge representation may change with increasing expertise. A 
description of this developmental process not only contributes to a theoretical 
understanding of the evolution of complex skills, but can also pose implications 
for instructional practice and for system design. 
This chapter explores the relationship between the evolution of expertise and 
schema development and organisation in the context of a programming task. The 
chapter presents an empirical study which provides evidence for changes in the 
structure of programming knowledge with increasing expertise. 
10.3 Schema development and expertise 
Previous work concerned with programming and other complex problem solving 
tasks suggests a number of different ways of accounting for the development of 
expertise and its relationship to knowledge structure and organisation. These 
different views can be characterised briefly as follows: 
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Experts posses more schemata than novices 
This is the position adopted by Soloway and Ehrlich (1984) in their analysis of the 
development of programming expertise. They introduce the notion of the 
programming plan to describe generic stereotypical knowledge structures or 
schemata that guide problem solving behaviour in programming. Soloway and 
Ehrlich claim that expert programmers possess this kind of programming 
knowledge while novices typically do not. According to this view, expertise 
develops through a gradual process of plan/schema acquisition and this process 
would appear to constitute the basic mode of learning in Soloway and Ehrlich's 
model. As a corollary, it has been suggested that one means of facilitating the 
development of expertise is to teach such plans explicitly to beginning 
programmers (Bonar and Cunningham, 1988). 
Expertise and schemata content 
Another way of accounting for differences in problem solving expertise is to 
suggest that experts have more complete schemata than novices (Heller and Riff, 
1984; Larkin, 1983; 1985). For instance, work by Chi, Feltovich and Glaser 
(1981) concerned with physics problem solving behaviour, suggests that while 
novices and experts may posses similar kinds of domain specific schemata, 
experts are able to access extra knowledge in comparison to novices in terms of 
elaborated schemata that represent general physical principles. Novices, by 
contrast, appear to represent only the 'surface features' of a problem and their 
problem solving behaviour is guided by keywords present in the problem 
description and by stated domain objects. Weiser and Shertz (1983) have 
replicated this finding for expert and novice computer programmers, thus 
suggesting that schemata content is an important general characteristic of 
competence in the programming domain. 
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Experts structure schemata differently 
The studies reported so far in this thesis suggest a rather different view of the 
relationship between expertise and the development of knowledge representation. 
These studies suggest that experts may posses a greater number of program 
specific schemata than novices. This accords with Soloway and Ehrlich's 
characterisation of the development of programming expertise. However, as we 
noted in chapter 7, intermediates appear to be able to access the same range of 
schemata as experts. This is evidenced by the fact that intermediates can detect 
violations to plan or schemata structure as proficiently as experts. This finding 
would not be predicted by a view of programming expertise which places 
emphasis on the acquisition of program specific schemata such as that proposed 
by Soloway and Ehrlich. Rather, one would expect intermediate performance in 
response to schemata or plan violation to be better than novice performance and 
rather worse than expert performance. If one assumes that schema acquisition is 
continuous and correlated with developing expertise, as suggested by Soloway 
and Ehrlich, then these kinds of abrupt discontinuities in performance would not 
be predicted. 
The model of knowledge restructuring presented in this thesis suggests that skill 
differences in programming may be related to the way in which programmers 
structure their knowledge about the programming activity. In particular, 
programmers who have attained high levels of skill appear to be able to access 
program schemata in which certain salient program structures have achieved 
prominence. According to this view, expertise is seen to be related in part to the 
development of hierarchically structured schemata, rather than to a relatively 
simple process of schemata acquisition. 
Following Rist (1989) it is suggested that programs can be represented at different 
levels of abstraction. Central to Rist's elaboration of schema development in 
programming is the notion of the 'focal line'. According to Rist, a focal line 
directly encodes the goal represented by a particular program schemata or plan. 
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For instance, a plan or schemata concerned with calculating a running total will 
associated with the focal line 'count:=count + 1'. The complete plan will also 
consist of an initialisation component and some means of reading and outputting 
data values. Hence, one might conceive of focal lines as corresponding to the 
highest level of schemata abstraction. The other components of a particular 
schemata (i.e. non-focal lines) simply serve to extend this plan focus. This view 
of the programming activity was presented in the previous chapter, and the 
empirical data reported there appears to provide some support for this view. 
If the development of expertise involves the restructuring of programming 
knowledge such that certain salient structures achieve prominence, then one might 
expect this to be reflected in the time taken to respond to the presence or absence 
of certain forms of stimuli. For example, if focal lines are taken to represent 
salient structures, then we might expect that when programmers are presented with 
focal lines and asked to state whether they were contained within a previously 
presented program which they were asked to memorise, they will respond faster 
than when presented with lines representing non-focal structures. 
Moreover, since this restructuring process is hypothesised to be related to skill 
development, then we should expect to find differences between novice and expert 
responses in the context of this task. In particular, in the case of novices we have 
hypothesised that schema structures remain undifferentiated, hence we may predict 
that response times to focal and non-focal lines will be broadly equivalent. In 
contrast, experts will respond to focal lines more quickly than non-focal lines. 
In the case of errors we might expect a slightly different result. For example, one 
major claim of this thesis is that while experts and intermediates may be able to 
access programming knowledge which has similar content, this knowledge is 
structured differently in the case of experts, and that this differential structuring 
leads to their enhanced performance in the context of certain tasks. If this is the 
case, while we might expect reaction times to differ when comparing intermediate 
and expert performance, their error rates should be broadly equivalent. These 
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specific hypotheses are evaluated in the experiment described below, in which 
programmers of different skill levels were asked to memorise a program and were 
then presented with probe items corresponding to focal or non-focal lines. A 
number of these probe items were derived from the programs the subjects were 
originally asked to memorise, while others were derived from other, similar, 
programs. 
10. 4 An experimental study of schema development in programming 
10.4.1 Participants and procedure 
The experimental study reported in this chapter employs a program memorisation 
and recognition task to explore the form and content of knowledge representation 
for programmers of different skill levels. Twenty Four subjects participated in this 
study. These subjects were assigned to three groups of equal size according to 
their level of programming expertise. The novice group consisted of first year 
undergraduate students, all of whom had completed a short introductory course in 
Pascal. The intermediate group was composed of second year undergraduate 
students. All members of this group had undertaken an intensive 6 month Pascal 
course during their first year of study and all had subsequently used this language 
extensively in project work. The third group consisted of expert Pascal 
programmers who were either teachers of Pascal or were professional 
programmers. 
Participants were presented with a number of short Pascal programs which they 
were asked to memorise. These programs were drawn from the collection of 
programs generated by subjects taking part in the experiment reported in the 
previous chapter. The participants were then presented with a probe item (focal or 
non-focal line) and were asked to state whether this probe item was present in the 
original program. 
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Half of the probe items were derived from the programs the participants were 
asked to memorise, while the remaining half were generated from other similar 
Pascal programs. A measure of reaction time from the presentation of the probe 
item to the subjects' response was collected together with information relating to 
the frequency of errors. In this context an error could be said to occur when a 
subject affirmed that a probe item was present in the original program when in fact 
it was absent or vice versa. The results of this study are represented graphically in 
figures 10.1 and 10.2. 
The programs that were presented to subjects were classified according to the 
scheme outlined in the previous chapter. A focal line was defined as the line of 
code that directly implements the current goal of a particular programming plan. 
Three independent raters identified the plan structures contained in each program 
and then indicated the focal line associated with each of the plans that they had 
identified. It should be noted that there was a high level of agreement between the 
raters in terms of both the plans that were identified and their associated focal 
lines. 
10.4.2 Results and discussion 
This study suggests that the transition from lower to higher levels of skill in 
programming does not follow a continuous developmental path as might be 
suggested by certain models of programming expertise. In particular, if expertise 
depends upon the acquisition of program schemata or plans then one would 
expect to find a roughly linear relationship between increasing expertise, the 
number of errors made and the subjects' reaction time in response to probe items. 
Hence, if experts possess a greater number and range of schemata than 
intermediates or novices then one might hypothesise that experts would be able to 
find a match to a probe item with greater speed and accuracy than both novices or 
intermediates. Additionally, intermediates should perform with greater accuracy 
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and speed than novices. The results of the present study, however, do not provide 
support for such a view. Rather, there appear to be clear discontinuities between 
subjects' response times and the number of errors made when comparing the 
performance of novices, intermediates and experts. 
The results of this study also provide support for the view that knowledge 
structures change with increasing expertise. Hence, experts respond to the 
presence of focal lines with greater speed than both intermediates (t = 2.83, 14 df, 
p<0.02) and novices (t = 5.72, 14 df, p<0.001). However, there is no significant 
difference between experimental groups in terms of their reaction to non-focal 
lines. This suggests that in the case of the expert group, focal lines are 
represented with greater saliency than non-focal lines. However, subjects in both 
the novice and intermediate groups do not appear to posses schemata which 
differentiate between focal and non-focal lines. The error data indicates that 
intermediate and expert groups identify both focal and non-focal lines with greater 
accuracy than novices ([focal] tintermediate= 3.42, 14 df, p<0.01; texpert = 8.63, 
14 df, p<0.001) ([non-focal] tintermediate= 5.83, 14 df, p<0.001; texpert = 7.93, 
14 df, p<0.001). 
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programmers. 
Conversely, both the intermediate and expert groups identify focal lines with about 
the same accuracy as non-focal lines (~ntermediate = 1.23, NS; texpert = 1.01, NS). 
This finding supports the view that intermediates and experts are able to access 
representations of programming knowledge which are composed of similar 
components. However, as suggested by the reaction time data, these 
representations appear to be differentially structured. In the case of the novice 
group, performance is only slightly better than chance (t = 1.14, NS). Hence, 
novice performance does not appear to be mediated by the possession of complete 
schematic representational structures. 
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In summary, these results suggest that both intermediate and expert programmers 
appear to be able to access abstract schemata based structures which represent 
stereotypical programming knowledge. The error data for these groups implies 
that these schemata have similar content since they give rise to equivalent patterns 
of error behaviour for both groups. However, in the case of the expert group, 
reaction time performance in response to the presentation of a probe item is 
enhanced. This effect is hypothesised to be related to the existence of a structural 
asymmetry in the expert programmers schematic representation of programming 
knowledge. 
10.5 Conclusions 
The results of the experiment reported in this chapter suggest that knowledge 
structures may develop via a restructuring process rather than through a process of 
knowledge accretion which simply involves developing a larger repertoire of 
plans. This view is similar to work by Lewis (1981) which suggests that algebra 
skill depends partly upon the creation of single variables to replace complex 
mathematical expressions. This restructuring or 'information hiding' process may 
allow more complex problems to be accommodated within the limited capacity of 
working memory thus facilitating problem solving. 
Previous accounts of programming expertise have tended to emphasise the 
development of extensive repertoires of programming knowledge rather than focus 
upon issues relating to knowledge restructuring processes. This is exemplified in 
Soloway's work on plans, where it is suggested that expertise simply involves 
building a more extensive collection of programming plans together with the rules 
which goven their use. However, as we have seen, the possession of plans per se 
cannot be used to diffrentiate certain groups of programmers, especially at higher 
levels of skill; namely at the point of transition between intermediates and experts. 
The work reported in this chapter suggests that a more cogent account of skill 
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development might combine knowledge accretion with a restructuring process 
whereby, once a sufficient library of plans has been constructed, fine-tuning or 
restructuring takes place. This view is similar to Rumelhart and Norman's account 
of skill devlopment which places central emphasis upon restructuring mechanisms 
founded upon the accretion of a large body accumulated domain knowledege 
(Rumelhart and Norman, 1978). 
The model outlined above also has clear parallels with work on program beacons 
reported by Wiedenbeck (1986). Wiedenbeck found that expert programmers 
recall key lines (beacons) in a program much better than they recall non-beacon 
lines. However, the recall of non-beacon lines does not differ significantly when 
comparing novice and expert performance. This suggests that there are key 
features of programs that play a focal role in program understanding, and from 
previous work, it seems likely that these features guide the comprehension 
(Brooks, 1983) of programs. Moreover, in chapter 8 it was suggested that these 
focal structures may also play a significant role in program generation. The present 
study advances this analysis by providing a means of defining salient knowledge 
structures in programming in a less intuitive manner than has previously been 
possible. In addition, the focal line analysis presented here extends existing plan 
theory of programming by suggesting a model that can account for plan 
restructuring and its relationship to skill development. 
The articulation of this model suggests that previous accounts of skill development 
in programming may be too simplistic to provide an adequate account of the 
development of expertise in this domain. In particular, it has been demonstrated 
that the existence of plans per se cannot account for the development of skill in 
programming. Rather, what appears to be more important is the way in which the 
organisation of individual schemata changes with increasing expertise. 
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Chapter 11. Expertise in programming: The role of working memory 
and display-based problem solving. 
11.1 Introduction 
The work reported in this chapter represents an attempt to explore the role of 
working memory in programming skill. Two experiments are reported in this 
chapter which demonstrate that the development of expertise in programming does 
not appear to depend upon an increase in working memory capacity or availability. 
This fmding is unexpected given the importance placed upon working memory 
capacity in other theoretical accounts of the development of complex skills. These 
experiments provide evidence for an alternative view which suggests that expertise 
in programming may be dependent upon the development of strategies for efficiently 
utilising external displays for the purpose of recording intermediate states and 
partially formed solution steps. 
In this context, it appears that novices rely extensively upon working memory to 
generate as much of a solution as possible before transferring it to an external 
source. In contrast, experts engage in problem solving behaviour which is 
characterised by the extensive use of an external display as an information 
repository. This gives rise to a pattern of generation behaviour which manifests itself 
in terms of a closely linked cycle of code generation and evaluation activities. One of 
the most striking results of this work is that when experts are unable to use an 
external display to support facets of this activity then their performance deteriorates 
to the level typically exhibited by novices. These results are discussed in terms of a 
framework which emphasises the role of display-based problem solving and its 
contribution to strategy development. Finally, the implications of this study are 
discussed in terms of its ability to account for performance in other complex problem 
solving domains. 
As we have seen in previous sections, until recently the prevailing focus of study in 
the psychology of programming has been concerned with the organisation of 
knowledge in long term memory and the role of certain forms of conceptual 
organisation in program comprehension and the development of expertise.However, 
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more recent studies have moved away from the consideration of static knowledge 
structures towards a view which emphasises the fluid and dynamic role played by 
programming knowledge in both the generation of code (Green, Bellamy and 
Parker, 1987) and in program design (Rist, 1986; 1989). Other studies have focused 
upon the generative and evaluative aspects of the coding activity. For instance, in 
chapter 8 the cognitive processes involved in programming were characterised by 
studying the nonlinearities in program generation that are evident in naturalistic task 
contexts. In a somewhat similar vein, Gray and Anderson (1987) have used 
so-called 'change episodes' - key junctures in the coding process where 
programmers make some change to their code - to highlight the important role played 
by the evaluative or checking activities that are normally invoked during code 
generation. 
These studies have extended our basic understanding of the strategies employed by 
problem-solvers in this relatively complex domain. However, they have tended to 
provide only rather general descriptive accounts of the cognitive processes which are 
thought to underpin the programming activity. Such studies have emphasised the 
effects of either different knowledge structures or of the salient notational features of 
the task language on the development and maintenance of particular types of 
strategy. However, by and large, they have ignored, or have addressed in only a 
cursory fashion, the nature of the basic cognitive mechanisms that may give rise 
such strategies. For instance, while it is true to say that such studies have explored 
the form of representation of programming knowledge in long term memory, and the 
effect this has on problem-solving strategy, they have typically only briefly 
addressed the role of other memory structures which may be closely implicated in 
the emergence of typical forms of programming behaviour. 
The study reported here seeks to extend existing work into the cognitive aspects of 
programming by examining the role of one seemingly important cognitive 
mechanism - working memory - in the development of programming expertise. In 
addition, interest is directed towards understanding the way in which this limited 
resource might influence the nature of the problem-solving processes involved in the 
programming activity. 
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The role of working memory has been implicated in a number of previous studies of 
programming behaviour. However, as a mechanism that might be thought to 
strongly contribute to programming strategy, it has received little experimental 
attention. 
This chapter will begin by briefly reviewing the existing work on programming that 
posits working memory as part of the framework within which the development of 
programming skill is discussed. Studies of working memory from other problem 
solving domains will be introduced in this section to provide a background to this 
discussion and to indicate any points of commonality or departure from those 
analyses suggested in recent studies of the programming activity. This provides a 
basis for the two experimental studies reported later in this chapter. The first of these 
studies looks at the effects of a straightforward articulatory suppression task on 
programming strategy and explores the role of working memory in the development 
of programming skill and its relationship to expertise. 
The second study considers the relationship between working memory and the use 
of an external memory source (in this case a VDU screen). Here the text editor used 
to enter code was modified such that the order of program generation had to conform 
to the final text order of the program. That is, the screen editor only allowed the 
programmer to enter text vertically - top to bottom- and to move between adjacent 
lines. This can be contrasted to the more typical use of a screen editor where 
programmers can generate any part of a program in any particular order and can 
suspend the development of code in one place to direct attention to other code 
structures elsewhere, returning latter to fill in any remaining gaps. 
A number of recent studies (Bellamy and Gilmore, 1990; Green et al, 1987 and see 
chapters 8 and 9) suggest that this is the way programmers typically develop their 
code. Conversely, if programmers have to commit themselves early to a particular 
course of action and are not able to effectively use an external medium to record their 
partially formed deliberations, then one might expect this to have both a detrimental 
effect on performance and to place extra load upon working memory. Previous 
studies which have explored the role of external memory sources have typically 
restricted their analysis to situations in which external sources are used to support 
long term memory (Intos-Peterson and Fournier, 1986; Schonflug, 1986a; 1986b). 
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The analysis reported here takes a different approach and considers the use of 
external memory support for short term and transient memory constructs. This 
approach also differs from other studies looking at the role of working memory in 
complex tasks (Hitch, 1978; Staszewski, 1988) in that typically these studies have 
required subjects to dispense with external aids even in tasks, such as simple 
addition and multiplication, where such aids appear to be used extensively under 
more normal circumstances. 
The final section of this chapter is concerned with a detailed discussion of the 
implications of these experiments for our understanding of the role of working 
memory in programming and in other complex cognitive skills. In particular, 
attention is directed toward the role of working memory in the development of 
expertise, its role in complex planning tasks and mental simulation and in situations 
where the potential exists for the deployment of external memory sources which can 
be used to partially supplant internal sources. 
11.2 The current status of working memory in studies of the programming activity 
One of the most pervasive findings of recent research into the cognitive aspects of 
programming is that programs are not generated in a simple linear fashion - that is, 
in a strict left-to-right or first-to-last order (Bellamy and Gilmore, 1990; Green et al, 
1987 and see chapters 8 and 9). Typically, programmers make many deviations 
from a strict linear development path, leaving gaps in the emerging program which 
are to be filled in later. Hence, the final text order of the program will rarely 
correspond to its generative order. 
Existing models of programming suggest a number of possible reasons for the 
existence of such nonlinearities. For instance, Rist ( 1986 a and b; 1989) claims that 
nonlinearaities in generation emerge as programmers build code structures around 
so-called 'focal lines'. The development of expertise in Rist's model is based upon 
the availability of knowledge and the notion of focal expansion. According to Rist, 
as expertise develops, plan schema are retrieved rather than created and the evolution 
of this process is reflected in the order of program generation. In terms of this 
model, novices are seen to generate programs in a bottom-up fashion expanding 
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outwards from the plan focus, while experts are able to simply retrieve plans in 
schema order, thus creating a pattern of top-down and forward program generation. 
This explains the differences observed in Rist's study between the strategies adopted 
by novices and by experts and the patterns of nonlinearities encountered. 
Green et al (1987) have proposed a number of extensions to Rist's model. In the 
parsing/gnisrap model of coding they describe the process by which a skeletal plan 
is instantiated in a programming notation. In the context of Rist's model, focal lines 
will be instantiated first and then other structures will be built around them. The 
order of generation of the program is determined largely by the knowledge that is 
available to the programmer and nonlinearities will only occur when a programmer 
starts to interleave new plans into the existing structure. The parsing/gnisrap model 
builds upon Rist's ideas but introduces one significant extension. 
Unlike Rist's model, the parsing/gnisrap framework introduces a working memory 
component into the analysis of coding behaviour. The parsing/gnisrap model has a 
severely limited working memory capacity which forces it to use an external medium 
(eg the VDU screen) when program fragments are completed or when working 
memory has become overloaded. 
In this model programs are not built up internally and then output to an external 
media from start to finish with a generative order that reflects the final text order of 
the program. This form of generation would presumably imply an unrealistically 
extended (and sustained) working memory capacity. However, the working memory 
limitations suggested by the parsing/gnisrap model give rise to other cognitive costs. 
This is because programmers will need to frequently refer back to generated 
fragments and in some way recreate the original plan structure which may have only 
been partially implemented in code. 
The parsing/gnisrap model, in its current conception, has primarily focused upon the 
factors that influence the program parsing process. Hence, interest is directed 
toward the way in which certain notational features of programming languages can 
obscure or reveal the functional role of components expressed in that notation 
(Gilmore, 1986; Gilmore and Green, 1988). 
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Bellamy and Gilmore ( 1990) examined the number of nonlinearities in terms of 
whether they occurred between plans (in the Soloway sense) or within plans. Using 
this technique they were able to compare predictions stemming from Rist's model 
with those implied by the parsing/gnisrap model. In Rist's model nonlinearities will 
only occur when a programmer starts to interleave a new plan into an existing 
structure. The parsing/gnisrap model suggests that nonlinearities can occur in other 
ways. For instance, minor parts may often be left out of plans and programmers will 
return later (in terms of the linear structure of the program) to insert these code 
fragments. 
Hence, Rist's model suggests that there will be more between plan than within plan 
nonlinearities, while the parsing/gnisrap model predicts that generation will be 
broadly in plan order, but that within plan nonlinearites will occur because of 
working memory limitations. The results of the Bellamy and Gilmore study broadly 
support the predictions stemming from the parsing/gnisrap model and provide some 
evidence for the influence of features of the notation of particular languages in 
determining the nature of the parsing/gnisrap cycle. 
11.3 External memory and display-based performance in problem solving 
The parsing/gnisrap model displays several important commonalities with emerging 
models of planning and problem solving in other complex domains. In particular, 
this model stresses the role played by external memory sources as information 
repositories which can be used to record intermediate problem solving states. In a 
similar vein, work connected with the development of planning models in Artificial 
Intelligence has suggested that actions are often enacted before plans or problem 
solution sequences are complete (see chapter 2). In formulating this alternative 
account of planning, these models stress the inexorable link between the planning 
process and the execution of plans. 
Models such as this differ significantly from the more classical accounts of planning 
that have been previously articulated in Artificial Intelligence in that an entire 
sequence of plans need not be worked out in advance. Rather, the effects of 
implementing partial plans can be tested against the planner's expectations and 
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information may then be sought from the external world in order to reduce the 
uncertainty that may be associated with the implementation of particular plans. 
More recently, the role of external memory sources as repositories for search control 
knowledge and intermediate state information has gained prominence in a variety of 
problem solving models (Howes and Payne, 1990; Larkin, 1989; Payne, 1990; in 
press). For instance, Larkin (1989) has proposed a production system model of 
human 'display-based' problem solving (DiBS) where the system's working 
memory is divided into two kinds of elements: those reflecting the problem solver's 
internal goals and those representing features of external real world objects. As in 
other production system models, specific productions are executed when their 
preconditions are satisfied in working memory (Anderson, 1983). The associated 
actions of these productions then act in turn to modify the content of working 
memory. In terms of Larkin's model, these changes can arise in two ways -either 
as changes to the physical world or as changes to the problem solver's internal 
representation of goals and subgoals. 
These accounts of problem solving and planning are clearly very similar in their 
general form to emerging accounts of problem solving and planning in the 
programming domain. For instance, a central feature of the parsing/gnisrap model is 
the idea that code generation involves two fundamental psychological processes; one 
in which the external structure (program code) is created from the internal (cognitive) 
structure that represents the problem requirements and an inverse process by which 
this internal structure is recreated when necessary from the external structure. 
Similarly, Gray and Anderson (1987) stress the importance of the evaluation 
episodes that are frequently seen to occur during code generation. The existence of 
these evaluative activities presumably implies that programmers are able to extract 
relevant information from the code that they have already generated in order to 
inform their subsequent problem solving activity. This will necessitate re-parsing the 
code and then matching it with an internal representation of plans and goals. Hence, 
in terms of both of these models, the external display becomes a central repository 
for intermediate state information when working memory is loaded. The 
parsing/gnisrap model implies that code will not be generated in a linear fashion, 
since code fragments will be externalised as soon as working memory is loaded or 
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when the programmer arbitrarily reprioritises some task that demands a different 
series of activities than are required by the current goal. 
11.4 Expertise and skilled memory theory 
Although the parsing/gnisrap model relies extensively upon the notion of working 
memory in order to explain the evident nonlinearites in program generation, it fails to 
address several key issues in relation to the role of working memory that have been 
raised elsewhere. One issue of particular importance is the relationship between 
working memory and the development of expertise. The emphasis of the 
parsing/gnisrap model directs our attention towards the effects of language structure 
and notation on the parsing/gnisrap cycle. However the effects of skill development 
on strategy are not considered. 
In chapter 8 a study was reported looking at the nature of the nonlinearities found to 
exist in a program generation task for programmers of different skill levels. One 
fmding to emerge from this work is that experts perform a significantly greater 
number of between plan jumps than novices and that novices correspondingly tend 
to perform more within plan jumps- that is, adopt a linear generation strategy. This 
result is unexpected for two reasons. On the one hand, the parsing/gnisrap model 
assumes that working memory is a fixed and limited capacity resource. Hence, if we 
assume that working memory is the only factor (excluding language features) to 
influence the parsing/gnisrap cycle, then expertise should not affect the number of 
between-plan nonlinearities that are evident in the generation task. 
Conversely, if we consider working memory to be a more flexible resource with an 
extensible capacity that is related in part to skill development (Chase and Ericsson, 
1982), then we should expect to find the obverse result. Moreover, the chunking, 
restructuring and compilation mechanisms that are central to many important 
production system models of skill development should give rise to a reduction in 
working memory load in the case of expert performance (Anderson, 1983; 1987; 
Newell and Rosenbloom, 1981; Laird, Newell and Rosenbloom, 1988). Here, it is 
assumed that the problem solving steps and intermediate states required to reach a 
solution will be reduced in number when productions are collapsed, compiled or 
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otherwise restructured. This would presumably reduce the requirement to 
concurrently maintain a large number of solution steps in working memory and 
consequently increase its availability. 
If we assume that there-parsing of some already generated output involves some 
cognitive cost, then one might expect the development of programming skill to be at 
least partly dependent upon a programmers ability to generate as much of the 
program internally before writing it to some external source, and therefore reducing 
the need tore-parse. However, the opposite appears to be the case. The results of 
the experiments reported in chapters 8 and 9 may suggest that skilled programmers 
make extensive use of an external memory source (i.e., a VDU screen) while 
novices tend to rely to a much greater extent upon the use of internal memory to 
develop as much of the solution as possible before transferring it to external 
memory. In addition, novices appear to rarely change their output once it is 
generated. 
In light of the well documented relationship between working memory and the 
development of expertise that has been observed in other domains (Chase and 
Ericsson, see above) these findings are clearly rather anomalous. Given the 
cognitive costs that are involved in continually evaluating and modifying generated 
code, we require an explanation as to why skilled programmers rely so extensively 
on external rather than internal memory sources. 
One reason for this phenomenon might be related to the way in which programming 
is taught - in particular to the effects of the teaching of program/software design, and 
their emphasis on functional decomposition and stepwise refinement. The effect of 
teaching programmers to decompose problems into manageable components, as 
suggested by these methods, may have a strong influence on their adoption of 
external sources- for instance, to record partially formed design decisions etc.- in 
preference to a reliance on internal memory. Unfortunately, most existing studies of 
working memory in the context of skill development have tended to artificially 
restrict the task under consideration by disallowing the use of external sources. 
Hence, the ecological validity of these studies may be limited to the rather unusual 
skills that are considered. One important component of skill development in a 
number of domains, including computer programming, seems to be the related to the 
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ability to efficiently use external memory sources - and this component has not been 
extensively considered in previous studies of problem solving in complex domains. 
Another factor that might give rise to a reliance on external sources is related to the 
question of whether the working memory system has a semantic component. That 
is, whether such a system can deal simultaneously with information derived from 
different semantic categories or levels of abstraction. When developing a program, 
information from a variety of sources needs to be assimilated, ranging from abstract 
information about high-level goals and plans to very low-level information relating 
to syntactic conventions etc. Indeed, the use of multiple forms of information is not 
only evident in programming. For instance, Kaplan and Simon (1990) have 
observed that problem solvers may need to search a variety of different problem 
spaces. However, in Kaplan and Simon's framework it appears that problem solvers 
are only able to access one problem space at a time. This is also evident in other 
generic problem solving models - e. g., SOAR (Laird, Newell and Rosenbloom, 
1987). 
It has been argued that programming demands the assimilation of information from a 
range of problem space representations (Pennington, 1987 a; Pennington and 
Grabowski, 1990) and this assimilation of representations may need to be 
coordinated and integrated simultaneously. However, this kind of coordination and 
integration of information has been shown in many studies to place a significant load 
on working memory (Elio, 1986; Logan, 1985; Schneider and Detweiler, 1987). 
Hence, it may be the case that continually switching between these different 
abstraction levels incurs too great a cognitive cost and that a more efficient strategy 
may involve developing a solution at one level of abstraction before moving on to a 
lower level. This may give rise to the observation that expert programmers appear to 
develop their code from focal structures, building the rest of the code around these 
fragments and using the external display as repository for intermediate solution 
steps. Conceiving of the programming task in this way allows us to consider the 
interactions between display-based problem solving and partial planning, and may 
provide a more coherent understanding of the complex problem solving activities 
that take place in programming and other tasks. 
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The nonlinearities observed in the context of skilled programming performance, 
where high level components (focal lines) are generated first before other lower level 
structures is amenable to this form of explanation. Of course, this form of top-down 
development has been reported extensively in studies of the program design activity 
(Adelson and Soloway, 1985; Guindon et al, 1987; Jeffries et al, 1981), but it is 
usually accounted for in terms of the organisation of conceptual knowledge in long 
term memory rather than in terms of more transient and short term memory 
structures. As little seems to known about the possible semantic component of 
working memory, an account of programming strategy based upon this kind of 
working memory limitation seems to be equally valid. 
Deviations from a top-down step-wise refinement approach to problem solving may 
be caused simply by working memory capacity limitations. Hence, problem solvers 
may simply forget details of their current goal and begin to pursue goals at other 
levels of abstraction. However, an alternative explanation might be to suggest that 
problem solvers find it more difficult to assimilate information in working memory 
when it is derived from a number of different abstraction levels. Anderson (1983) 
suggests this possibility when discussing proposed opportunistic control structures 
for cognition (Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979) where information from a variety 
of different hierarchical levels is assimilated in working memory during problem 
solving activities. Anderson claims that opportunistic control of this kind "causes 
problems because skipping among its many planes and levels makes unrealistic 
demands on working memory" (p 130). Hence, we may suggest that in cases such 
as this the use of an external display becomes paramount. Moreover, the typical 
form of programming strategy exhibited by experts may simply be a manifestation of 
the use of such external resources and the fact that this necessitates many interlinked 
planning and evaluation cycles. 
11.5 Experimental Studies 
The present chapter seeks to explore a number of the issues outlined above in terms 
of the two experimental studies reported in this section. While previous research 
provides a strong indication of the role of working memory in programming, there 
exists no empirical research which has addressed its role more directly. The standard 
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paradigm of working memory research is adopted for the first experiment. Here, 
subjects were requested to carry out a straightforward articulatory suppression task 
while engaged in a concurrent program generation activity. Here, the number of 
within and between plan nonlinearities were recorded as were the number of errors 
remaining in the program on task completion. 
This experiment addresses a number of specific hypotheses. Firstly, if working 
memory limitations cause programmers to make use of an external medium, as 
suggested by Green et al, then the act of loading the working memory system 
through a concurrent task should give rise to an increase in nonlinearities. Given the 
effort required to use an external medium, in terms of the number of times a 
programmer must engage in the parsing/gnisrap cycle, one would expect 
experienced programmers to rely more extensively upon internal sources. Additional 
support for this hypotheses also arises from a range of studies which suggest that 
skill development is accompanied by an increase in working memory capacity or 
availability (Chase and Simon, 1982; Staszewski, 1988). 
However, the results presented in chapter 9 suggest a rather different picture and 
indeed give rise to an opposing hypothesis, i.e., that skilled programmers make less 
use of internal sources than do novices and tend to rely much more extensively upon 
using an external medium to record partial code fragments as they are generated. 
Hence, when working memory capacity is restricted this should give rise to a greater 
number of nonlinearites in the context of novice behaviour and only a small 
decrement in nonlinearites for experts. The first experiment attempts to address these 
specific hypotheses by recording the nonlnearities in program generation for novice 
and expert programmers under normal task conditions and in the situation where 
working memory is loaded via a concurrent task. 
The second experiment considers the role of working memory from a rather different 
perspective. Here interest is directed towards the way in which restricting the use of 
an external medium affects programming performance. In terms of the above 
analysis, if programmers are not able to correct already generated code at later stages 
in the coding process, then this should have an effect on their performance. 
Programmers can use a variety of different media to record a program as it is 
generated and the nature of this media is likely to affect the programming process 
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itself. For instance, pen and paper provides great flexability in terms of changing an 
existing output- programmers can simply correct errors as they become apparent. In 
addition, pen and paper can provide a means of indicating commitment to some 
output - for instance, using light rather than heavy strokes (Green, 1989). 
Screen editor~ can provide similar flexibility, but require users to engage in 
additional effort in terms of formulating and issuing editing and search commands 
etc. An example of a highly restrictive environment is that of a simple line-editor 
where the complexity of editing and search is exacerbated, since users often need to 
explicitly address a particular line of text to carry out some editing operation. One 
can envisage even more restrictive environments where it is not possible at all to 
decouple the order of program generation from its final text order. For instance, 
Green (1989) suggests that the failure of a prototype Pascal speech-input system 
was caused largely by the fact that users were required to dictate the program in final 
text order, rather than in the order in which they might normally generate it. 
The second experiment required subjects to create a program using a full-screen 
editor that provided no opportunity for the subject to revise already generated input 
or to insert new material into existing text. The use of such an editor will clearly 
place a significant load upon a subjects working memory capacity since they will be 
required to internally generate as much of the program as possible before 
externalising it. Anderson and Jeffries (1985) have demonstrated that many errors in 
programming arise when there is a loss of information in the working memory 
representation of a problem. Hence, by placing emphasis upon the use of working 
memory it should be possible to induce error prone behaviour that parallels that 
evident when working memory is loaded in other ways, for instance via articulartory 
suppression. 
In terms of the previous discussion, we hypothesise that experts would perform 
worse than novices when the device used to create the program is restricted in such a 
way as to make retrospective changes impossible. This is based upon the 
assumption outlined above which suggests that experts make more extensive use of 
external sources to record partial code fragments that are then later elaborated and 
extended through a closely linked cycle of generative and evaluative activities. 
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Conversely, it has been suggested that novices will tend to rely to a greater extent 
upon generating as much of the program as possible internally before writing it to an 
external source. It is clear that these strategic differences will be supported to a 
greater or a lesser extent by the device used to create the program. Hence, for expert 
programmers, it is hypothesised that restricting the device will cause them to revert 
to a novice strategy, since they will then be unable to use the external display in the 
normal way. This, in turn leads to the hypothesis that novice and expert error rates 
will be similar in the restricted device condition, reflecting a decrement in 
performance by the expert group. 
Establishing support for this hypothesis would have a number of important 
implications. Firstly, it would suggest that the development of expertise may not be 
based simply upon the acquisition of knowledge about a particular domain. If this 
were the case, we would expect experts to perform better than novices no matter 
what constraints were imposed by the task environment. Secondly, it would indicate 
that increased working memory availability, perhaps arising through some 
mechanism such as chunking, does not necessarily lead to better performance. 
If increased working memory availability is correlated with expertise, then experts 
should perform better that novices in situations where they are required to rely 
almost exclusively upon internal sources. If this is not the case, then it may become 
necessary to review the central status of working memory in theories dealing with 
the development of complex skills. One possible alternative explanation is to argue 
that experts have developed particular strategies for dealing with task complexity that 
involve close interaction with external information repositories to record partial 
solution fragments as they are generated. If novices have not developed such 
strategies, then it is unlikely that their performance would be affected significantly 
by restricting the task environment. 
This analysis can be further extended by attempting to classify the errors in the 
programs generated by subjects. For example, a scheme devised by Gilmore 
(1986b) suggests four main categories of error: 
1. Surface level errors caused mainly by typing and syntactic slips: For example, 
confusion between < and >, missing or misplaced quotes etc. 
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2. Control-Flow errors: For example, missing or spurious else statements, split 
loops etc. 
3. Plan-Structure errors: Including, guard test on wrong variable, update wrong 
variable etc. 
4. Interaction errors: A class of errors occurring at the point where structures of 
different types interact: For example, a missing 'Read' in the main loop, 
initialisations within the main loop. 
Clearly some of these errors will be knowledge-based (specifically, plan-structure 
errors) while others will be strongly dependent upon working memory limitations. 
For example, both control-flow and interaction errors, since they depend upon the 
establishment of referential links and dependencies between code structures, are 
likely to be affected by working memory constraints. Hence, in terms of the first 
experiment, we might expect that both control-flow and interaction errors will 
predominate in novice solutions in the situation where working memory availability 
is reduced. In the case of experts, it is argued that the interactions and 
interdependencies between code structures will be evaluated in the context of using 
an external memory source. That is, by reparsing existing code fragments in order to 
reconcile them with the code the programmer is currently working on. As a 
consequence, that the act of loading working memory will therefore not affect the 
occurrence of these types of error. 
In the case of the second experiment we would expect the converse. If experts are 
not able to use the external display to aid problem solving in the manner predicted, 
then it might be hypothesised that interaction and control-flow errors will 
predominate in the condition where use of the device is restricted such that 
retrospective changes cannot be made. It might also be predicted that this 
experimental manipulation will not affect the occurrence of plan-structure errors 
since these are hypothesised to be knowledge-based rather than strategy-based. 
275 
11.5.1 Experiment 1. The effects of articulatory suppression on programming 
strategy and errors 
Method 
Subjects 
Twenty subjects participated in this experiment. One group of ten subjects consisted 
of professional programmers who were employed in commercial or industrial 
contexts. All the subjects in this group used Pascal on a daily basis and all had 
substantial formal training in the use of this language. Members of this group were 
classified as experts. A second group of ten subjects consisted of second year 
undergraduate students all of whom had been formally instructed in Pascal syntax 
and language use during the first year of their course. None of these subjects had 
used Pascal before, however some had prior experience of other languages 
(predominantly BASIC and COBOL). Members of this group were classified as 
novices. 
Materials and procedure 
A variety of suppression tasks were explored initially, but the more complex tasks 
tended to disrupt performance to such an extent that a very simple articulatory 
suppression task was adopted. This involved asking the subjects to repeat a string of 
five auditorily presented random digits. Subjects engaged in this task until they had 
completed the experimental session. Hitch and Baddeley (1976) found that a 
concurrent task similar to this significantly affected verbal reasoning performance in 
the context of an experimental task which involved fairly simple logical deductions. 
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that this concurrent task would also affect 
performance in a more complex activity such as programming. 
The experimenter was present throughout the session in order to ensure that this 
concurrent task was performed, and intervened only when the subject paused for 
more than 5 sec. The subjects were requested to generate a fairly simple program 
from a natural language specification. This specification required the subjects to 
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produce a program that could read a series of input values, calculate a running total, 
output an average value and stop given a specific terminating condition (see chapter 
6 for a full description of this specification). This specification was derived from 
Johnson and Soloway (1985) and was chosen because it has formed the basis for 
many empirical studies of programmers. Hence, it was assumed that the resulting 
programs could be more easily analysed in terms of their constituent structures 
(specifically, plan structures) and in terms of any errors remaining in the program 
on completion of the task. 
The subjects were allowed to study the specification for 2 mins. and were then asked 
to generate a program corresponding to this specification while engaged in the 
concurrent suppression task. The subjects were given 15 mins. to complete this 
task, and were asked to work as quickly and accurately as possible. The subjects 
typed their solutions onto a familiar full-screen text editor. 
A non-invasive keystroke recording device was used to monitor the subject's 
behaviour. This device provides facilities for replaying keystrokes via a host 
machine. This replay was analysed to provide some indication of the temporal 
sequence in which programs were generated by subjects. In addition, three 
independent raters were asked to analyse all the resulting program transcripts for the 
presence of plan structures and for errors. Within and between-plan jumps were 
defined as follows: Within plan jumps were classified as movements between a 
particular line of the program text to another line which formed part of the same plan 
structure. Between plan jumps were defined as movements from the current line to 
lines within different plan structures. These protocols applied only to situations 
where the jumps was followed by an editing action (i.e., to insert, append or change 
some text). Finally, the errors were classified according to the scheme described 
above. That is, into surface, control-flow, plan or interaction errors. 
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Design 
The experiment was a two-factor design, with the following independent variables: 
1. Articulatory suppression/No suppression 
2. Level of expertise- Novice/Expert 
There were two dependent variables: 
1. The number of Between/Within plan jumps during program generation 
2. The number of errors remaining in the final program 
Results 
Plan-jumps 
The results of this experiment are shown graphically in figures 11.1, 11.2 and 
11.3. Figure 11.1 shows the number of within and between-plan jumps performed 
by novice and expert programmers in the two experimental conditions. These results 
were analysed using a three-way analysis of variance. 
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Figure 11.1 Number of within and between-plan jumps performed by novice and 
expert groups in the two experimental conditions. 
This analysis revealed main effects of suppression (F1 72 = 8.47, p<O.Ol) and , 
expertise (F1 72 = 12.56, p<O.Ol) on jump-type and a more complex interaction , 
between suppression and expertise (F154 = 4.73, p<0.05). A number of post-hoc , 
comparisons were carried out using the Newman-Keules test with an adopted 
significance level of p<O.Ol. This procedure indicated that experts produced 
significantly more between plan jumps than novices in the non-suppression 
condition. Conversely, novices produced a greater number of within plan-jumps in 
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this condition. In the case of the suppression condition, there were no significant 
differences between both within and between-plan jumps for either novices or 
experts. 
The results of comparisons across conditions indicated a significant difference 
between the number of both within and between-plan jumps for the novice group. 
No significant cross condition comparisons were evident in the case of the expert 
group. 
Errors 
Figure 11.2 shows the total mean number of errors remaining in the programs on 
task completion for novice and expert subjects in the two experimental conditions. 
This was analysed using a two-way analysis of variance. This analysis revealed a 
main effect of expertise (F1,36 = 9.37, p<0.01) and suppression (F1,36 = 4.54, 
p<0.05) and an interaction between these two factors (F1,36 = 15.89, p<0.01). Once 
again a number of post-hoc comparisons were carried out using the Newman-Keules 
test with an adopted significance level ofp<0.01. This indicated a significant 
difference in error rates in the both experimental conditions when comparing the 
novice and expert groups. In addition, a significant difference between error rates 
across conditions was evident for the novice group. In the case of the expert group 
the same comparison proved not to be significant. 
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Figure 11.2 Mean number of errors in each of the experimental conditions for 
experiment 1. 
Error classification analysis 
Figure 11.3 represents the proportion of errors falling into each error classification. 
In the case of experts, there is a fairly even distribution of error types across the two 
experimental conditions. Indeed, further statistical analysis revealed no significant 
differences between error types both within and between conditions (multiple 
t-tests). In the case of the novice group, the distribution of error types is less 
straightforward. In the non-suppression condition, novices produced a significantly 
greater number of plan errors in comparison to the other categories (t-test). 
Moreover, the only significant difference between the novice and experts groups in 
this condition was the number of plan errors produced by the novice group (t-test). 
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In the second condition, the distribution of errors across classification types for 
expert subjects was again fairly even. No significant differences between any of the 
error classifications were evident (multiplet-tests). In the case of the novice group, 
significantly more control-flow and interaction errors were evident in comparison to 
the other two error classifications (t-test). Moreover, for the novice group,the 
number of plan errors occurring in the second condition was significantly less than 
in the first condition (t-test). 
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Figure 11.3 Proportion of errors in each error category in experiment 1. 
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Discussion 
This experiment has clearly demonstrated that expert performance in programming 
tasks is not significantly affected by articulatory suppression. Hence, for experts the 
total number of errors remaining in the final program on task completion is not 
significantly different in the suppression condition in comparison to the 
non-suppression condition. Moreover, it appears that the nature of expert strategy is 
similarly unaffected by this experimental manipulation. Hence, the prevalence of 
between-plan jumps that is evident in the non-suppression condition for the expert 
group is not diminished in the suppression condition. Similarly, the occurrence of 
within-plan jumps does not differ significantly in the two experimental conditions. 
Conversely, the novice group produced significantly more errors in the suppression 
condition when compared to the non-suppression condition. In addition, the nature 
of the coding strategy that they adopt is also affected. In particular, it appears that 
novice programmers revert from a linear generation strategy characterised by the 
prevalence of within-plan jumps, to a strategy more characteristic of experts. That is, 
to a strategy which reflects a greater number of between-plan jumps. 
In section 11.5 it was stated that expert programmers appear to rely much more 
extensively than novices upon the use of external sources to record partial code 
fragments and that the act of loading working memory or of otherwise reducing its 
availability would not affect this process. Hence, in terms of that model, it was 
suggested that experts will tend to engage in very closely linked cycles of planning, 
subsequent code generation and evaluation. Since it is posited that this process relies 
very little upon the programmer's working memory capacity it is reasonable to 
expect that articulatory suppression would not affect the nature of performance in the 
context of this task. The results of this experiment provide support for this view. 
Conversely, it has been argued that novice programmers place much greater reliance 
upon the internal development and simulation of code. In this case, it is claimed that 
reducing the availability of working memory will cause the novice programmer to 
revert to a strategy that necessitates more extensive use of an external media. 
Moreover, it is hypothesised that this change in strategy will be reflected in the 
number of discontinuities between discrete program structures. That is, in terms of 
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between-plan jumps. Once again, the results of this experiment provide some 
evidence for this account of programming behaviour. 
Further support for this view is evident in the error data. In the non-suppression 
condition, novice subjects are clearly more error prone than experts. This finding is 
not unexpected. However, in the suppression condition, the error rate for the expert 
group changes little from this base line whereas the novice error rate more than 
doubles. This may indicate that when working memory is loaded novices must 
externalise information and that this constitutes a strategy which they find unnatural, 
thus leading to an increased error rate. 
A more detailed analysis of these errors in terms of the classification scheme 
described in section 11.5 reveals a change in the nature of errors for novice subjects 
between the two experimental conditions. Hence, in the non-suppression condition, 
the novice group tend to make a greater number of plan errors, suggesting 
knowledge-based difficulties. Conversely, in the suppression condition a greater 
proportion of control-flow and interaction errors are evident. In terms of the analysis 
presented in previous sections, the preponderance of control-flow and interaction 
errors may simply reflect a difficulty in keeping track of the interdependences 
between various elements in the emerging program. When working memory 
availability is reduced it appears that novices experience some difficulty with these 
interdependencies. Moreover, unlike experts, it appears that novices cannot use the 
external display as an aid to memory to its full extent. 
It could be argued that an alternative explanation for these findings is that experts 
simply have an extended working memory capacity and are not affected to the same 
extent as novices by a reduction in this capacity. Such an account would presumably 
have no difficulty predicting the results of the experiment reported above. 
In order to assess the cogency of this alternative explanation the second experiment 
reported in this chapter adopts a rather different approach for exploring the 
relationship between working memory and the development of programming skill. 
In particular, if experts, for whatever reason, are able to extend their effective 
working memory capacity or increase its availability in other ways then restricting 
the task environment should not significantly affect their performance. 
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The second experiment reported in this chapter should be seen as complementary to 
the first. Whereas the first experiment involved an attempt to reduce the subjects' 
available working memory capacity, the second experiment has been designed so as 
to encourage subjects to rely extensively upon working memory. Hence, if experts 
have an extended working memory capacity then they should demonstrate 
performance equitable to that displayed in the first experiment. Moreover, if this 
extended capacity notion is correct, then clearly experts should perform better than 
novices even in the situation where the task environment is severely restricted as is 
the case in the second experiment. 
11.5.2 Experiment 2. Effects of restricting the task environment 
Method 
Subjects 
The same subjects participated in this experiment. However, the order in which they 
took part in each experiment was randomised. 
Materials and procedure 
Once again, the subjects were asked to produce a program corresponding to a brief 
specification written in English. This program (based upon the bank problem 
described in Johnson, 1988. See figure 11.4) involved processing three types of 
bank transactions. In this experiment, the nature of the task environment formed the 
basis for the two experimental conditions. In one condition, subjects were aksed to 
generate a program using a familar full-screen text editor. In the second condition 
subjects used a modified version of the same editor, which allowed cursor movement 
in only one direction. That is, from the top of the screen to the bottom. In addition, 
the text editor allowed only cursor movement between adjacent lines. Hence, once a 
subject had generated a line and pressed the return key, they were unable to then 
return to that line to perform any subsequent editing operations. The editor did, 
however, allow edits to the curent line being generated. 
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Write a Pascal program that can process three types of bank 
transaction: deposits, withdrawals, and a special transaction that 
indicates that no more transactions are to follow. Your program 
should begin by asking the user to input their account id and initial 
balance. The program should then prompt the user to input the 
following information: 
1. the transaction type 
2. if it is an END-Processing transaction the program should print 
out (a) the final balance of the users account, (b) the total number of 
transactions, and (c) the total number of each type of transaction. 
The program should then stop. 
3. if it is a DEPOSIT or WITHDRAWAL, the program should ask 
for the amount of the transaction and then post it appropriately. 
Figure 11.4 A specification of the 'bank problem' 
The subjects first participated in a 5 min. familiarisation session, where the basic 
modifications to the editor were described. The subjects were then asked to attempt 
to generate a program from the specification. They were told to be as accurate as 
possible since they would be unable to change their input one they had pressed the 
return key at the end of each line. They were asked to check each line of their 
program before pressing the return key, in order to determine whether they were 
satisfied with their response. Subjects in both conditions were given 15 mins to 
complete this task. The subjects were randomly assigned to each of the experimental 
conditions. 
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Design 
This experiment was a two-factor design with the following independent variables: 
Environment - restricted/unrestricted 
Level of expertise- Novice/Expert 
In this case the dependent variable was the number of errors remaining in the final 
program. 
Results 
Errors 
The results of this experiment are shown graphically in figures 11.5 and 11.6. 
Figure 11.5 shows the total mean number of errors produced by the expert and 
novice groups in the two experimental conditions. These data were analysed using a 
two-way analysis of variance with the following factors; Environment (restricted or 
unrestricted) and Level of expertise (Novice/Expert) This analysis revealed a main 
effect of Environment (F1,36 = 5.74, p<0.05), a main effect of Level of expertise 
(F1,36 = 4.21, p<0.05) and an interaction beween these two factors (F1,36 = 9.76, 
p<0.01). A number of post-hoc comparisions were carried out using the 
Newman-Keules test with an adopted significance level of p<O.Ol. This analysis 
revealed a significant difference between the number of errors produced by novices 
and experts in condition 1 (unrestricted environment). In condition 2 (restricted 
environment), this comparison did not prove significant. Comparisons across 
conditions revealed a significant difference in the number of errors produced by the 
expert group, but no difference in the case of the novice group. 
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Figure 11.5 Mean number of errors in the two experimental conditions in 
experiment 1. 
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Error classification 
The resulting program transcripts were analysed in terms of different error types 
according to the classification scheme described above. The results of this anlysis 
are shown in Figure 11.6. In the case of experts, there is a fairly even distribution of 
error types in the first experimental condition. Indeed, further statistical analysis 
revealed no significant differences between error types within this condition 
(multiplet-tests). In the case of the novice group, the distribution of error types in 
the first condition suggests a greater proportion of plan errors in comparison to the 
other categories (t-test). 
In the second condition, the distribution of errors across classification types for 
expert subjects was rather more complicated. Here, experts produced a greater 
proportion of control-flow and interaction errors in comparion to the other error 
classifications (multiplet-tests). In addition, experts produced significantly more 
control-flow and interaction errors in comparison to the first condition. Experts also 
produced significantly more control-flow and interaction errors in comparison to the 
novice group in this condition. In the case of the novice group, there were no 
significant differences in terms of each error classification across the two conditions. 
As in the first condition, novices produced significantly more plan errors in the 
second condition. 
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Discussion 
These results provide a striking demonstration of the effects of restricting the task 
environment on problem solving performance. In previous sections it was argued 
that experts rely to a great extent upon using the e.xternal dispaly to record fragments 
of code that are then further elaborated at subsequent points during the generation 
process. This led to the hypothesis that if programmers were unable to return to 
previously generated fragments then they would be forced into a situation where 
they would have to rely extensively upon working memory to establish the various 
dependences and interactions between code structures. However, it appears that 
while novices are seemingly unaffected by changes to the task environment, experts 
not only perform worse than novices but also produce the kinds of errors that are 
indicative of an inability to internally construct links and interdependencies between 
code structures. Hence, these results reveal that experts produce more errors than 
novices in the restricted task environment. Moreover, experts produce a significantly 
greater number of control-flow and interaction errors in this second condition. 
It was suggested in discussion of the first experiment that the results emerging from 
that study might reasonably be interprited as indicating that experts have an extended 
working memory capacity. However, if this were the case then the results of this 
second experiment would appear to be rather anomolus. In particular, if experts have 
an extended working memory capacity in comparison to novices, then we might 
expect that situations which cause experts to rely upon working memory would not 
give rise to such an extensive decrement in performance. 
Moreover, there appears to be no reasonable explanation in terms of the increased 
working memory capacity assumption as to why experts produce many more 
control-flow and interaction errors in comparison to novices. Recall that in the first 
experiment it was the novice group that displayed a greater frequency of 
control-flow and interaction errors. 
A more cogent explanation for these findings might simply involve suggesting that 
experts rely upon external sources and are not able to efficiently revert to a strategy 
that demands extensive reliance upon working memory. This analysis would 
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account for both sets of experimental findings. In the first experiment a reduction in 
working memory availability did not affect expert performance. 
This could clearly be accounted for in two ways. On the one hand, it could be 
argued that experts simply have an extended working memory capacity. Conversely, 
we might claim that experts rely extensively upon external sources and find it 
difficult to adopt other alternative strategies. However, the second experiment 
appears to suggest that the first of these explanations is incorrect. In particular, if 
experts have an extended working memory capacity then we would expect them to 
perform better than novices in situations where a reliance upon working memory is 
necessitated. This appears not to be the case. 
11.6 Conclusions 
11.6.1 Working memory, display-based problem solving and the development of 
expertise. 
These experiments have clearly demonstrated that the relationship between skill 
development in programming and working memory is not as predicted. Hence, it 
appears that experts rely significantly upon external sources to record code 
fragments as these are generated and then return later, in terms of the temporal 
sequence of program generation, to further elaborate and extend these fragments. It 
has been suggested that one of the major determinants of expertise in programming 
may be related to the adoption or the development of strategies that facilitate the 
efficient use of external sources. In contrast, novices appear to develop as much of 
the program internally before transfering it to an external source. In addition, they 
appear to rarely change their code once it has been generated 
The reason why experts make such extensive use of an external medium is unclear. 
This externalsiation of information clearly has a high cost in terms of the reparsing 
or recomprehension of generated code that is implied. Hence, it might seem 
counterintuitive to suggest that problem solvers will tend to rely upon this kind of 
strategy rather than upon a strategy which involves the more extensive use of 
working memory. However, this explanation is consonant with existing work which 
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has implicated display-based recognition skills in theoretical analyses of complex 
problem solving (Larkin, 1989; Howes and Payne, 1990). The contribution of these 
analyses has been important, however they have neglected to consider the 
relationship between display use and expertise and the consequent effect that this 
may have upon the nature of problem solving strategies. 
It is clear that a problem solver's ability to maintain prior states of control and to 
remember intermediate solution steps is severly limited (Greeno and Simon, 1974; 
Simon, 1975). In addition, Hitch (1978) has shown that working memory errors are 
reduced if intermediate results are utilised as soon as possible after they are 
produced. These factors may give rise to the development of strategies which cause 
the programmer to rely primarily upon the use of external memory sources. 
The results of the experiments reported here question the cogency of accounts of 
skill development which place central emphasis upon the assumption that experts 
possess an extended working memory capacity or availability. In the case of expert 
programmers, it has been show that articulatory suppression affects neither 
programming strategy nor number of errors. This would be expected given the 
increased capacity assumption posited in previous models. However, the results of 
the second experiment would not be predicted on the basis of this assumption. 
In particular, restricting the task environment such that the programmer must rely 
more extensively upon working memory should affect neither strategy nor errors to 
the extent that was apparent in this particular study. Since it is uncommon to see 
expert performance reduced to level exhibited by novices, it might therefore be 
assumed that restricting the environment in this way causes experts to revert from 
their adopted strategy to one more characteristic of novices. 
Not withstanding this, there is a significant amount of empirical evidence for the 
increased capacity assumption, and as such it would be premature to reject it on the 
basis of the experiments reported here. However, these experiments suggest that 
display-based competence is an important factor in the development of expertise in 
programming. The extent to which the development of such a competence is relevant 
to other skills remains an important empirical question. Programming is clearly a 
complex skill, and this complexity appears to necessitate the use of an external 
293 
medium. In the context of other skills, it may be the case that an external medium is 
not available. Alternatively, other problem domains may not give rise to an extensive 
number of interacting solution steps as is clearly the case in programming. Hence, in 
other complex domains it is possible that there are very good reasons for relying 
upon working memory. 
The present study may be limited in terms of its ability to account for problem 
solving strategies in other domains, although there are areas where this kind of 
analysis appears to be relevant, e.g., in writing and text composition, where multiple 
constraints and solution step interactions are inescapable (Flower and Hayes, 1980; 
Sharples and O'Malley, 1988). While the analysis presented here may not be 
appropriate to all problem solving domains, it is clear that, in terms of programming 
at least, this study poses a number of implications which may challenge the validity 
some of the claims made in previous analyses. 
11.6.2 Working memory and the nature of errors 
The work reported here has a number of implications for the way in which we might 
attempt to explain the occurrence and distribution of different types of error. In 
particular, it is clear that a certain classes of error can be attributed to working 
memory limitations and that such errors are not distributed at random. In terms of 
the error classification employed here, it appears that interaction and control flow 
errors predominate in situations where working memory availability is reduced. 
Previous work (Anderson and Jeffries, 1985) has suggested that errors arising from 
working memory failures will occur at random. More recently, Anderson (1989) has 
claimed that "working memory failures are slips at random and produce a wide range 
of different responses and would not concentrate at one place in the protocol" (p 
350). However, the results of the present study suggest that working memory 
related errors may have a more systematic distribution, and that the type of errors 
one might expect to occur may to some extent be predictable. 
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11.6.3. The role oflanguage features and the nature of task environments 
Gilmore (1986a) has criticised Anderson and Jeffries' analysis of working memory 
errors from a rather different perspective. Gilmore suggests that their analysis "is 
very weak and its main impact lies in the new approach, rather than the detailed 
analysis. The main weakness is that language features do not seem to be considered 
relevant to the analysis. Anderson and Jeffries make no attempt to analyse the causes 
of processing overload ... " (p 528-529). 
This criticism is pertinent to the present analysis since the nature of display-based 
problem solving in programming will be highly dependent upon features of the 
particular programming language considered. For example, Green (1990; 1991) 
suggests that some programming languages are "viscous" in that they are highly 
resistant to local modification. In terms of the analysis presented here, less viscous 
languages will provide better support for the kind of incremental problem-solving 
processes that are proposed. Hence, we might predict that programmers using 
different languages will make different kinds of error. In addition, since experts 
appear to employ an incremental strategy and novices a characteristically linear 
strategy, then it could be argued that some languages may be more suited to experts 
and others to novices. 
The language features described above will affect the strategies employed in the 
generation of code. However, there are other language features which will affect its 
comprehension. Gilmore and Green (1988) suggest that some languages are 
"role-expressive" (for example, Pascal) in that they may contain a rich source of 
lexical cues which enable a programmer to distinguish more easily the constituent 
structures contained in a program written in that language. They contest that less 
role-expressive languages (for instance, Prolog) are lexically more amorphous and 
that such languages will not facilitate certain forms of comprehension. 
More recently, claims have been made about object-oriented languages which may 
provide support for the present analysis. For example, Rosson and Alpert (1990) 
have claimed that such languages facilitate decomposition of the problem space by 
enabling programmers to develop encapsulated chunks of code whose internal 
operations are effectively isolated from other chunks. They go on to claim that this 
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form of decomposition will increase the amount of information that can be held in 
working memory since objects in the problem space can be held as separable chunks 
whose lower order implementation has no implications for other objects of interest. 
This arises because object-oriented languages enable a programmer to establish an 
abstract interface to a data structure which effectively hides the implementation 
details from the procedure using that data. All access to a data structure is effected 
via operations provided by the data structure's public interface. In object-oriented 
languages, the data contained within an object are private to that object and are 
accessible only via messages to the owning object (Micallef, 1988). Hence, the 
message interface can make useful information about an object available while hiding 
its implementation details (Goldberg and Robson, 1983). 
Rosson and Alpert claim that this kind of encapsulation will reduce working memory 
load since the programmer need not worry about the interactions between the object 
they are constructing and other objects. This claim has not been subject to empirical 
evaluation but the analysis presented in this paper would suggest that such a claim 
may well be valid. One should note, however, that at other levels, the use of 
object-oriented languages may place an extra burden upon working memory. In 
particular, in most object-oriented systems one is forced to specify the relationships 
among objects (or more accurately, among classes of objects) before operations 
upon those objects can be defined. Detienne (1990) has shown that this requirement 
causes considerable difficulties since changing the structure of an evolving program 
can be very difficult. To avoid this problem, one might expect programmers to rely 
upon working memory in order to establish relationships between objects and 
classes before committing this structure to an external representation. 
One issue that is important in the context of the display-based analysis proposed in 
this paper is how one might begin to devise a scheme for externalising working 
memory during program generation. In the realm of object-oriented languages it has 
been proposed that one way of facilitating this is to provide a description level 
similar to that found in bibliographic databases (Green, Gilmore, Blumenthal, 
Davies and Winder, in press). Here, the problem is one of retrieving a target from a 
partial description. Typically, bibliographic databases not only represent attributes of 
a text itself but also additional key words which can be used for searching and 
browsing. In programming terms, descriptors might be based upon persistent (eg. 
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functional subsystems) or transient (eg. a set of items to be documented) 
relationships between code structures; chronological relationships (eg. code 
developed or tested at a particular time) etc. 
Providing this additional representation of a program may facilitate the 
recomprehension process that is central to the analysis presented in the present 
chapter. In particular, the provision of a description level could make certain 
relationships salient within a given task context, thus facilitating display-based 
recomprehension. Indeed, even such things as simple colour cues or tags (Lansdale, 
Simpson and Stroud, 1988) which identify commonalities between important code 
structures may facilitate the representation of salient relationships. Clearly there is 
significant scope for further research into mechanisms which can support both the 
externalisation of working memory and the recomprehension processes that appear 
to be central to display-based competence. 
The language features described in this section are important in terms of the present 
analysis, since the incremental nature of code generation and 
comprehension/recomprehension will clearly be affected by the nature of the 
language. The present analysis extends existing work by suggesting ways in which 
language features and strategy may interact in concert with features of the task 
environment to give rise to particular forms of behaviour. It should be noted that 
these effects would not taken into account by display-based views, since the salience 
of particular features of the display remains undifferentiated. Hence, one important 
extension to the display-based models of problem solving would be the 
incorporation of a mechanism which allows one to specify the salience of particular 
display-based features. 
The analysis presented here also suggests that problem solving success in 
programming will in part be determined by the nature of the task environment. Of 
particular importance will be the extent to which an environment supports nonlinear 
generation strategies and the ease with which changes to existing structures can be 
effected. These considerations may shed light upon the finding that the use of certain 
forms of programming environment can be frustrating for experienced 
programmers. For instance, Neal (1987 a and b) has conducted a number of studies 
exploring the efficacy of syntax-directed editors. Such editors provide syntactic 
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templates for particular structures. Hence, in Pascal, if the programmer inserts a 
'begin' statement, a corresponding 'end' statement will be generated automatically. 
Neal found that experienced programmers frequently expressed dissatisfaction with 
such editors. Neal (1987a) comments that expert programmers "felt that to enter a 
program they had to do much more, both conceptually and physically because of the 
methods allowed for inserting and changing text ... " (p 100). Neal's findings 
together with those reported in this paper suggest that environments intended to 
support the coding process should provide the flexibility to support both incremental 
development and change. 
11.7 Summary 
The experiments reported in this chapter suggest that the development of expertise in 
programming is dependent upon the adoption of strategies for effectively utilising an 
external display. Moreover, these experiments have demonstrated that increased 
working memory capacity or availability is not a necessary prerequisite of skilled 
performance in this domain. Rather, skilled programmers appear to engage in 
closely linked cycles of code generation and evaluation activities. According to this 
model, code is generated in a fragmentary fashion and the display is used as a 
repository for recording intermediate solution steps. In addition, it has been argued 
that the success of this strategy will depend upon features of the programming 
language and upon the nature of the task environment. 
While the analysis presented in this chapter has indicated the importance of 
display-based performance in programming, it has also suggested two primary 
limitations of this general approach. Firstly, existing accounts of display-based 
problem solving ignore the apparent relationship between expertise and the 
development of strategies for utilising display-based information. Secondly, such 
accounts do not consider the possibility that different forms of display-based 
information will be differentially salient in the context of a given task. Further 
developments of display-based accounts of problem solving will need to address 
these issues if they are to provide a full and coherent description of human problem 
solving in the context of complex tasks. 
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Chapter 12 Knowledge restructuring processes and the 
development of expertise in programming 
12.1 Summary of experimental work 
Two experiments were reported in chapter six which highlighted the effects of 
design experience upon the nature and development of programming plans. 
These experiments showed that the plan theory cannot account straightforwardly 
for the differences between novice and expert programming performance. In 
particular, they demonstrated the important role played by the acquisition of 
design-based knowledge in the comprehension of programs. The implications of 
these experiments are that current views concerning the nature and development 
of programming plans are flawed in two ways. On the one hand, the notational 
view is too narrow in its perspective because of the emphasis it places on notation 
at the expense of other demonstrably important factors. On the other hand, the 
views expounded by the Soloway group reflect a fundamental confusion between 
the measurement of plans and their use in theoretical explanations of expert 
performance. Hence, neither provides a sound theoretical basis for a full 
psychological theory of programming. 
Subsequent experiments reporteded in this thesis suggested that the development 
of expertise in programming does not simply involve the accumulation of plans. 
Rather, programming expertise appears to depend upon the structuring of 
programming knowledge such that certain salient plan elements can be retrieved 
and accessed more quickly. It may be the case that design training facilitates this 
structuring process by encouraging programmers to focus upon the salient 
elements of plans. In addition, this might be expected to enhance the mapping 
between the language and problem domain that is discussed above, by providing 
a means of applying the salient features of plans and establishing the links 
between them. 
The results of the experiment reported chapter seven extend this theme by 
providing general support for the idea that the possession of plans per se does not 
necessarily guarantee the same level of programming performance for different 
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groups of subjects. Hence, in the context of that experiment, while intermediates 
were to be able access the same plan knowledge as experts, they were able to 
achieve this more effectively, as evidenced by their greater speed. 
The implications of this experiment are twofold. Firstly, it seems clear that a 
programmer's knowledge representation must support the representation of 
salient code structures. Such structures, which might be characterised as 
'beacons' or 'focal lines', act as partial descriptions of particular code fragments 
and provide reminders that a segment of a program may need completing at a 
subsequent stage. In addition, the development of these code structures appears 
to coincide with increasing expertise. This may suggest that as expertise 
develops, knowledge structures change such that the organisation of these 
structures reflects the increasing importance of 'focal lines' and 'beacons' etc. 
The results of the experiments presented in chapter 8 contribute to our 
understanding of the processes which underpin schema or plan development, and 
provide a framework for elaborating the relationship between the development of 
knowledge structures and expertise. One of the more interesting findings of the 
study presented there was that notation does not appear to support an 
opportunistic or a breadth-first strategy to the same degree for programmers of 
different skill levels. That is, the effects of notation on strategy are less extensive 
for experts than for intermediates. 
One way to explain this differential effect might be to suggest that notation and 
knowledge representation interact very strongly to determine strategy. Hence, as 
representations of programming knowledge are in the process of development, as 
we suggest in the case of intermediates, then any additional means of facilitating 
programming strategy, such as might be provided by certain features of the 
notation, are likely to be of particular importance. At higher levels of skill, factors 
relating to the organisation of knowledge appear to play a greater part in the 
determination and the support of programming strategy. 
A number of interesting findings emerged from this analysis. Firstly, it was 
shown that opportunistic episodes may occur at any point during the evolution of 
a program. However, this does not rule out the existence of an overall top-down 
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strategy. Hence, the clear dichotomy between top-down and opportunistic 
approaches that is implicated in previous work may be unfounded. Secondly, it 
was demonstrated that the emergence of top-down or opportunistic strategies is 
not task dependent as suggested by a number of previous studies. Rather such 
strategies can co-exist within the context of a single task. However, one form of 
strategy make take precedence over the the other at particular points during the 
evolution of the program. 
Expertise also appears to play a major role in the determination of particular 
forms of strategy. For instance, novice programming behaviour appears to be 
systematically opportunistic, displaying none of the characteristics of a top-down 
approach. Conversely, expert programmers adopt a broadly top-down approach, 
at least during the early stages of program generation. In this context, the notion 
of the focal line appears to play a significant role in expert programming 
behaviour. The experiment reported in chapter 8 demonstrated that experts tend to 
generate focal lines first, providing a framework around which the rest of the 
program can be constructed. This may arise as a consequence of the knowledge 
restructuring process proposed in this thesis whereby the devlopment of expertise 
is seen to be accompanied by the restructuring of plan/schemata structures such 
that focal lines achieve promanance. 
The results of the experiment reported in chapter 9 suggested that knowledge 
structures may develop via a restructuring process rather than through a process 
of knowledge accretion which simply involves developing a larger repertoire of 
plans. Previous accounts of programming expertise have tended to emphasise the 
development of extensive repertoires of programming knowledge rather than 
focus upon issues relating to knowledge restructuring processes. This is 
exemplified in Soloway's work on plans, where it is suggested that expertise 
simply involves building a more extensive collection of programming plans 
together with the rules which goven their use. However, as we have seen, the 
possession of plans per se cannot be used to diffrentiate certain groups of 
programmers, especially at higher levels of skill; namely at the point of transition 
between intermediates and experts. 
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The final experiment indicated the importance of display-based performance in 
programming and suggested two primary limitations of this general approach. 
Firstly, existing accounts of display-based problem solving ignore the apparent 
relationship between expertise and the development of strategies for utilising 
display-based information. Secondly, such accounts do not consider the 
possibility that different forms of display-based information will be differentially 
salient in the context of a given task. Further developments of display-based 
accounts of problem solving will need to address these issues if they are to 
provide a full and coherent description of human problem solving in the context 
of complex tasks. In the context of the present discussion it was suggested that 
focal lines would be diffrrentially salient and would form a kemal around which 
code could be built. We suggested that the primary mechanism in code generation 
was based upon the close interaction between planning and re-evaluation which 
demands extensive reliance upon information that had previously been 
extemalised. 
12.2 An overview of the framework - Knowledge restructuring in programming 
These experiments form the empirical basis for the central argument advanced in 
this thesis. This argument proposes that the possession of plans or of other 
schematic programming knowledge structures does not in itself provide an 
adequate account of the development of expertise in programming. The 
experiments reported in this thesis have demonstrated that programming expertise 
depends not only upon the possession of plans but also upon the structure of plan 
knowledge and upon the way in which such knowledge can be used to guide 
strategy. For example, the experiments reported here have shown that 
intermediate and expert programmers can display similar levels of performance in 
certain tasks which require the application of generic plan knowledge. However, 
in contrast, other features of performance appear to be dependent upon the level 
of expertise of the programmer. The results of these experiments have been taken 
to imply that while intermediates and experts may be able to access a similar 
range of plan structures, they appear to use these knowledge structures rather 
differently during both program generation and comprehension. The reasons for 
this appear to be related to the way in which this knowledge is structured. 
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To account for this phenomena, it has been argued that the development of 
programming expertise is underpinned by a knowledge restructuring process, 
leading to the development of hierarchically structured schemata which emphasise 
the salient aspects of each plan or schema structure. It has been suggested that 
this restructuring process may give rise to differences in the observed program 
generation strategies that are adopted by programmers of various skill levels. 
Hence, it has been demonstrated that expert programmers adopt a strategy 
whereby the focal aspects of plans are generated first and other program 
structures are built around them. This can be contrasted with other models of 
program generation, for example that presented by Rist, which predicts that 
experts will adopt a sequential mode of code generation and develop programs in 
schema order. The framework presented here has more in common with the 
parsing/gnisrap model advanced by Green et. al. which suggests that programs 
are developed in a fragmentary and incremental fashion. The parsing/gnisrap 
model also stresses the very close link between planning and execution which is a 
central element in the present analysis. 
A number of the experiments reported in this thesis have demonstrated that expert 
programmers do not generate their programs in a linear fashion. More 
specifically, it appears that experts tend to generate the focal elements of plans 
and then later extend these to include subsidiary plan elements. It has been 
suggested that developing programs in this way reduces the demand on working 
memory since the decomposition of the emerging program will be held at a single 
level of abstraction (see chapters 8, 9 and 11). In chapter 11 it was suggested that 
jumping between different levels of abstraction in a problem space can place 
significant demands upon working memory (see also Anderson, 1983) and this 
may lead to the observation that experts tend to decompose their solutions in a 
broadly top-down fashion. 
Experts also appear to rely extensively upon externalising the contents of 
working memory during program generation (see chapter 11). It was suggested 
in chapter 11 that one of the major determinants of expertise may be the adoption 
or the development of strategies which facilitate the effective use of external 
memory sources. As a consequence, it has been argued that both the nature of the 
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problem solving environment and the programming language will have an effect 
upon problem solving behaviour. In particular, given the incremental nature of 
program generation, the success of this process will in large part be determined 
by the flexibility of the environment in terms of the support it provides for 
implementing changes. Similarly, the viscosity of the language will affect this 
process, since it determines the ease with which changes can be made. In terms 
of comprehension, other factors come into play. Here, the expressiveness of the 
language, measured in terms of the ease with which various structures can be 
located and differentiated, will play a central role in facilitating comprehension. 
The model of programming behaviour presented in this thesis suggests a small 
number of reasonably straightforward mechanisms which can account for both 
the generation and the comprehension of programs. In addition, this framework 
stresses the importance of both language and environmental features in 
determining the nature and success of programming behaviour. 
In this final chapter, a more detailed framework for understanding the knowledge 
restructuring processes outlined in this thesis will be presented. This chapter will 
attempt to demonstrate how the experimental work reported in this thesis can be 
used to support a parsimonious interpretation of program generation and 
comprehension. 
In the context of this framework there appear to be three important areas of 
concern. Firstly, we need to explain action. That is, how schematic 
representations of programming knowledge are instantiated as code. This derives 
from a consideration of the problems of previous schema-based accounts of 
programming behaviour and in particular the notion that such accounts have 
failed to provide a specification of the processes governing schema instantiation. 
This problem appears to derive largely from the fact that the components of 
schemata are equally accessible, and that they can be implemented in any order. It 
is argued that this leads to difficulties in understanding how action is initiated. 
Moreover, such models provide no indication of how programming strategy 
might develop. Indeed, they fail to provide any description of the nature of the 
strategic elements of problem solving in this complex domain. Hence, while such 
accounts may provide a theory of plans, they fail to provide a theory of planning. 
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The second area of concern discussed in this chapter relates to the actual 
representation of programming knowledge, and in particular to the form of 
representation one might adopt in order to provide a basis for a hierarchical 
representation of such knowledge. In this context, it is suggested that schemata 
are not flat structures where every part of the structure can be accessed equally. 
Adopting ideas from the text comprehension domain, it is suggested that 
schemata structures may be viewed as hierarchically structured propositional 
representations. In this context, the salient elements of programming plans, that 
is those elements that encode information relating to the current goal (focal lines) 
will occur at higher levels of the propositional hierarchy. It is suggested that this 
form of representation may go some way towards capturing the structural 
organisation of programming knowledge that is hypothesised to give rise to many 
of the experimental findings reported in this thesis. 
Models of programming behaviour based upon propositional accounts are not 
new. However, such models have failed to provide a cogent explanation of how 
levels in a propositional hierarchy can be determined. Moreover, these models 
have not considered the way in which knowledge structures might develop with 
expertise. One aim of this thesis is to address these limitations by providing an 
account of the nature and development of programming knowledge and a 
demonstration of how differences in the structure of this knowledge can lead to 
differences in strategy. 
Finally, consideration is given to the acquisition of structured representations of 
programming knowledge. It is suggested that the development of structured 
representations may not simply arise via the control of a basic psychological 
mechanism such as knowledge compilation. Rather, it is argued that the specific 
learning or training experience of the programmer contributes significantly to the 
development of hierarchical representations of programming knowledge. 
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12.3 Knowledge restructuring- A process model of schema instantiation 
One important area of work which may contribute to the development of a model 
of knowledge representation in programming is that concerned with 
representations of linguistic knowledge and in particular with work in the text 
comprehension domain. It is clear that the plan theory of programming has strong 
parallels with work in these domains. In particular, advocates of the plan theory 
have attempted to frame their analysis of programming knowledge in terms of 
Schank's notion of scripts. Scripts have been used to provide a representational 
scheme for describing generic domain specific knowledge structures, and on this 
basis clearly bear some relationship to programming plans. 
However, one of the main criticisms of Schank's theory is that is that it lacks a 
process model which specifies in detail how scripts or schemata are used. For 
example, Anderson (1983) claims that the symmetry of schemata can lead to 
potential problems "For instance, from the fact that the light is green one wants to 
infer that one can walk. One does not want to infer that the light is green from the 
fact that one is walking. No successful general-purpose programming language 
has yet been created that did not have an asymmetric conditionality built in as a 
basic property. We should expect no less of the human mind" (p 39). The 
problem with schemata is that it is very difficult to see how they can provide a 
basis for understanding action. Similarly, the plan theory of programming fails to 
specify how plans are used. It seems rather anomalous that researchers are 
prepared to advance a theory of plans without specifying a theory of planning. 
One of the main aims of this thesis has been concerned with explicating a 
framework to account for action and planning in programming, and this 
framework depends to a significant degree upon the rejection of some of the 
rather more simplistic notions which are embodied in plan theories. 
The present framework suggests that expertise may involve the acquisition of 
declarative schemata which are accessible in the context of certain recognition and 
recall tasks (see chapter 10). Hence, programmers of different skill levels (expert 
and intermediate) can respond with similar levels of accuracy to the presentation 
of probe items, but experts tend to respond faster than intermediates in response 
to focal lines, whereas there is no difference in response to non-focal lines. 
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This finding suggests that while programmers can access their declarative 
programming knowledge, there is a basic asymmetry in their representation. The 
work presented here suggests a schema-based framework which may go some 
way toward addressing the criticisms typically levelled at other schema-based 
models of problem solving. In particular, as Anderson (1983) points out, in most 
schema based accounts, it is possible to instantiate and/or execute any part of a 
given schema since the control structure inherent in such models provides 
equality of access to all components. In the present context, it is suggested that 
certain elements of programming schemata will have permanently raised 
activation levels and will tend to be generated before other elements of the same 
schemata (see chapter 9).This reflects the empirical finding that focal lines tend to 
be generated before other elements of a particular schemata are expanded and/or 
refined. 
12.4 Knowledge restructuring- towards a hierarchical model of knowledge 
representation in programming 
In order to develop the model presented in this thesis in more detail it is necessary 
to not only specify the mechanisms which underpin the knowledge restructuring 
and control processes that are central to the theory, but also to outline a 
representational scheme which can accommodate a hierarchically organised 
knowledge base of plans and goal structures. 
One way of viewing programming knowledge from this perspective is to 
consider such knowledge structures as being represented as a set of hierarchically 
structured propositions. This is the approach taken by Kintsch and van Dijk in 
their analysis of text comprehension and production. 
Kintsch and van Dijk suggest that there are three levels of memory representation 
for text which can be distinguished. At one level, a text can be described in terms 
of the exact words and phrases used. Kintsch and van Dijk refer to this as the 
surface level representation. Another level of representation captures the 
semantic content of the text which represents both local (microstructure) and 
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global (macrostructure) features. The content of this level is captured in 
propositional form (Kintsch, 1974), where each statement in the text is 
represented as an individual proposition. For example, the phrase "If Mary 
Trusts John she is a fool" might be represented as (IF, (TRUST, MARY, 
JOHN),(FOOL, MARY)). Kintsch and van Dijk argue that this sentence would 
be represented by subjects in a hierarchical fashion with the proposition (IF, 
(TRUST, MARY, JOHN) occurring at a higher level than (FOOL, MARY). One 
prediction arising from this is that propositions identified as important (i.e., high 
in the propositional hierarchy) will be best recalled. A number of studies have 
shown this to be the case (Christiaansen, 1980; Kintsch and Keenan, 1973; 
Mandler and Johnson, 1977 and Meyer, 1975) and these studies provide strong 
evidence for some form of hierarchically structured representation of linguistic 
knowledge. 
The experiment reported in chapter 10 employs a similar paradigm to analyse 
programming knowledge. Here, it was demonstrated that highly skilled 
programmers are able to respond more quickly to focal lines than intermediates, 
although their levels of accuracy were similar. Novices, however, performed 
much less accurately than both experts and intermediates. By analogy to the work 
of Kintsch and his colleagues, this study may suggest that certain salient 
programming structures may appear at higher levels in a programmer's 
macrostructure representation. Moreover, the restructuring of programming 
knowledge appears to be related explicitly to the development of expertise. 
In terms of the framework presented here, plan structures in programming might 
be seen as a similar unit of analysis as the macrostructure representation of text as 
proposed by Kintsch. The macrostructure of a text represents sentences in terms 
of agents, goals and objects. It may be possible to derive a similar form of 
representation for programming knowledge where a focal line may be taken to 
represent or to express the goal of a particular plan. In terms of the present 
analysis, each goal structure will manipulate one more objects according a given 
procedure. In this sense a plan or programming schemata should be seen as 
analogous to a sentence. Previous analyses which have attempted to describe 
programming knowledge using the text structure model presented by Kintsch 
have described each program statement in propositional form. However, a more 
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appropriate level of representation would appear to suggest that programming 
plans or schemata should be considered as the basic unit of representation having 
more in common with the macrostructure level of analysis. 
Having said this, however, the programming plan also appears to bear some 
resemblance to the third level of text structure knowledge proposed by Kintsch 
and van Dijk. Kintsch and van Dijk term this third level of representation the 
situation model. They claim that the situation model represents the situation 
described by the text and that it is "detached from the text structure proper and 
embedded in pre-established fields of knowledge" (p 135). They go on to 
suggest that "(T)he principle of organisation at this level may not be the text's 
macrostructure, but the knowledge schema (e.g., an appropriate script or frame) 
used to assimilate it." (p 135-136) 
It is of interest to note that the situation model may appear to represent the same 
kind of structure as described by programming plans. However, this analogy 
poses problems if one examines the correspondence more closely. For example, 
it is clear that since notational factors appear to play a role in the perception and 
use of plans, then the text structure itself must in tum influence the representation 
of plan structures. 
Atwood and Ramsey (1978) have also applied Kintsch and van Dijk's model of 
text comprehension to program understanding. They equate individual program 
statements with propositions, and the macrostructure representation is formed by 
grouping these propositions into a functional unit or chunk. Atwood and 
Ramsey, attempted to provide some evidence for their analysis by examining bug 
detection rates. They predicted that bugs residing at higher levels in the 
macrostructure hierarchy would be easer to detect than bugs at lower levels. Their 
data provides some support for this prediction and subsequent studies have found 
similar patterns of results (Vessey, 1989). 
There are, however, a number of serious problems with this work. The main 
weakness of these studies is that the measure of depth in the proposition structure 
is flawed and does not correspond to Kintsch's propositional analysis. For 
example, Vessey uses depth in the control structure of the program as a measure 
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of level in the propositional hierarchy. However, Kintsch's propositional 
analysis attempts to capture the salience of each proposition in terms of its 
meaning to the reader. Another problem with this work is that, in Vessey's case 
at least, the conclusions that are drawn are based upon the analysis of a single 
bug occurring in different places. However, as Gilmore (in press) points out the 
'same' bugs in different locations, may not be the same bugs at at. For example, 
Gilmore claims that while control-flow bugs may seem to be easily equated, the 
same cannot be said about semantic and plan-related bugs since they cannot be 
equivalent unless they appear at the same point in the program. A third problem, 
which may be related in part to these other difficulties, has been noted by 
Pennington (1985) who has suggested that the Atwood and Ramsey study may 
have been confounded by the location of bugs in the program text. It appears that 
bugs that resided high in their propositional hierarchy also occurred near the 
beginning of the program. 
The model presented here attempts to specify the salience of programming 
structures at the program text level by equating focal lines with structures which 
occur at high levels in the propositional hierarchy. A focal line, as we have seen, 
describes the line of code that directly implements the programmer's current goal 
and hence we would expect that this structure would have some psychological 
significance for the programmer. 
Gilmore (1988b) suggests that Schneiderman's (1980) model of programming is 
also very similar to Kintsch and van Dijk's model and that "the major weakness 
of this approach is that although it places much emphasis on factors of notational 
design (because the main process is the extraction of information from the 
program), it has nothing to say about what features of notations improve the 
efficiency of these processes, even though this should be one of the important 
functions of a model of program comprehension." (p 16). The work reported in 
this thesis represents a step in the opposite direction in that predictions about 
notational properties of programming languages are related to an explicit model of 
knowledge representation in programming. This model also makes predictions 
about the forms of strategy adopted by programmers of different skill levels and 
the extent to which certain notational properties might support preferred 
strategies. 
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In summary, while other models of programming have attempted to use ideas 
from the text comprehension domain none have paid sufficient attention to the 
saliency of particular programming structures nor to the effects of surface 
features of the text base that might affect program comprehension and generation. 
The main contribution of the present analysis is that it provides a means of 
specifying the saliency of particular structures and demonstrates how features of 
the notation of a language might affect the implementation and the subsequent 
comprehension of such structures. 
12.5 Acquiring hierarchical representations: Design training and the 
development of structured representations of programming knowledge 
One question that arises in terms of the above discussion is how the process of 
knowledge restructuring presented in this thesis might be initiated. It is clear that 
one of the central issues addressed in this thesis is the extent to which structured 
knowledge representations might develop via straightforward mechanisms of 
skill acquisition or alternatively whether they arise as a consequence of specific 
forms of training. 
In chapter 6 it was demonstrated that certain kinds of tasks involving plan 
knowledge appear to depend upon the prior learning experiences of the 
programmers studied. In particular, it was shown that design experienced 
programmers performed significantly better in those situations which demanded 
the application of plan-based knowledge. It might be suggested on the basis of 
the studies reported in this chapter that design training facilitates plan use by 
focusing upon methods which emphasis the strict application of a top-down 
hierarchically levelled model. 
In other domains it has been demonstrated that presenting hierarchically 
organised instructions can not only facilitate the acquisition of declarative 
knowledge (Smith and Goodman, 1984) but can also increase performance in 
complex problem solving tasks (Eylon and Reif, 1984; Larkin, 1980; Zeitz and 
Spoehr, 1989). Hence, it might be claimed that the degree to which explanatory 
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or training material emphasises a hierarchical structure will influence the 
development of knowledge representation which might in turn exert an influence 
over the degree to which that information can be proceduralised with practice into 
effective problem solving methods. 
The effects of specific forms of prior training has not, until recently, been a factor 
that has figured significantly in more traditional accounts of skill acquisition. For 
example, in terms of the ACT* framework , programmers who achieve similar 
levels of practice should develop similar levels of procedural skill. Learning and 
skill acquisition in the ACT* framework are effectively based upon the amount of 
material presented and practised, while much less emphasis is placed upon the 
way in which this learning material is presented. The ACT* framework tends to 
emphasise the hierarchical nature of goal structures while neglecting specific 
issues in training. More recently, the embodyment of ACT* principles in 
intelligent tutoring systems has led to the suggestion that some effort should be 
put into communicating goal structures explicitly to students. Anderson, Boyle, 
Farrell and Reisner (1987) suggest that "there is a natural danger of casting 
instruction ... in terms of the linear structure (of the program)" (p 103). They go 
on to suggest that "fortunately, more enlightened instruction does emphasise a 
hierarchical, structured program" (p 103). However, they suggest "while 
structured programming is definitely a step in the right direction, it only 
ameriorates the basic problem ... the structured program itself is only a syntactic 
object which will have an imperfect correspondence to the structure of the 
programmer's plan" (p 103). 
However, while seemingly excluding structured programming as a method of 
communicating goal structures, Anderson et al do not go on to suggest how a 
goal structure should be communicated. They qoute protocol studies which 
indicate that the explicit tutoring of plan structures can improve programming 
performance (Pirolli and Anderson, 1985), however they say nothing about how 
this might relete to instruction in the way in which plans are hierarchically linked 
and structured. The work reported in this thesis may go some way toward 
proving and account of the way in which specific forms of training might lead to 
improved problem solving performance. 
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In particular, it is argued that while structured programs may be linear artifacts 
which may not communicate a program's goal structure nor necessarily map onto 
the structure of programming plans, the actual process of devloping structured 
programs may encourage programmers to focus upon the salient features of plans 
and their application. Indeed, as we saw in chapter 6, the development of certain 
forms of programming skill (particularly the ability to use plan structures) 
appears to depend centrally upon the way in which learning material is presented 
to students. Hence, while the two groups of programmers studied in that 
experiment possessed equivalent levels of experience with the particular language 
concerned, they tended to use their knowledge rather differently. Moreover, 
another implication of this work is that programming plans are not taught directly 
to students. The efficacy of tutoring environments which emphasise the explicit 
teaching of plans, as suggested by Anderson et al, may be misguided in that it 
fails to recognise that an important element in skill development appears to be 
concerened with establishing the salient elements of plans and mapping between 
plans and actual code structures. It was suggested in chapter 6 that design 
training may facilitate these kinds of abilities. 
The work reported in this thesis appears to draw into question important aspects 
of extant theories of skill acquisition to the extent that it suggests that certain 
forms of training may lead to hierarchically organised knowledge structures and 
consequently to differences in the way in which such knowledge is applied. It 
appears that in situations where learners are subject to the same amount of 
practice but where they are not given a framework for organising the knowledge 
that they acquire then their performance in certain tasks is significantly impaired. 
In the context of the present discussion, it might be argued that design training 
(particularly in structured programming/design) causes programmers to focus 
upon salient elements of relevant knowledge structures and that this in turn may 
lead to the development of structured schemata where focal plan elements are 
salient. 
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12. 6 Implications for further experimental work 
The framework proposed in this thesis suggests a number of possibilities for 
further research into the cognitive processes that might be involved in 
programming. For example, one issue relates to debugging. The experiment 
reported by Vessey described above showed that bugs are not detected more 
quickly if they occur at higher levels in a program's propositional hierarchy. 
However, as we have seen, Vessey equates position in the structural hierarchy 
with the indentation level of the program statement. One prediction arising from 
the work reported here is that bugs in focal lines will be detected more quickly 
than bugs in occurring other structures. Moreover, focal lines may be highly 
embedded in the program's indentation structure, indicating a possible 
confounding factor in Vessey's study. If errors occurring in focal line are 
detected more quickly than errors residing elsewhere this would indicate that 
focal lines are of particular salience to programmers. This may also have more 
general implications for the design of tools intended to support the debugging 
process. 
Figure 12.1 illustrates a propositional analysis of one of the experimental 
programs discussed in chapter 6. This program was analysed according to 
Kintsch's original formaulation (Kintsch, 1982). However, certain modifications 
were needed to accommodate the differences between programs and texts. Two 
major assumptions were made. Firstly, the notion of an argument in terms of 
textual analysis has been translated into the value of a variable. This may be 
slightly problematic since the value of this variable will change during execution. 
For instance, in figure 12.1 the value of the variables SUM and COUNT are used 
in the calculation of Average. 
Under strict argument repetition, SUM and COUNT would be bound to the first 
occurrence of SUM and COUNT (as represented by the intialisation). In terms of 
the interpretation of argument repetition that is presented here, data flow is used 
to represent hierarchy as opposed to simply using the name of the variable. The 
choice of data flow was to some extent aribitrary, since control flow or an other 
mode of representation might have been used. The illustrates one difficulty of 
considering programs as analogous to text. In particular, there are many ways in 
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which to view a program, and each of these different perspectives is likely to give 
rise to a different representation of the problem. 
Figure 12.1 presents this propositional analysis and indicates the program's focal 
lines (derived from Rist's (1989) definition). This diagram shows that, in terms 
of this analysis at least, focal lines are not represented with greater saliency than 
other structures in the propositional analysis. It may be that other forms of 
representation would show greater saliency for focal structures. Another line of 
research might be concerned with the ability of different forms of representation 
to provide support for the empirical findings presented in this thesis. For 
example, a more fine-grained analysis might show that, while focal-lines may not 
reside at a high level in the structural hierarchy, there may well still be systematic 
differences in recall when recall patterns are correlated with different levels in 
this structure. It is possible that we may not be able to construct macrostructure 
representations of programs since they may differ too significantly from text in 
their communicative function. It is clear that more empirical research will be 
required before the proposed analogy between text and programs can be 
supported. 
One interesting observation that arose while constructing the propositional 
analysis presented below is that while focal lines may not be hierachically 
distinct, it is clear that, compared to other components of the program, they have 
many more links with other propositions. Hence, line e has four connections, 
while linesfand d have 3 connections. Note that with the exception of h andj, all 
other propositions have only two connections. It is possible that the degree of 
connectiveness is a better predictor of recall strategy, debugging performance and 
other behaviour than level in the propositional hierarchy. 
Another area of potential interest stemming from the present analysis might be 
concerned with the question of whether there are performance changes at the 
point where knowledge restructuring takes place. For example, Lesgold et al 
(1988) have shown that many errors occur at the point where representations 
begin to change in the context of the development of a complex problem solving 
skill. This study demonstrated a nonmonotonic relationship between experience 
and performance in the development of radiological diagnostic skills. Lesgold et 
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al suggest that this kink in the learning curve might arise as a consequence of a 
major shift in processing or in knowledge representation. Immediately after a 
shift, intermediate practitioners were much more likely to make errors than they 
were before. 
Program A 
1 Sum= 0 
2 Count= 0 
3 read (number) 
4 (F) WHILE number <> 9999 DO 
5 BEGIN 
6 (F) Sum = Sum + number 
7 (F) Count = Count + 1 
8 read (number) 
9 END 
10 IF Count> 0 
11 THEN 
12 BEGIN 
13 average= Sum/Count 
14 writeln (average) 
15 END 
16 ELSE 
17 writeln ('no legal inputs) 
/a 
Progrem A b 
~c 
a INITIALISE (Sum 0) 
b INITIALISE (Count 0) 
c SUBCALL (read, number) 
d LOOP (number<> 0) 
e UPDATE (Sum, Sum + number) 
f INCREMENT (Count) 
g SUBCALL (read, number) 
h TEST (Count) 
i COND (Count > 0) 
j SET (average, Sum/Count) 
k SUBCALL (write, average) 
1 COND (Count <= 0) 
m SUBCALL (write, average) 
---!.j-k 
--m 
Figure 12.1 A propositional analysis of a short program. Focal lines are indicated 
in bold (F), and the propositional decomposition is shown on the right. The 
diagram illustrates the hierarchical level of each proposition (read from left to 
right). Note that the number of connections for focal lines is greater than for 
non-focallines. 
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It should be noted that a similar phenomenon has also been reported by 
developmental psychologists (Bowerman, 1982; Karmiloff-Srnith, 1979; Klahr, 
1982; Strauss and Stavy, 1982). For instance Bowerman reported that children 
initially produce the correct instances of many irregular past-tense verbs and 
plural nouns (e.g., went, feet). Later they shift to incorrect regularisations of 
those words (e.g., goed, foots). Still later, children gain complete control over 
the irregularities in their vocabulary and stop making these kinds of mistakes. 
Hence, it seems that restructuring may lead to a short term decrement in 
performance in many areas of skill development when the transformation takes 
place between an adequate representation and an optimal representation. This 
might also be combined with procedural changes in the sense that strategies 
appropriate for one representation may be inappropriate in the context of another 
representation. 
In terms of the present analysis, one might predict similar effects in the 
development of programming skill. An alternative possibility is that at 
intermediate skill levels processing is partly but not completely automated, with a 
fluctuating level of control suggesting that certain aspects of a task may be 
especially prone to error at this point. However, in the case of programming skill 
it may be the case that when such errors do occur they will be related more 
explicitly to focal structures in programs. If this is the case it would provide 
support for the idea that shifts in knowledge representation accompany the 
development of expertise and that the development of focal structures is an 
important part of this process. 
Another possibility for further research is concerned with the question of whether 
there are other levels in the structural representation of programs. The present 
analysis suggests only two levels of representation, but it is possible that other 
important structures will be identified. The important point is that one should not 
consider schema structures as flat undifferentiated chunks of knowledge. Rather, 
it is clear that schema or plan structures will embody some internal organisation 
which reflects the importance of various structures to the programmer. The work 
reported here has identified the role of focal lines in capturing the salient goal 
structures of programming plans, but it is clear that other structures may also be 
of importance. 
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12.7 Implications for programming environments 
In addition to these theoretical concerns, the model also poses a number of 
practical implications for the design of systems intended to provide support for 
the programming activity. For example, programming environments that 
incorporate a "fisheye" view of source code text (Furnas, 1986) rely upon some 
way of indicating a current focus around which the fisheye view can be 
constructed. Furnas (1986) suggests that a degree of interest (DOl) function can 
be assigned to each point in a program's structure indicating how interested a 
user is in seeing that point, given the current task. This DOl function is generated 
by an algorithm which employs a notion of 'a priori importance' to assign 
suitable values to points in the program structure. This a priori importance value 
is intended to represent components of a structure which are of psychological 
importance to a particular user engaged in a given task. However as Furnas 
concedes "the usefulness of a DOl ... will depend at least upon the suitable 
definition of ... a priori importance" (Furnas, 1986. pg 17). The findings of the 
present study may provide the basis for such a definition by indicating the salient 
features of a programmers knowledge representation. Hence, the identification 
of focal lines may provide the starting point for a more psychologically valid 
conception of a priori importance leading to the design of more suitable displays 
for complex information structures such as programs. 
Of course for such a system to work one would need to automatically derive a 
program's plan structures and associated focal lines. However, this has not 
proved to be a straightforward task since commonly the same plan will not share 
the same surface characteristics at the code level (Rich and Wills, 1990). A 
promising approach has recently been proposed by Rist (forthcoming) who 
outlines a system intended to derive plan structure from code by tracing plan 
dependency links (capturing both data and control flow) from the plan focus to 
other elements of the plan. In its basic form, Rist's algorithm consists of a single 
recursive procedure that links the data flow into each line with its control flow. 
This algorithm employs a parsing mechanism- PARE (Plan Analysis by Reverse 
Engineering) which represents each basic system object (line of code) as a series 
of slots which when instantiated specify the use of that line of code, other code it 
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obeys, the data values it makes and the other lines of code that it controls (Rist 
and Bevemyr, 1991). Rist claims that this algorithm has been used on hundreds 
of Pascal programs to derive their constituent plan structure and as such it would 
seem like a potential contender for a system which might extract and display focal 
code elements and provide a basis for environments which can emulate or reflect 
cognitively-based structures. 
12.8 Conclusions 
In conclusion, this thesis has presented an analysis of the problem solving 
activities involved in programming tasks. A model has been presented which 
aims to extend our current thinking about problem solving in complex domains 
such as programming. This model emphasises the role of knowledge 
restructuring in the development of programming expertise and suggests that the 
processes of program generation and program comprehension are based upon the 
implementation of a small number of reasonably straightforward cognitive 
processes. These processes involve the creation or the location and subsequent 
recomprehension of the focal structures contained in schematic representations of 
programming knowledge. 
The process of program generation is presented as an incremental process of 
fragmentary code generation and recomprehension which is governed by 
working memory limitations and is mediated by features of the programming 
language used and the environment in which the program is created. The process 
of program comprehension is described as an activity which involves the search 
for focal structures in extant code which can be mapped onto an internal 
representation of schematic programming knowledge. As for generation, the 
process of comprehension is also affected by language features in the sense that 
the ease with which focal structures can be discriminated will be dependent upon 
the the expressive power of the language. The processes of comprehension and 
generation should be seen as complementary since they are both fundamentally 
related to the development and the comprehension of salient structures residing 
either in the code or in terms of the programmer's representation of programming 
knowledge. 
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While this thesis has been concerned with problem solving activities in 
programming it clearly raises a number of issues with respect to the adequacy of 
existing generic models of problem solving. In particular, the work reported here 
suggests that a full understanding of problem solving in the context of complex 
tasks may require an articulation of the relationship between planning/operator 
selection and execution. The work reported in this thesis suggests that these 
processes cannot be considered in isolation. This in tum suggests that a 
significant amount of problem solving behaviour may only be explicable in terms 
of a detailed understanding of the way in which problem solvers extemalise 
current states and then subsequently respond to these extemalised states. It is 
suggested here that a more complete understanding of problem solving in 
complex domains will only be achieved once these factors begin to receive the 
attention that they deserve. 
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